FOUNTAIN, FL, USA
N6600
Beech B95A
Before departure on a ferry flight, both previously damaged propellers were removed and replaced. An incorrect propeller was installed on the left position by a person with a revoked mechanic's certificate. The flight departed with full fuel tanks, all gears braced down, and no radios. After takeoff while flying with another airplane, the pilot motioned by hand signals that he needed to land. The pilot landed in a field with no flaps and after rolling approximately 300 feet, the airplane became airborne, then collided with several trees. Post accident examination revealed that the right propeller was feathered. Examination of the fuel vent system revealed all recovered fuel vents were blocked; an insect resembling a wasp was found in a section of the left fuel vent line. Examination of the flight controls, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of pre-impact failure or mechanical malfunction. The No. 1 top spark plug of the left engine was missing. The pilot's airman certificate was suspended for 180 days in February 1996, for operating an airplane with incorrect propellers installed. The permanent maintenance records did not contain an entry that the airplane was inspected and found to be safe for the intended ferry flight.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 23, 1999, about 1800 central daylight time, a Beech B95A, N6600, purchased on April 9, 1999, by U.S. Air Salvage, collided with trees during a forced landing near Fountain, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 ferry flight. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated at 1734, from the Panama City-Bay County International Airport, Panama City, Florida. The landing gears were braced down and no radios were installed in the accident airplane when the flight departed. The accident airplane and another airplane (N5720K) planned to depart as a flight of two. The pilot of N5720K, who was the accident pilot's father, planned to communicate to air traffic control for both flights. According to a transcription of communications with the Panama City-Bay County International Airport Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower, at 1729.55, the pilot of N5720K contacted the ground controller and reported "yes sir we're a bonanza on the north end of the field and we're operating with november six six zero zero he doesn't have radios." The pilot of N5720K also advised the ground controller that he would like to taxi out in front of the accident airplane, but it would be the first to depart. The controller questioned the pilot about the direction of flight after departure and after responding, the controller cleared the flight to taxi to runway 23. At 1731.46, the controller contacted the pilot of N5720K and asked "bonanza two zero kilo understand the ah travelair is going to be departing prior to you" to which the pilot responded "unable to decipher." Four seconds later the controller contacted the pilot and stated "roger you all got the ah signals worked up for him to depart" to which the pilot responded "yeah when i face him he's ready to go." The controller acknowledged that transmission and at 1733.56, the pilot of N5720K contacted the local controller and reported "tower two zero kilo and six six zero zero are ready to go." The controller cleared the flight to takeoff with a left turn to the north after departure. At 1734.15, the pilot of N5720K reported "two zero kilo ah left turn out." The local controller again cleared the flight to takeoff and at 1734.31, the pilot of N5720K responded "six six hundred is ready to go first." The local controller advised the pilot "roger he's cleared as well." At 1737.10, the controller advised the pilot that a frequency change was approved and suggested that he contact Tyndall tower and provided the appropriate frequency. The pilot acknowledged this and there were no further communications with the pilot of N5720K with the Panama City Air Traffic Control Tower. According to the accident pilot's father, after departure, the accident pilot motioned to him by visual signals that he needed to land the airplane. He observed that the accident pilot had landed and flew over that area. He noted the crash site, landed in a nearby field, then proceeded to the accident site. Another witness who was flying in N5720K reported that after takeoff, the accident airplane was flying behind and at a lower altitude than the altitude they were flying at (2,500 feet). He observed that they were flying above a 4-lane highway and about 10-15 minutes into the flight, the accident airplane climbed to the altitude they were flying at and was at their 9 o'clock position. At this time he observed the flashing of the gear lights and "...we knew he was having problems." He observed the accident pilot motioning with his hand that he needed to land the airplane and both occupants in N5720K responded by hand signals that they understood. The pilot of the airplane he was a passenger in began to turn to the right toward an airport that was located approximately 28 miles away but he noticed that the accident airplane was not following. He noticed that the accident pilot continued to flash the lights and use hand signals, which was acknowledged by dipping the wings. The accident airplane then flew under their airplane flying at about their 4 o'clock position, then he noticed that the accident airplane was losing altitude. The airplane continued to lose altitude and he observed that the airplane was just above trees, then below them. He observed a cloud of dust and after flying over the area, they spotted the wreckage. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the accident pilot did not hold an airframe and/or powerplant mechanic certificate. The FAA records also indicate that his airman certificate was suspended for 180 days, effective February 9, 1996. The suspension was due to the fact that the pilot operated a multiengine airplane without holding a multiengine class rating, and for operating an unairworthy airplane on a ferry flight from Laredo, Texas, to Jackson, Mississippi, on or about September 27, 1995. According to FAA personnel, after landing in Jackson, Mississippi, the location of a FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO); a FAA Airworthiness Inspector examined the airplane and noted incorrectly installed propellers, no propeller spinners were installed, the nose gear damper mount flange was cracked half way through, the left steering cable was chafing on loose pulley and bracket, the registration number tape was peeling off, metal pipes, automobile hose clamps and rubber straps were utilized to brace the nose landing gear, a large nick was noted in the right propeller tip, a floor panel was missing behind the pilot's seat, and records were unavailable to prove compliance with Airworthiness Directives. Review of the pilot's pilot logbook revealed the first entry indicated that his original logbook was lost and all times were approximate. The total flight time carried forward was listed as 150 hours, all of that flight time was in single engine land type airplanes. The first page of the logbook does not indicate any multiengine time carried forward; and the first 4 pages of the logbook do not indicate the year of entry. The fifth page of the logbook which is also the last page with flight time entries, indicates the year to be 1997, with the last entry dated November 19. That entry indicated that he satisfactory passed his multiengine flight test. No determination could be made as to his total flight time since the last logged flight on November 19, 1997. His total logged multiengine flight time was documented to be approximately 41 hours. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Review of the aircraft maintenance records revealed that on October 16, 1998, the airplane was inspected in accordance with an annual inspection. On October 17, 1998, while being operated by the aircraft owner, the nose and left main landing gears collapsed on landing at the Panama City-Bay County International Airport, Panama City, Florida. As a result, both propellers were damaged, along with damage to the leading edge of the right wing between the fuselage and the inboard section of the engine nacelle. An inspection of the airplane was performed for the insurance adjuster only for a repair estimate following the incident by personnel from a fixed base operator (FBO) located on the airport. The inspection determined that both propellers were damaged as well as the right wing. No repairs or further inspections were performed to the airplane by personnel of the FBO that inspected the airplane. The airplane remained outside on the ramp from the date of recovery to the day of the accident with the exception of an approximate 1 week period that the airplane was inside a hangar for the inspection. A company by the name of U.S. Air Salvage located in Johnson City, Tennessee, purchased the airplane from the insurance company on April 9, 1999. According to Mark W. Trent, he is a friend of the accident pilot and is not a FAA certificated airframe or powerplant mechanic. On the day of the accident, he was a passenger in another airplane occupied by the accident pilot and the accident pilot's father. They flew to the Panama City Airport and as later determined by Air Traffic Control, landed at 1311 hours. The replacement propellers were in the airplane with them. After arriving, he observed the accident airplane parked on the ramp; the accident pilot's father removed the left propeller which had been previously damaged, and installed a replacement propeller on the left engine, with the help of the accident pilot. Mr. Trent removed the right propeller which also had been previously damaged and installed a replacement propeller on the right engine, also with the help of the accident pilot. The replacement propellers were provided by U.S. Air Salvage. Following the removal and replacement of the propellers on the ramp, Mr. Trent added 3 quarts of oil to the left engine which brought the oil level to the full mark, and the accident pilot added 3 quarts of oil to the right engine. He was not sure if the accident pilot's father further inspected the airplane following the removal and installation of the propeller but did report that the accident pilot inspected the airplane. Additionally, a commercial battery purchased at Wal-mart was installed in the accident airplane before the flight departed. A Special Flight Permit was issued by an FAA Airworthiness Inspector on April 14, 1999, and sent via facsimile to the accident pilot's attention. The permit which was documented to expire 10 days from the date of issue or upon arrival at destination, whichever occurs first, allowed the accident airplane to be flown from Panama City-Bay County International Airport to Tri-Cities Regional TN/VA Airport. The operating limitations listed in the Special Flight Permit included a statement which indicated "An inspection to determine if the aircraft is safe for the intended flight and an entry in the permanent aircraft records of the results of this inspection must be made by an appropriately certified mechanic or repair station before any flight in connection with this authorization is valid." Review of the permanent maintenance records revealed no such entry. On the day of the accident, the permanent maintenance records were in the custody and control of the insurance adjuster from the October 17, 1998, incident. The accident pilot's father made a verbal statement to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator, on May 3, 1999, that he inspected the airplane for the flight and made an entry in a booklet that was with the ferry permit paperwork in the wreckage that he inspected the airplane and it was safe for the intended ferry flight. He was advised that the booklet was not located in the wreckage and was asked to duplicate the entry that was made and to send it to the NTSB. He stated that he would provide a duplicate of the entry. On May 10, 1999, he was asked to send a duplicate of the entry that he initially reported he made in the booklet. He offered a nebulous statement that he would be fined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) $250,000.00 whether he did or whether he did not provide to the NTSB a copy of the duplicate entry. He was asked for the entry; he refused to comply, and referred further inquiries regarding the duplicate entry to his attorney. On June 7, 1999, a statement dated June 5, 1999, reportedly signed by the accident pilot's father, Jerry Pressley, A & P certificate number 237587185, was sent via facsimile to the NTSB office located in Miami, Florida. The statement indicated "During our last conversation on the telephone you stated that you needed a written statement from me concerning the ferry permit for N6600. I did not sign any document for the aircraft stating that I had inspected the aircraft and found it airworthy for the ferry flight, nor did I sign any statement that could be interpreted to mean anything similar." No contact was made by the NTSB investigator with the attorney between May 10, 1999, and June 7, 1999. Numerous attempts to obtain a written statement from Jerry Pressley regarding his installation of the left propeller through his attorney, were unsuccessful. According to personnel from U.S. Air Salvage, no maintenance records were located for the propeller that was installed on the left engine of the airplane. The airplane recording hour/tenth meter recorded a .5 hour increase from the reading following the incident on October 17, 1998, to the reading after the accident on April 23, 1999. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Additional information pertaining to weather is contained on page 4 of the Factual Report-Aviation. COMMUNICATIONS The accident airplane was not equipped with either fixed or portable Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver which would allow for communications with any Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility. The ATC communications for the accident airplane was handled through the accident pilot's father flying in another airplane that was to accompany the accident airplane. A transcript of communications with the accident pilot's father who was flying in another airplane is an attachment to this report. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Examination of the ramp where the airplane had been parked before the flight revealed oil on the ground when the location was examined 3 days after the accident. The airplane crashed at N30 degrees 31.53 minutes and W 085 degrees 22.63 minutes. Examination of the area revealed damage to the top of a 30-foot tall tree. Ground scars from all landing gears were noted beginning on dry brush 240 feet past the first impact point with the tree. An approximate 20-foot tall un-marked power line located about 50 feet before the ground scars from the landing gears was noted to be undamaged. The descent angle of the airplane from the tree contact to the ground contact was calculated to be 7 degrees. The ground roll which was measured to be about 300 feet, was on a magnetic heading of 040 degrees; ground scars from all landing gears were noted for the full length of the ground roll. The ground scars made by all landing gears continue to a point just before a ditch beyond which a small tree was noted to be broken about 3 feet above ground level. Beyond that point no ground scars from the landing gear were observed. A large diameter tree was determined to be damaged about 5 feet agl , which was 65 feet beyond the damage to the small tree. The main wreckage which consisted of the fuselage, and empennage, came to rest on a heading of 050 degrees. Both wings were separated from the fuselage. The left wing was resting with the leading edge towards the ground with the engine/propeller assembly attached. The right wing separated into 2 segments; the inboard section of the wing from the wing root to just outboard of the engine nacelle, was beneath the separated nose and cockpit section of the wreckage. The outboard section of the right wing was beneath the aft fuselage section and about 18 inches inboard from the tip was wrapped around a small diameter tree. The right side of the fuselage about 3 feet forward of the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was noted to be wrapped around a tree and the right flap was also wrapped around that same tree. Both horizontal stabilizers and both elevators were in place as well as the vertical stabilizer and rudder assembly. All components necessary to sustain flight were in the immediate vicinity of the crash site. The nose landing gear was braced down, and the brace for the left main landing gear was not in place but the clamps for the brace were in place. The brace for the right main landing gear punctured a hole in the upper surface skin of the right wing. The instrument panel was separated from the airplane. The external portion of the nose cone was noted to be wrapped with an unknown brand of "duct" tape. The right engine propeller was noted to be in the "feathered" position and the flaps were determined to be retracted. Approximately 4 gallons of 100 LL fuel were drained from the rig
The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection of the airplane that resulted in a loss of engine power because of fuel vent blockage and his selection of unsuitable terrain for the forced landing.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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