ACAMPO, CA, USA
N35095
BEECH UC-45J
THE PILOT WAS CONDUCTING A LOCAL SKYDIVING FLIGHT. DURING THE CLIMB, BOTH ENGINES BEGAN TO OPERATE INTERMITTENTLY. THE PILOT INSTRUCTED THE PARACHUTISTS TO BAIL OUT AT 9,000 FEET MSL AND RETURNED TO THE AIRPORT. THE PILOT FAILED TO USE CARBURETOR HEAT DURING THE DESCENT. THE PILOT APPLIED POWER TO BOTH ENGINES WHILE ON FINAL APPROACH, BUT GOT NO RESPONSE. THE PILOT ELECTED TO LAND IN AN OPEN AREA, BUT THE AIRPLANE COLLIDED WITH A POWER LINE AND CRASHED. ACCORDING TO THE FAA'S CARBURETOR PROBABILITY CHART, THE EXISTING WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SERIOUS CARBURETOR ICING IN A POWER-OFF DESCENT.
On April 24, 1994, at 1445 hours Pacific daylight time, a Beech UC-45J, N35095, crashed after colliding with a power line near Lodi Airport, Acampo, California. The pilot was conducting a local visual flight rules skydiving flight. The airplane, registered to and operated by the pilot, sustained substantial damage. The certificated commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated at Lodi Airport at 1430 hours. The pilot reported in a telephone interview conducted on April 25, 1994, that the flight departed Lodi Airport with several parachutists. Before departing on the accident flight, he put fuel in the right wing main fuel tank. During the climb out, he switched the fuel selector to the crossfeed position knowing that the left fuel tank was low in fuel. While climbing to cruise altitude, the left engine stopped momentarily. After passing through 9,000 feet mean sea level, the right engine stopped momentarily. The pilot elected to descend to 5,000 feet and then instructed the parachutists to bail out. After the parachutists bailed out, the pilot returned to the airport. The pilot reduced the power to idle on both engines and began the descent toward the airport. Both engines appeared to be running. The pilot entered the traffic pattern while descending. When the pilot turned onto the base leg, he applied power on both engines, but they did not respond. Realizing that the airplane's altitude was insufficient to make the airport, the pilot elected to land in an open field. The airplane collided with a power line during the forced landing and crashed. The pilot also said that during the descent he diverted his attention to the fuel system to find the cause of the momentary loss of power on both engines. He then said that during the descent he did not apply carburetor heat and that both engines lost power due to carburetor icing. The pilot submitted the required Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1/2, to the National Transportation Safety Board, Southwest Regional Office. He reiterated his telephone statement in the report. He also said that the parachutists bailed out at 9,000 feet msl. When he turned the airplane onto the final approach course (not onto the base leg as he stated in the telephone interview) with the landing gears and flaps retracted, he added power on both engines. The engines did not respond and then he elected to land in an open field. Mr. Scott R. Myers, Aviation Safety Inspector, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Oakland [California] Flight Standards District Office, conducted the on-scene investigation. Inspector Myers reported that the operator had moved the airplane before he arrived to conduct the investigation. Inspector Myers' examination of the wreckage showed no evidence of any fuel in either fuel tank. He was able to drain about 2 centimeters of fuel from the left engine carburetor supply line. The right engine carburetor supply line was broken and contained no fuel. The pilot provided Inspector Myers with a video tape of the accident scene that showed him "dipping" the fuel tanks. The video revealed that the left fuel tank was empty and the right fuel tank appeared to have liquid, presumably fuel. The Stockton Airport, located about 22 miles south of the accident site, surface weather observation revealed that the prevailing temperature was 58 degrees fahrenheit and the dewpoint was 41 degrees fahrenheit. According to the FAA's Carburetor Icing Probability Chart, serious carburetor icing could occur at glide power.
THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO USE CARBURETOR HEAT DURING THE EXTENDED POWER-OFF DESCENT. THE EXISTING CARBURETOR ICING CONDITIONS, THE PILOT'S DIVERTED ATTENTION, AND THE POWER LINES WERE FACTORS IN THIS ACCIDENT.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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