WAUCHULA, FL, USA
N966N
BEECH 95-C55
DURING A WEATHER BRIEFING THE PILOT ADVISED THE BRIEFER THAT ON A PREVIOUS FLIGHT THE CENTER CONTROLLER WAS PROVIDING VECTORS AROUND WEATHER. AFTER DEPARTURE DURING CRUISE FLIGHT WITHOUT ONBOARD WEATHER AVOIDANCE RADAR, THE CENTER CONTROLLER ADVISED THE PILOT OF WEATHER 10 MILES AHEAD BUT THAT OTHER AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN PICKING THEIR WAY THROUGH IT AND THE FLIGHT WAS CLEARED TO DEVIATE. THE FLIGHT CONTINUED WITHOUT DEVIATING OR REQUESTING ASSISTANCE BEFORE ENCOUNTERING THE WEATHER AND A SHORT TIME LATER THE PILOT REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE CONTROLLER TO GET OUT OF THE WEATHER ENCOUNTERED. THE CONTROLLER PROVIDED A HEADING TO FLY BUT RADAR AND RADIO CONTACT WERE LOST SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THE AIRPLANE EXPERIENCED AN INFLIGHT BREAKUP. EXAMINATION OF ALL FRACTURE SURFACES REVEALED EVIDENCE OF OVERLOAD FAILURE. NO DETERMINATION COULD BE MADE IF THE AUTOPILOT SYSTEM WAS ENGAGED. THE ENGINES WERE EXAMINED WITH NO EVIDENCE OF PREIMPACT FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On June 7, 1994, about 1456 eastern daylight time, a Beechcraft 95-C55, N966N, registered to Jack Alan George, experienced an in-flight breakup, near Wauchula, Florida, while on a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The flight originated from the Tallahassee Commercial Airport, Havana, Florida, about 1323. Before departure all fuel tanks were filled and according to one witness, he talked with the owner/pilot of the accident airplane and advised the pilot of the danger associated with thunderstorms that occur in Florida. He also advised that the flight should fly offshore to avoid the typical location of the thunderstorms. Before departure the pilot contacted the Gainesville Automated Flight Service Station via telephone to request a weather briefing for the intended flight from Tallahassee to Key West, Florida. The route of flight provided the briefer was Tallahassee to St. Petersburg VORTAC then Lee County VORTAC and to Key West Airport. Convective Sigmet "40E" which was issued at 1655 Zulu time valid until 1855 Zulu time on the day of the accident, revealed that an area of thunderstorms located 100 nautical miles (nm) east of Jacksonville to Vero Beach to 40 nm west-northwest of Fort Myers, to 10 nm northeast of St. Petersburg to 100 nm east of Jacksonville, Florida. The thunderstorms were moving from 240 degrees at 20 knots with tops above 45,000 feet. The pilots planned route of flight would have placed the airplane in the extreme southwestern section of the convective sigmet area. The pilot was not given the convective sigmet "40E" information. During the briefing the pilot was advised that radar was showing thunderstorm activity in the Gulf of Mexico south of Tallahassee between Tallahassee and St. Petersburg, Florida, and rain was indicated southeast of Tallahassee for about 45-50 miles. The pilot advised the briefer that he was a stranger when the briefer questioned "...I don't know how familiar you are with." The briefer also advised the pilot of rain located between Cross City and St. Petersburg, Florida, "...and after that I'm not showing anything but that's right now you know you know summertime in." The briefer then stated "Florida things do build up over the land area the Gulf ah or the Atlantic either one ah usually in pretty good shape in the afternoon." He further advised the pilot that deviation over water or along the coastline if you don't like what you see inland is quite a bit better. The pilot mentioned to the briefer that the airplane was not equipped with "...on board radar", and "... will have center have radar for us...." The pilot also informed the briefer that "well we've been getting service all along from Austin." Earlier in the briefing the pilot advised the briefer that the flight had just come from Austin, Texas. The flight departed under visual flight rules (VFR) about 1323.48 and contacted Tallahassee Approach Control requesting IFR clearance in accordance with his previously filed instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. After radar contact was established the IFR clearance was obtained and communications were transferred to the Jacksonville, Florida, Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). While in contact with the Jacksonville ARTCC, the pilot was issued an amended clearance to fly to the Cross City VORTAC, then direct to the Lakeland VORTAC then via Victor Airway 521. This amended clearance placed the airplane further inland than originally planned. The flight climbed to 9,000 feet for traffic, ATC communications were then transferred to Tampa Approach Control and about 1446.01, communications were transferred to the Miami, Florida, ARTCC. About 1448.20 the Miami ARTCC controller advised the pilot "november niner six six november I show precipitation at your twelve o'clock position beginning in about one zero miles uh aircraft have pretty much been picking their way through it you may deviate left or right of course and when able direct lee county." The pilot acknowledged this and about 1452.25, the pilot asked the controller "...do you show much precipe ahead of us now." The controller replied "november niner six six november affirmative I show that majority of the precipitation appears to be in your one to two o'clock position uh starting in about one to two miles and proceeding for about oh I'd say about 15 miles then once you get south of Arcadia it is clear." An unintelligible comment was heard from N966N about 17 seconds later to which the controller requested the pilot to say again. About 1452.55, the pilot of N966N asked the controller "...can you give us a heading that might steer us around some of this." The controller advised the pilot to turn to a heading of 145 for "...vectors around the weather." The controller repeated twice the heading to fly and about 1453.44, the crew of N966N advised "Baron 66N." There was no further radio contact with the crew of the accident airplane. Witnesses in the area reported that there was a thunderstorm near the accident site with associated rain, lightning, and one report of heavy rains. One witness reported hearing a "small boom" followed by a "large boom." Part of the wreckage was located by the owner of a house. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Information pertaining to the first pilot is contained in the NTSB Factual Report-Aviation. Review of his pilot logbook revealed that the last flight logged which was a biennial flight review was on April 22. The year was not listed. No determination could be made as to whether he met the instrument recency of experience requirement. According to the pilot's son, his father had owned the accident airplane for about 20 years. Information pertaining to the pilot-rated passenger is contained in the NTSB Form 6120.4, Supplement E. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Information pertaining to the airplane is contained in the NTSB Factual Report-Aviation, and Supplements A and B. Additionally, review of the aircraft logbook revealed that the altimeter, static system, pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were tested and inspected on January 25, 1994. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Information pertaining to weather is contained in the NTSB Factual Report-Aviation. Review of doppler weather radar from Melbourne, Florida, for 1453, revealed that the last radar return for the accident airplane was located in an area of Video Integrated Processor (VIP) level 6 echoes. The VIP level 6 echo was located about 5 nautical miles northwest of the location of the last radar return of the airplane. The location of the last radar return of the airplane was in a VIP level 2 weather echo. COMMUNICATIONS Two-way radio communication was established with the Miami ARTCC at the time of the accident. The controller was interviewed by an NTSB investigator who prepared a ATC Group Chairman's Factual Report. The report is an attachment to this report. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT A survey was prepared which documented the location of all recovered parts. The farthest recovered part was located about 11,881 feet north-northeast of the main wreckage which consisted of the fuselage. A straight line drawn from the farthest piece to the main wreckage indicated that the heading was 192 degrees 12 minutes 29 seconds. The farthest most parts located were the vertical stabilizer components. Continuing south-southeast from the first component toward the main wreckage was the left and right horizontal stabilizers located 6,914 and 6,750 feet respectively from the main wreckage. Examination of the fracture surfaces of the left and right horizontal stabilizers revealed that the left failed positive and the right failed negative both due to overload failure. The right elevator was located 6,095 feet from the main wreckage and the left elevator was located about 4,314 feet from the main wreckage. The section of right wing which separated was located about 3,756 feet from the main wreckage and the section of the left wing which separated was located 3,150 feet from the main wreckage. Examination of the fracture surfaces of each wing revealed evidence of overload failure downward. The right elevator counterweight was located about 2,817 feet from the main wreckage and examination revealed no evidence of flutter. The left elevator counterweight was not located. The vertical stabilizer was located about 2,173 feet from the main wreckage. Examination of the main wreckage at the accident site revealed that it was inverted. The left and right wings failed about 7 feet outboard from the wingroot. The vertical and horizontal stabilizers were completely separated from the airplane. Examination of the recovered flight control trim tab actuators revealed that the aileron, rudder, and elevator were at full extension but according to a representative of the airframe manufacturer, during an in-flight breakup, pulling and stretching of the cables drives the actuators to full extension. Examination of the aileron, elevator, and rudder flight control systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The engines were taken to a facility for examination. Examination of the left and right engines revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Additionally, examination of each engine driven oil lubricated vacuum pump revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The propellers were not examined. Examination of the autopilot mode annunciator panel revealed that the trim and altitude bulbs filaments were stretched and broken. The navigation, glideslope, and approach bulb filaments were broken. The autopilot bulb was broken and no determination could be made if the autopilot was engaged. The autopilot mode controller which has no electronic memory capability was examined but no useful information was obtained. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL Post-mortem examinations of the pilot and passengers were performed by Alexander Melamud, M.D., Medical Examiner District Ten. The cause of death for all was listed as multiple injuries. Toxicological testing was performed of specimens of the pilot by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and by the Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital Laboratory. The results of the AFIP analysis were positive for volatiles but the condition of the specimen was noted to be marked putrefaction. The Wuesthoff analysis was negative for volatiles, and tested drugs. Toxicological analysis was also performed by the Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital Laboratory on specimens of the pilot-rated passenger. The results were negative for tested drugs and volatiles. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The wreckage and all retained components were released to Mr. Al Sharp of Aviation Consultant Services, Wimauma, Florida, on November 16, 1994.
DELAY BY THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND TO OBTAIN WEATHER AVOIDANCE ASSISTANCE FROM THE ARTCC CONTROLLER RESULTING IN THE INFLIGHT BREAKUP AFTER ENCOUNTER WITH A THUNDERSTORM.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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