FAIRBANKS, AK, USA
N200BV
Veazie SUPER ACRO ZENITH CH
The pilot of the Zenith, N200BV, had been cleared to conduct touch-and-go landings to hard surface runway 19L. Two minutes later, the pilot of a Cessna 185, N1074F, was cleared to land on gravel runway 19 that is oriented on the same magnetic heading as the hard surface runway but is displaced about 650 feet south of the end of the hard surface runway. There is no lateral displacement between the two runways. One minute later, the controller cleared the pilot of the Zenith to land, and advised '...I'll call the departure.' The controller did not receive a verbal response, only a garbled radio transmission. The pilot of the Zenith performed a touch-and-go and emerged under the second airplane that was in the landing approach to the gravel runway. The FAA's handbook for air traffic conrollers does not contain procedures for simultaneous operations on runways that are oriented on the same heading and not laterally parallel to each other.
On May 1, 1996, at 1757 Alaska daylight time, an experimental Super Acro Zenith, N200BV, had a near-midair collision with a Cessna 185, N1074F, at Fairbanks International Airport, Fairbanks, Alaska. Both airplanes were being operated under visual flight rules (VFR) for landing on runway 19. The pilot/owner of N200BV was not injured and the airplane was not damaged. N1074F, operated by Arctic Air Alaska Inc., Salcha, Alaska, was not damaged and the pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The Fairbanks International Airport has four landing areas. Runway 19R/01L is a hard surface runway that is 10,300 feet long and 150 feet wide. Runway 19L/01R is a hard surface runway that is 3,190 feet long and 60 feet wide. A seaplane landing area (water lane 19/01) separates runway 19R from 19L. The ski strip 19/01 is a gravel surface runway that is 3,978 feet long and 75 feet wide and is oriented on the same magnetic heading as runway 19L/01R. There is no lateral displacement between the two runways. The arrival end of the ski strip 19 is displaced directly south of the departure end of runway 19L about 650 feet and is intersected by taxiway B. The control tower is located along the east edge of the airport surface area, just south of taxiway B. Review of the air-ground radio communications tapes maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Fairbanks, Alaska, Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) facility, revealed that N200BV's radio was difficult to understand. The air traffic control specialist working the position of local control initially responded to N200BV's call sign as N700BV and later utilized the proper call sign. This confusion persisted throughout the incident. At 1750:41, the pilot of N200BV reported that he was seven miles east of the Fairbanks airport and requested touch and go landings. The local controller advised the pilot to report abeam Metro Field. At 1754:24, N200BV was advised..."OK sir, follow a Piper Cherokee on a ah looks like a two mile final for 19L, follow that Cherokee, you're number two, cleared for touch and go." At 1752:49, the pilot of N1074F contacted the Fairbanks tower and was given instructions to continue his downwind approach, with the controller providing instructions to begin a base turn. At 1755:46, the local controller advised N1074F..."and I'm going to try and get you in a short approach just inside the tower." At 1756:14, the controller advised..."Cessna 1074F, base now, ski strip ah 19, cleared to land." At 1756:29, the controller advised..."N700BV, runway 19L, cleared to land, I'll call the departure." There was no response and at 1756:31, the controller repeated the previous clearance. At 1756:33, a garbled radio transmission was received. The pilot of N200BV performed a touch and go and then climbed toward N1074F that was landing on the ski strip. At 1757:22, the pilot of N1074F reported..."74F, I've got traffic right under me." The local controller advised N1074F..."74F roger, I was going to have him land and call his departure but he ah slipped on through, ski strip 19, cleared to land." The pilot of N1074F reported a near-mid air collision when N200BV emerged under his airplane. The vertical separation was described as 50 feet between the two airplanes. A transcript of the air to ground communications between the two airplanes and the Fairbanks ATCT is included in this report. The Fairbanks International Airport, Air Traffic Control Tower Facility Handbook, publication 7210.1B, contains standard operating procedures that are unique to the airport. The local controller's position procedures contained in part H, states, in part: "...1. Local Control (LC) shall: ...e. Be responsible for separation of all aircraft that are being controlled by LC." Part h., states: "The ski/gravel strip and 01R/19L shall be treated as separate runways for same direction operations only. All other aircraft operations shall be considered as the same runway." The FAA's air traffic controller's handbook, publication 7110.65, Chapter 2, Section 4, Radio and Interphone Communications, states, in part: "...2-72 Pilot Acknowledgment/Readback, a. When issuing clearances, instructions, or information, ensure acknowledgment by the pilot." The FAA's air traffic controller's handbook, Chapter 3, Section 1, General, states, in part: "...3-1 Provide Service. Provide airport traffic control service based only upon observed or known traffic and airport conditions. 3-1 Note. When operating in accordance with the FAR's, it is the responsibility of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft. However, due to the limited space around terminal locations, traffic information can aid pilots in avoiding collision between aircraft operating within Class B, C, or D surface areas...." The FAA's air traffic controller's handbook, Chapter 3, Section 8, Spacing and Sequencing, specifies procedures and phraseology that controllers should utilize to establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft and states, in part: "...3-90 Sequence/Spacing Application. Establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft by requiring them to adjust flight or ground operations as necessary to achieve proper spacing. Phraseology:..."Cleared: touch and go, or stop and go, or low approach, or cleared for the option." Chapter 3, Section 8, 3-92, Simultaneous Same Direction Operation, describes operations to laterally parallel runways and states, in part: "Authorize simultaneous, same direction operations on parallel runways, on parallel landing strips, or on a runway and a parallel landing strip only when the following conditions are met: a. Operations are conducted in VFR conditions unless visual separation is applied. b. Two-way radio communication is maintained with the aircraft involved and pertinent traffic information is issued. c. The distance between the runways or landing strips is in accordance with the minima in Table 3-92[1]...." The table describes minimum centerline and runway edges distances between laterally parallel runway. The air traffic controller's handbook does not contain procedures to be utilized when two runways, (in this case the ski strip 19 and runway 19L), are oriented on the same magnetic heading and not laterally parallel to each other.
the pilot's improper understanding of his amended clearance, and the local controller's failure to assure that the pilot understood that he was cleared only to land. Factors in the incident were: the airport design that places two airplanes in close proximity to each other, and the FAA's insufficient standards for simultaneous operations to runways not laterally displaced from one another.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
