BIG BEAR CITY, CA, USA
N4931U
Cessna 210E
The airplane engine sustained a total loss of power while approaching the airport to land. The pilot elected to land in an open field. During the landing the airplane struck a dirt mound and then became entangled with a telephone support cable. The investigation revealed that the engine driven fuel pump jet orifice was blocked and air bubbles were introduced into the engine fuel system. The fuel metering unit filter screen was 20 percent blocked with unidentified debris. The filter screen had not been recently removed. Two of the fuel system hoses leaked. The inlet fuel hose at the gascolator gap between the 'B' nut and the collar exceeded the manufacturer's recommended tolerances. All of the engine fuel system hoses exterior were deteriorated. The last annual inspection was accomplished about 7 months before the accident. The annual inspection was the first inspection accomplished in 2 years. The airplane accrued 7.95 hours in the 2 years preceding the accident. The investigation revealed that the pilot recently had both hips replaced and a coronary by-pass operation.
History of Flight On August 17, 1996, at 0933 hours Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 210E, N4931U, collided with a dirt mound while executing an emergency landing about 2.33 statute miles southwest of the Big Bear City Airport, Big Bear City, California. There was no postimpact fire. The emergency landing was precipitated by a total loss of power. The pilot was conducting a visual flight rules personal flight to Big Bear City Airport. The airplane, registered to and operated by Bodell Manufacturing Company, Hesperia, California, was destroyed by the resulting impact forces. The certificated commercial pilot died on August 26, 1996, from injuries resulting from the accident; his passenger sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight departed San Bernardino International Airport, San Bernardino, California, about 0905. A San Bernardino Sheriff's deputy interviewed the pilot before he was transported to Loma Linda Hospital, Loma Linda, California. The deputy reported that the pilot said he departed Hesperia Airport early in the morning and then flew to San Bernardino International Airport and refueled the airplane. He topped off the tanks and then flew to Big Bear City Airport. When the flight was about 3 miles southwest of the airport, the engine lost total power. During the ensuing forced landing, the airplane collided with dirt mound and then became entangled with a telephone support cable. A fixed-base maintenance facility operator at San Bernardino International Airport said in a telephone interview and written statement that on August 15, 1996, he worked on the accident airplane. He said that the pilot reported that the landing gear system, including the warning horn, was inoperative. Mr. Blue said that he found a hole in the main landing gear system hydraulic line and that the throttle warning horn was wired backward. The hydraulic hose was original equipment installed when the airplane was manufactured. After he repaired the landing gear system, he called the pilot and told him that the landing gear was fixed. The pilot asked him to fly the airplane to Hesperia, but the operator declined to fly the airplane because of other obvious discrepancies. He told the pilot that he would pick him up in his airplane. The operator is a certificated commercial pilot and aircraft mechanic. His mechanic certificate is endorsed with an inspection authorization. The operator said that on the day of the accident the pilot called him and asked him if he had his airplane tow bar. The operator told him that he had the tow bar and the pilot said he would pick it up later that morning. About 30 minutes later, the pilot arrived at his hangar. In a brief discussion with the pilot, the operator told the pilot, with the pilot's wife present, that the last annual inspection was poor and that there were many discrepancies that needed to be corrected. He told the pilot that ". . .whoever had signed off his annual [inspection] had not done him any favors. The aircraft could not have been looked at in years. . . ." The pilot told him that he would bring the airplane to him the following week to correct any maintenance discrepancies. The accident occurred shortly thereafter. The accident coordinates are: north 34 degrees, 15 minutes and west 116 degrees, 53 minutes. Pilot Information The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land rating. He also held a second-class medical certificate that was issued on December 5, 1994; the certificate contained a "must have available glasses for near vision" limitation endorsement. According to current federal air regulations, a second-class medical certificate is valid for 12 calendar months. After 12-calendar months and before 24 calendar months, the certificate reverts to a third-class medical certificate and the pilot can exercise the private pilot privileges during this period. The pilot's family could not provide the Safety Board with the pilot's personal flight hours logbook. The flight hours reflected on page 3 of this report were obtained from the pilot's last medical certificate application form. Safety Board investigators could not determine if the pilot complied with the general recency requirements of current federal regulations, or if he received a biennial flight review within 2 years preceding the accident. According to the pilot's family, within 2 years preceding the accident, the pilot had both hips replaced and a coronary by-pass operation. Title 14 CFR 67.15 Second-class medical certificate eligibility requirements states, in part: (a) To be eligible for a second-class medical certificate, an applicant must meet the requirements of paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section. Section (e) Cardiovascular states: (1) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of: (i) Myocardial infarction; (ii) Angina pectoris; or (iii) Coronary heart disease that has required treatment or, if untreated, that has been symptomatic or clinically significant. Aircraft Information The airplane was manufactured in 1965. Safety Board investigators retrieved the no. 2 airframe and powerplant logbooks. According to the logbooks, the airplane accrued 2,352.11 hours' flight hours at the time of the accident; the engine accrued 1,019.4 hours. The last annual inspection was performed on January 13, 1996; the airplane accrued 2,344.24 hours at the time of the inspection. The mechanic noted that all applicable airworthiness directives were accomplished. The logbooks also revealed that on the annual inspection preceding the January 13, 1996, inspection was conducted on February 15, 1994. An annual inspection was not accomplished during 1995. At the time of the 1994 annual inspection, the airplane accrued 2,344.16 hours. According to the maintenance logbooks, the airplane accrued 7.95 hours between February 15, 1994, and the date of the accident. Wreckage and Impact Information The on-scene investigation was conducted by an FAA airworthiness inspector from the Riverside [California] Flight Standards District Office. The inspector reported that the airplane initially struck a 3-foot-high dirt mound, bounced, and its tail section entangled with a telephone line support cable about 71 feet north of the dirt mound. The airplane came to rest, inverted, about 200 feet from the initial ground impact point. The engine separated from the airplane and was found about 15 feet south of the main wreckage. According to the wreckage retriever, all of the airplane's major components were found at the accident site. The flight controls remained connected at their respective attach points. Both wings sustained leading edge damage, but were attached at their respective wing-to-fuselage attach points. A section of the telephone wire was found wrapped around the airplane's vertical fin. The retriever said that he established continuity of the flight control system to the cockpit area before he cutoff the tail section and removed both wings for transport. He also said that both flaps were extended about 20 degrees. Safety Board investigators examined the airplane at Aircraft Recovery Service, Compton Airport, Compton, California, on August 20, 1996. The leading edge of the left wing was crushed downward to a point about 3 1/2 feet from the inboard section. The underside near the leading edge exhibited a rock impact signature. The leading edge of the right wing exhibited a puncture about 7 feet inboard from the root. The upper side of the right wing displayed extensive spanwise and 45-degree chordwise scrape marks. The aileron displayed a concave tear from midspan to the outboard section. The nose section was found crushed upward from its lower horizontal plane. The nose crushing angle was about 45 degrees. The three landing gears separated at impact. The section of the fuselage near the rear bulkhead had separated and was found torn and twisted. The empennage was intact; the leading edge of the vertical fairing exhibited a telephone line cut from the lower section up toward the rear section about 19 inches. The fuel selector valve handle was found positioned to the right fuel tank. The fuel selector valve position corresponded to the fuel selector handle position. Both wing fuel tanks and their respective fuel screens were intact and free of contaminates. The right wing fuel line was found unobstructed after air was blown through the line. The left wing fuel line was torn away from its fuel tank attach point. Both bladder fuel tanks displayed several wrinkles on the bottom of each tank. The left reservoir tank was removed. Examination of the tank showed no evidence of any fuel leakage. The lines were connected and not compromised. The right fuel reservoir tank was crushed and exhibited a tear at the inlet port. The vapor vent return line was found severed. The tank did not contain any fuel. The gascolator was intact and did not contain any fuel or contaminates. The fuel line between the engine driven fuel pump and the fuel control unit contained about 1/8 ounce of uncontaminated blue colored fuel. The fuel line from the fuel flow divider to the throttle body contained a few drops of fuel. The fuel was clean and free of contaminates. The fuel injectors and their lines were unobstructed and free of contaminates. The left side of the engine cylinders displayed impact damage on the upper side. Continuity of the engine gear and valve train assembly was established. Except for the number 2 cylinder, thumb compression was noted on the cylinders. The number 2 cylinder did not produce any compression when the crankshaft was rotated. The number 5 cylinder compression was present, but was less that the other cylinders that produced compression. See "Differential Compression Check Table" in this report for detailed compression check findings. Disassembly examination of the number 2 cylinder displayed normal operating signatures. The piston and its associated rings were intact and properly installed. The number 5 cylinder exhaust valve contained no significant amount of debris on the valves or its respective seat; the intake valve, however, contained extensive dirt deposits on the seat and underneath the valve. All the accessories were intact. The spark plugs displayed normal operating signatures. The left magneto separated from its attach point. The right magneto produced spark upon rotation of the engine crankshaft. The left magneto was examined at Larry Martin Aviation, Compton Airport on August 20, 1996. The magneto was placed on the test bench as it was found. The spark plug leads were extensively damaged, twisted, and shorted. The magneto did produce spark when it was operated on the test bench, but showed internal shorting in the leads. The leads were replaced and the magneto produced normal spark. The propeller remained attached at its respective crankshaft attach point. Both blades showed minimal "S" twisting signatures; the tip end displayed some chordwise scuffing. The inboard section of the blades also showed some 45 degrees to the chord line scuff marks at the inboard section One propeller blade was bent toward the face side about 80 degrees; the remaining blade tip was "S" twisted and bent toward the face side about 15 degrees. The propeller spinner displayed extensive crushing and was twisted to the right. The oil filter was free of contaminates. Medical And Pathological Information The San Bernardino County Coroner's Office conducted the postmortem examination on the pilot. The pathologist noted the pilot had extensive coronary disease. At the time of the accident, toxicological examinations were not conducted. Tests and Research The engine fuel pump and the throttle body were tested at Airmotive Carburetor, Burbank, California; the fuel hoses were pressure tested at Air-Pro, Inc., Long Beach, California. Both tests were conducted on August 22, 1996. Engine Fuel Pump The outlet pressure was excessive with the vapor return line closed. When the vapor return line was opened, the pressure dropped and a large stream of air bubbles was observed in the fuel outlet flow manometer. The flow indicator did not rise as required. The technician reported that the pump output was consistent with the jet pump in the top of the vapor tower being blocked. The technician shut down and evacuated the system. The pump was disassembled for inspection. The disassembly examination showed no particles blocking the jet pump. The technician reported that blocked particles were purged from the jet pump orifice during the test stand shutdown and evacuation procedure. The pump operated normally after it was reassembled. Fuel Metering Unit The mixture arm was found bent from impact forces. The technician slightly straightened the arm to facilitate the test. The inlet screen was about 20 percent blocked with unidentified debris. The technician removed the debris before installing the unit in the test stand. The technician said that screen appeared to have not been removed for a considerable time. He said that the debris contained in the screen would cause blockage to the jet pump tower orifice. The fuel metering unit was installed in the test stand and functionally tested. The unit tested normally on all but test points two and three. Test points two and three were slightly lean (see item number 15.02, Fuel Pump and Fuel Control Unit Examination Tables, for a detailed description of the test). Fuel Hoses The engine pump to metering fuel line was manufactured in August 1964, and was pressure tested at 3,000 pounds/square inch (psi). The line leaked between the "B" nut and collar, and it also leaked behind the collar. The manufacture date of the vapor return line was not determined. The line was pressure tested at 3,000 psi and did not leak. The internal check valve functioned normally. The manufacture date of the inlet fuel line was not determined. The line was pressure tested at 4,000 psi and it leaked at both ends (inlet and gascolator "B" nuts and collars). The gap between the collar (at the gascolator end) was 0.62 inch. The maximum allowable gap is 0.30 inch. According to the technician, the excessive gap would introduce air into the system. Most of the hoses' exterior was deteriorated. Internal examination of the hoses showed no evidence of any fretting or deterioration. Additional Information The airframe, engine, and logbooks were released to Aircraft Recovery Service, Compton, California, on August 20, 1996.
an inadequate annual inspection conducted by other maintenance personnel.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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