CHEHALIS, WA, USA
N344LC
Piper PA-28RT-201
The first pilot (PIC) and his father, the second pilot, shared the duties of a preflight inspection on the airplane in preparation to perform some touch-and-go landings. The second pilot visually checked both fuel tanks and noted that the left tank was low. He stated that he had mentioned this to the first pilot, and the first pilot did not 'carefully note.' The first pilot selected the left tank for the flight because the left fuel quantity gauge was erroneously indicating a full tank. During the third touch-and-go takeoff, the engine was starved of fuel and suddenly lost all power about 300 feet above the ground. The second pilot, who was also a CFI, immediately took the controls, banked the airplane to the right to avoid trees, and force landed the airplane into an open corn field. The right wing struck the ground during the landing and the airplane nosed over. No preimpact mechanical deficiencies were found with the engine. An examination of the left cockpit fuel quantity gauge revealed that the needle was captured between a deformed face plate and a sticky substance found beneath the glass. The source of the deformation and substance could not be determined.
On January 26, 1997, about 1200 Pacific standard time, N344LC, a Piper PA-28RT-201, operated by the owner/pilot, impacted terrain during a forced landing and was destroyed in Chehalis, Washington. There was no fire. The forced landing was precipitated by a total loss of engine power during initial climb after takeoff. The first pilot received minor injuries and the second pilot was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed. The personal, local flight departed from Chehalis and was conducted under 14 CFR 91. Written statements and interviews (attached) were provided by both pilots to the Safety Board and to an aviation safety inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) office in Seattle, Washington. According to both pilots, the flight was for the purpose of practicing touch-and-go landings. The private pilot was designated as the pilot-in-command (first pilot) and was seated in the left front seat of the airplane. His father, a commercial pilot and certified flight instructor (second pilot), was seated in the right front seat and had intended on being only a passenger. Both pilots shared the preflight inspection duties. The second pilot stated that he visually checked the fuel quantity in each wing's fuel tank. He stated that the fuel level of the right tank was "at the indicator tab," which meant that 25 gallons of fuel was in the right tank. He stated that the fuel level of the left tank was below the lowest sight tab, which meant that he could not see any fuel in the tank. The second pilot stated that he alerted the first pilot about the "low" fuel level of the left tank, but the first pilot "... did not carefully note..." this information. The second pilot also stated that he may not have relayed this information to the first pilot clearly enough. The first pilot stated that he selected the left fuel tank prior to takeoff because the left cockpit fuel quantity gage was indicating a full tank, while the right fuel gage was indicating a lesser amount. The first pilot stated that the engine run-up prior to takeoff was normal, and he took off from runway 33. After takeoff, the first pilot remained in the traffic pattern and performed a touch-and-go landing. During the second takeoff, the first pilot noted a momentary "hesitation" with the engine. He looked at the second pilot, who did not respond to the hesitation. The second pilot stated that he did not notice or recall the event. The first pilot continued to fly the airplane in the traffic pattern and performed a third touch-and-go landing. During the third takeoff, the engine suddenly stopped producing power between 200 feet and 400 feet above the ground. The second pilot stated that he immediately took control of the aircraft, noted that the fuel boost pump switch was "on" and asked the first pilot to switch fuel tanks. The first pilot complied. The second pilot stated that he then banked the airplane to the right in order to "avoid trees," and he attempted a forced landing in an open corn field. During the forced landing, the right wing struck the ground. The first pilot, age 18, held an FAA Private Pilot Certificate with ratings for single-engine land and multiengine land airplanes. The first pilot reported that he had accumulated 112.7 hours of total flight time, including 111.1 hours in type. He had not flown in the 90 days previous to the accident. The first pilot was wearing his seat belt and shoulder harness at the time of the accident and received minor injuries. The second pilot, age 47, held an FAA Commercial Pilot Certificate with ratings for single-engine land, multiengine land, single-engine sea, and instrument airplanes. He was also licensed to pilot helicopters and gliders, and he was a certified flight instructor in single-engine airplanes. The second pilot reported that he had accumulated 3,500 hours of flight time, including 15 hours in type and 30 hours during the previous 90 days. He also reported that he had never instructed in a Piper PA-28RT-201. The second pilot was not wearing his shoulder harness at the time of the accident and received serious injuries. The aircraft, a 1980 Piper model PA-28RT-201 "Arrow IV," was purchased by the second pilot in 1994 primarily for his son, the first pilot, to use. An examination of the aircraft's maintenance records dating back to 1991 revealed that the airframe and engine had received an annual inspection on May 10, 1996, and had been flown for 75 hours since the inspection. The airframe had accumulated a total of 8,296 flight hours. The logbook examination did not reveal any unresolved discrepancies prior to the date of the accident. No entries were found in the available log books to indicate any specific maintenance associated with the fuel quantity gauges. The wreckage was examined at the accident site by an FAA aviation safety inspector on the day of the accident. It was also examined on January 30, 1997, after it was removed and secured in a hangar at the Chehalis Airport. The examinations (FAA report attached) revealed that the right wing was destroyed, while the left wing remained intact. The right fuel tank was destroyed, while the left fuel tank remained intact and uncompromised. Less than a gallon of fluid was found in the left tank; the fluid was similar to the color, smell, and consistency of uncontaminated 100 low lead aviation fuel. The engine-driven fuel pump and fuel flow servo were removed, disassembled and inspected. Only trace amounts of fuel were found in the components and their associated hoses. The engine was partially disassembled and inspected; no preimpact mechanical deficiencies were found. The right main landing gear was found in the extended position and was damaged. The left gear was extended and undamaged. The nose gear was found crushed underneath the engine. The landing gear selector was found in the retracted position (the airplane has an automatic landing gear extension device to prevent gear-up landings). The left cockpit fuel quantity gauge was removed and inspected in detail. The instrument's installation hardware appeared undamaged. The gauge was indicating a full tank prior to its removal, and its needle dropped to an empty indication upon removal. The gauge's face plate was slightly deformed, while the protective glass remained intact. Also, a sticky substance was observed between the glass and the face plate near the full range of the indicator where the deformation was found. The source of the substance and the deformation were undetermined.
The failure of the first pilot to conduct an adequate preflight inspection, and his failure to properly manage the aircraft fuel supply. This led to fuel starvation and a subsequent loss of engine power. Factors contributing to the accident are the false indication of the left cockpit fuel quantity gage due to the presence of a foreign substance and a deformed face plate, and unsuitable terrain available for a successful forced landing.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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