N831LA
McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
The airplane encountered in-flight turbulence and an aft cabin attendant was injured. The captain ensured the seat belt sign was 'ON,' briefed the in-flight director, and told the flight engineer to make sure the cabin attendants were seated. Three minutes before the turbulence encounter, the flight engineer briefed the forward cabin attendant of the anticipated turbulence, and told her to brief the rest of the cabin crew. After securing a portion of her galley, she only briefed the mid galley cabin crew, and assumed that the in-flight director had briefed the rest of the cabin crew. The in-flight director said by the time the cockpit called to advise of moderate turbulence and to sit, it was too late. The cabin attendants in the aft galley did not receive the briefing and their beverage carts were not secured. Shortly after the accident, the carrier published crew notification and procedure changes in their operations manuals for turbulence encounters and other in flight emergencies.
On July 25, 1997, at 1800 eastern daylight time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, N831LA, operated by Laker Airways, was not damaged when it encountered turbulence over the Atlantic Ocean near Jacksonville, Florida. The 3 flightcrew members, 7 cabin attendants, and 310 passengers were not injured. Three cabin attendants received minor injuries, and one cabin attendant received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight that originated at Orlando, Florida, at 1732, destined for Prestwick, Scotland. An IFR flight plan had been filed for the flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 121. In a written statement, the captain stated that he briefed the cabin attendants In-flight Director (IFD) on the expected weather and westerly rerouting by Air Traffic Control (ATC). The captain stated that he suggested a 2 to 3 hour delay in the meal service due to extensive weather along the east coast of the United States. However, when the airplane reached 10,000 feet, the flight engineer called the cabin for a departure check. The cabin attendants stated that they then got up from their seats and prepared for a beverage service. In written statements and telephone interviews, several cabin attendants stated the call for departure check was their cue to leave their seats and begin service. According to statements provided by the captain and the first officer, shortly after takeoff a deviation east of the intended course was requested from ATC due to thunderstorms. The request was denied due to arriving traffic already deviating in the area. ATC then approved a deviation west of course. The First Officer stated: "Northwest of [Craig] VOR, an opening was showing on radar that had sufficient size and distance for safe flight between cells. The radar also showed that it was clear on the other side of the thunderstorms. This appeared to be the best course at this time. The Captain ensured the seat belt sign was 'ON' and told the flight Engineer to make sure the cabin attendants were seated." In a written statement, the flight engineer stated he advised the cabin crew to ensure the passengers and crew were seated, with seatbelts secure, approximately 3 minutes prior to the turbulence encounter. According to all three members of the cockpit crew, the turbulence encountered was "moderate" and lasted 10 to 15 seconds. The first officer described the encounter as "...intermittent light turbulence for up to 11 seconds; moderate chop for 4 to 5 seconds." The IFD stated: "...the cockpit called to advise of moderate turbulence and to sit. When I picked up the PA to let the [cabin attendants] know, it was too late. The plane went up and down a couple of times, heaving us up in the air in the [forward] galley." In written statements, several cabin attendants stated they were advised to take their seats after the turbulence began. The cabin attendants that were in the aft galley stated they were thrown up and down and that liquor bottles, cans, and beverage carts were bounced about and on top of them. One cabin attendant described the aft portion of the cabin as: "A total disaster; there was alcohol 6 inches deep floating by the R4 door and in the galley. There were broken bottles, punctured soda cans spraying and the metal bins were folded like accordions. Everything that came out of the bins was on the floor blocking the entrance to the galley." The injured cabin attendants were positioned in the aft section of the airplane. The captain stated that after receiving an assessment of the injuries on board, and consulting with Laker Dispatch, Bangor, Maine was chosen as the landing site for seeking medical attention. Four cabin attendants were treated at the hospital. One cabin attendant returned to the airplane, and the airplane continued to Prestwick, Scotland. In a telephone interview conducted August 11, 1997, a cabin attendant stationed in the forward portion of the cabin (L2 door) stated the flight engineer came out of the cockpit to advise her that a turbulence encounter was anticipated in approximately 5 minutes. She stated the flight engineer directed her to secure her galley and to advise the remainder of the cabin crew. The cabin attendant stated she immediately began to secure her galley. She said the galley can be secured in approximately 10 minutes. The cabin attendant stated she had secured "...about 30 percent..." of her galley when she stopped her work, picked up the interphone, and advised the mid galley of the forecast turbulence and to secure the galley. She replaced the interphone and returned to secure her assigned galley. The cabin attendant did not advise the aft galley. The cabin attendant stated the IFD appeared at her station shortly after she returned to her work. She advised the IFD of the forecast turbulence and he responded, "I know, I know." When questioned why she failed to contact the aft galley, the cabin attendant stated: "I don't remember...there was such a miscommunication at this time. Everything was coming from the flight engineer, not the captain. I can only do one thing at a time. I didn't think to ring the one in the back. I only spoke to the mid. I didn't have time to call the one in the back. I figured the in-flight director would handle the one in the back." ADDITIONAL INFORMATION After discussion of the chronology of events and the procedures used on the accident flight, the Director of Operations for Laker Airways revised and published changes to the General Operations Manual, the Cabin Attendant Training Manual, and the In-flight Service Manual. The revisions were approved and accepted by the Federal Aviation Administration principal operations inspector for Laker Airways on August 14, 1998. The published changes included the following: TURBULENCE ENCOUNTERS When weather forecasts or existing conditions indicate a possibility of turbulence the crew will be thoroughly briefed by the Captain...If turbulence is expected during climb or departure, the departure check announcement should be briefed and include the phrase "DEPARTURE CHECK, CABIN ATTENDANTS REMAIN SEATED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED." When clear of all clouds and expected turbulence the Captain will then announce that the Flight Attendants may resume service. For turbulence encounters in flight, a PA announcement is to be made advising the flight attendants to "SUSPEND SERVICE UNTILL FURTHER ADVISED." At this point, all service will be immediately suspended and Cabin Attendants will immediately return to their stations and fasten their seatbelts until advised by the Captain to "Resume Service."
Failure of the aft flight attendant to secure her seat belt. Related factors were turbulence in clouds, and the flight attendant not receiving the crew briefing.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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