LEXINGTON, KY, USA
N227R
Dassault DA-20
Approximately 4 to 5 miles from the destination airport, and while conducting an ILS approach at night to runway 04, the pilot made visual contact with the airport, the runway lights, and the visual approach slope indicator. The approach was continued visually. Over the approach lights the airplane encountered heavy rain. The copilot observed the airplane was low on both the VASI and the airplane's HSI. The pilot applied power and initiated a go-around. The airplane landed hard on a grass bank, about 13 feet short of runway 4. Weather 9 minutes before the accident included winds from 310 degrees at 6 knots, with a visibility of 8 miles, light rain and mist. Weather 4 minutes after accident included winds from 310 degrees at 8 knots, with a visibility of 2 1/2 miles and heavy rain. The approach end of the runway was about 34 feet lower than the highest point of the runway, about 4,500 feet from the approach end. The Aeronautical Information Manual stated either upsloping runways, or rain on the windscreens, could create illusions that an aircraft was higher than actual altitude.
On August 13, 1997, about 2250 eastern daylight time, a Dassault DA-20 Falcon Jet, N227R, was substantially damaged when it landed short of the runway at the Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The certificated airline transport pilot and copilot were not injured. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that departed the Will Rogers World Airport, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at 2110. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the cargo flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 135. The pilot stated he was flying the airplane during the execution of the ILS runway 4 approach at LEX. He made visual contact with the airport, approach lights, and visual approach slope indicators (VASI), at approximately 4 miles. Then, on short final, and about 100 feet agl, the airplane encountered heavy rain and strong down drafts. The pilot lost visual contact with the runway, and initiated a go-around by advancing the power levers, and announced his intentions to the copilot; however, he could not arrest the decent, and the airplane landed hard and skidded down the runway. The pilot did not mention any mechanical or electrical problems with the airplane. During a telephone interview with the copilot, he stated that there was nothing out of the ordinary until the last 8 seconds of the flight. He reported seeing the runway lights when the airplane was in the vicinity of the outer marker, about 5 miles from the runway. The airplane then proceeded visually for about 5 miles on the final approach. The copilot added that it was raining very heavily when they were over the approach lights. He also said that they were on a stabilized approach at a point where they would reduce power for landing. He stated that the engines were not at idle, when the airplane was 50 to 100 feet agl, and on speed for their weight. At that point, the copilot could not see the ground, and he could not say for sure if the runway lights were in sight. He further stated, "Right before things got exciting, I heard [the pilot] proceed to go-around." The copilot stated that the engines' started to spool up and the airplane pitched up. The copilot continued, " I had already called we were getting low on the glide slope and getting lower and lower, and called for a missed approach..." When the copilot was asked how he knew that the airplane was low, he responded that the VASI and the HSI indicated that the airplane was low. During a second interview, the copilot stated that the airplane was never below the glide slope during the approach, but after passing decision height the pilot had allowed the airplane to descend below the glide slope. He added that the airplane's monochrome weather radar revealed only light radar returns over the airport during the approach. In both the first and second interviews, the copilot made no mention of any mechanical or electrical problems with the airplane. The weather reported at LEX, at 2241, included winds from 310 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 8 miles with light rain and mist. Cloud conditions were reported as 1,500 feet scattered, 2,100 feet broken, and 6,500 feet overcast. The weather 4 minutes after the accident, at 2254, reported winds from 310 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 2 1/2 miles, heavy rain and mist. Cloud conditions were reported as 1,300 broken, 1,800 broken, and 2,600 overcast. The pilot reported approximately 6,000 hours of total flight experience, of which 4,500 were in the accident airplane make and model. The copilot had about 4,200 hours of total flight experience, with 20 hours in the accident airplane make and model. According to an incident report provided by the airport police, the pilots would not make a statement or give vital information to the reporting officer; however, they had commented to other officers on scene that they "were a little short (on approach)." Examination of a diagram and pictures provided by airport officials revealed two impact marks, about 10 feet apart, that started in a grass bank 13 feet prior to the non-weight bearing pavement of runway 4, and continued 3,750 feet down the runway, ending where the airplane came to rest. According to the Dassault DA-20 maintenance manual, the distance between the left and right main landing gear, from the center of each main gear, was 11 feet and 6 inches. The ILS glide slope antenna for Runway 4 was located 999 feet beyond the approach end of the runway, and had a published angle of 2.8 degrees. The vertical distance from the runway threshold to the glide slope was 60 feet. The vertical distance from the first point of impact by the airplane to the glide slope was about 65 feet. The glide slope receiver antenna on the airplane was located behind and beneath the radome. The horizontal distance from the glide slope receiver antenna to the main landing gear was about 23 feet. The normal airplane deck angle that was used to maintain a 2.8 degree glide slope would have been about 2 to 3 degrees nose up. Review of the LEX tower Equipment Status Checklist, and notices to airmen issued for LEX, revealed that the Low Level Wind Shear Advisory Systems was functioning normally. There were no reports of it activating. The Aeronautical Information Manual stated, "Rain on the windscreen can create an illusion of being at a higher altitude, while atmospheric haze can create an illusion of being at a greater distance from a runway. The pilot who does not recognize these illusions will fly a lower approach." The Aeronautical Information Manual stated, "An upsloping runway, upsloping terrain, or both, can create the illusion that the aircraft is at a higher altitude than it actually is. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will fly a lower approach." According to an airport diagram provide by airport officials, the elevation at the approach end of the runway 4 was 944.8 feet, which increased to its highest point of 979.4 feet, approximately 2/3 distance down the runway.
The pilot misjudged distance and altitude to the runway after transition from an instrument approach to a visual approach. Factors related to the accident were the rain, and uphill runway conditions at a dark night.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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