PORT ORANGE, FL, USA
N8135Q
Cessna 310Q
The pilot received weather briefings the day before and 1 1/2 hours before departure. The flight departed under visual flight rules with fog at the departure end of the runway lower than at the approach end of the runway as indicated by a pilot-rated witness. After takeoff the airplane immediately entered the fog in a wings level gear down configuration. The pilot contacted air traffic control to obtain his instrument flight rules clearance; communications lasted a total of about 25 seconds, but the right wing collided with a tree about 29 feet above ground level. The tree was located about 1 nautical mile from the departure end of the runway. The airplane then collided with a power line and the ground. Sound analysis indicated that each propeller rpm was about near full rated rpm, respectively, during the three separate times of communications. Examination of the engines, propellers, flight control systems, and vacuum system and instruments revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 23, 1998, about 0801 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 310Q, N8135Q, registered to a private individual, collided with a tree then the ground shortly after takeoff near Port Orange, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an IFR flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated about 0800 from the Spruce Creek Airport, Daytona Beach, Florida. According to a pilot-rated witness who was walking outside along Beechcraft Boulevard, he observed the accident airplane taxiing down that boulevard towards runway 23. He noted that the airplane was at the approach end of the runway for what seemed to be a long time, and continued walking coming to within about 1/8 mile from the departure end of runway 23. He noted that the ceiling at the approach end of runway 23 was between 500 to 700 feet agl, but the ceiling at the departure end of the runway was between 150 and 200 feet agl; the fog was rolling in. While at that location, he heard the engines operating "perfectly" then noted that after the airplane became airborne, it disappeared immediately into the fog. He last observed the airplane before it entered the fog in a wings level, gear down configuration. He further stated that he did not hear the accident. At about 0801, the pilot contacted Daytona Approach Control and advised that he had an IFR flight plan on file. The pilot was advised to stay clear of the Class C airspace and given a discreet transponder code. The pilot began reading back the four digit code but only completed three of the four numbers. The airplane collided with a tree about 29 feet above ground level, with the outer portion of the right wing. The airplane then contacted a power line, descended, and impacted the ground resulting in a short duration postcrash fire. OTHER DAMAGE Damage to personal property, and the cost to remove contaminated fuel resulted in insurance claims by two separate property owners. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Four of the pilot's logbooks were located, and review of the last logbook revealed that it ended on August 22, 1994. According to a flight instructor, the pilot was given a biennial flight review and an instrument proficiency flight in the accident airplane, on May 15, 1998. The total flight lasted 1 hour 40 minutes. The instrument proficiency flight consisted of one NDB approach to a runway at the Daytona Beach International Airport, two ILS approaches to a runway at the Daytona Beach International Airport, one of which was a single engine approach ending in a missed approach, and finally, one VOR approach to a runway at the Ormond Beach Municipal Airport. When the flight was completed he signed the pilot's pilot logbook. Additional information pertaining to the pilot is contained on page 3 of the Factual Report-Aviation. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Review of the aircraft maintenance manual revealed that on July 16, 1998, the pilot's altimeter, the pitot static system, and the automatic pressure altitude reporting system was tested satisfactory as required by Title 14 CFR 91.411 (a) (1). The aircraft was equipped with two transponders. Both were located in the center instrument panel, with the second installed in the lower left radio stack position. Both tested satisfactory as required by Title 14 CFR Part 91.413 (a). Additional information pertaining to the airplane is contained on page 2 of the Factual Report-Aviation. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The day before the accident about 1629 local, the pilot contacted the Gainesville Automated Flight Service Station (GNV AFSS) by telephone and obtained an outlook weather briefing. The pilot was advised in part that based on his proposed time of departure between 0730-0800 the next morning, a scattered layer of clouds was forecast to exist between 3,000 to 5,000 feet in the Daytona area. The visibility was forecast to be unrestricted with the surface winds variable at 4 knots till 1000 local, then becoming southerly at 8 knots through 1400 local. Following the briefing, the pilot filed the IFR flight plan, but did not obtain a void time. According to the Daytona Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) issued on the day of the accident at 0916 UTC (0516 local), indicates that temporary changes were expected between 0900 and 1300 UTC (0500 - 0900 local), with a visibility of 4 statute miles (sm), mist. A weather observation taken at 0553 local from the Daytona Beach International Airport, on the day of the accident indicates that the wind was calm, the visibility was 5 sm mist, no clouds at or below 12,000 feet, temperature and dew point in degrees Centigrade 24 and 23 respectively. The altimeter was 30.11. The remarks section of the observation indicates in part that the temperature and dew point in degrees Centigrade were actually 23.9 and 23.3 respectively. At 0621, on the day of the accident, the pilot contacted the GNV AFSS by telephone and advised that he had a flight plan on file and requested a weather update for the route of flight. The briefer advised the pilot in part that the weather in Daytona was reported as clear below 12,000 feet, visibility 5 miles and mist; no further weather information was provided to the pilot pertaining to the Daytona observation that was taken at 0553. According to an individual who patrolled the departure runway on the day of the accident at about 0735, from Cessna Boulevard to the end of runway 5, a wall of fog existed with a ceiling and visibility of 0,0, respectively. A weather observation taken at the Daytona Beach International Airport, at 0753, was reported as: wind-calm, 2.5 statute miles visibility, mist, 200 feet scattered clouds, temperature 26 degrees Centigrade, dew point 25 degrees Centigrade, altimeter 30.15 inHg. The crash site was located about 182 degrees and 6.19 nautical miles from the Daytona Beach airport. A special weather observation taken at 0804, from Daytona was reported as wind calm, visibility 1 3/4 statute miles, mist, scattered clouds at 200 feet, temperature and dew point 26 and 25 degrees Centigrade respectively, and the altimeter was 30.15 inHg. The remarks section of that observation indicates that the visibility to the west was 1 mile and the clouds were scattered variable broken. According to the homeowner of the house where the first contact was made with the tree, she reported that at the time of the accident, she could not see the treetop which was about 40-50 feet tall, and about 75 yards from her house. Review of the METAR's for the Daytona Beach International Airport, for the day of the accident revealed that with respect to the visibility, temperature, and dew point, between 0153 and 0804 local, a total of eight observations were taken. As recorded, the observations indicate that the temperature/dew point spreads were no greater than 1 degree apart or were equal, and the visibility decreased from 8 to 1 3/4 statute miles. COMMUNICATIONS The pilot was in contact with the Daytona Beach Air Traffic Control Tower, Arrival Radar South position for a period of about 25 seconds. A transcript of communications is an attachment to this report. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Examination of the accident site area revealed that the right wing tip of the airplane collided with a tree 29 feet 3 inches above ground level while on a heading of 315 degrees magnetic. The tree was located about 229 degrees and 1.01 nautical miles from the departure end of runway 23. The right main fuel tank separated from the airplane after the impact with the tree trunk and impacted with the wooden supports of an empty horse stable, then came to rest about 246 feet from the tree. Browning of grass forward of the resting point of the separated main fuel tank was noted the day after the accident. The airplane continued, and the outer portion of the damaged right wing was determined to have contacted and minimally damaged an upper unmarked power line cable located 32.5 feet above the roadway elevation. The airplane then impacted the ground about 2,490 feet from the first impact with the tree on a heading of 344 degrees magnetic from the tree. The airplane impacted the ground in a nose and right wing low attitude adjacent to a driveway leading to a horse farm. The energy path of the airplane after the ground impact was on a magnetic heading of 008 degrees and the airplane came to rest on a magnetic heading of 136 degrees. Browning of grass east of the final resting point of the airplane was noted the day after the accident. Additionally, slight fire damage was noted along the main wreckage path. Both engines were separated from the airframe and the left engine was found in the cockpit area. The right engine was located along the wreckage path. Both propellers were separated from their respective engines and all propeller blades were located in the immediate vicinity of the crash site. Fire damage to the cockpit and cabin was noted. All components necessary to sustain flight were located in the immediate vicinity of the impact point with the tree or at the main wreckage location. The landing gear was down and the flaps were determined to be retracted. Examination of the aileron, elevator, and rudder flight control systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Both engines were recovered for further examination. Examination of the left engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Both magnetos were secured and determined to be properly timed to the engine. The engine-driven fuel pump was secured to the engine and the drive coupling was intact, but the fuel pump was seized. Slight fire damage was noted externally on the fuel pump. The propeller governor was found in the midrange position and rotated freely by hand. The mixture control was found in the full rich position and the throttle control was found in the 3/4 full open position. The wet type vacuum pump was removed and the drive shaft was not failed. The pump was turned and suction and pressure were noted from each respective opening. Examination of the spark plugs revealed that the bottom Nos. 1 and 3 plugs were fouled with lead deposits. Examination of the oil filter and the oil pump gears revealed no metal or scoring, respectively. The propeller governor, magnetos, and manifold valve were bench tested with no preimpact failure or malfunction noted. Disassembly of the engine-driven fuel pump and the throttle and fuel control revealed no evidence of preimpact failure. Examination of the left engine propeller revealed that one propeller blade remained inside the hub. Examination of that blade revealed that the pitch change pin was twisted and the leading edge of the blade exhibited torsional twisting about 90 degrees. The second propeller blade was separated from the hub. Examination of that blade revealed slight aft bending of the blade with slight chordwise scratches. Examination of the right engine revealed that the throttle and fuel control, both magnetos, and the vacuum pump had separated from the engine on impact. The propeller governor was partially attached to the engine and the top portion of the governor was impact damaged. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed and thumb compression was noted in all cylinders except the No. 5 cylinder. Examination of the No. 5 cylinder revealed impact damage to the cylinder head. Removal of the No. 5 cylinder revealed that the intake valve was only contacting the valve seat around approximately 40 degrees of circumference. The engine-driven fuel pump was installed and would rotate by hand; the drive coupling was intact. The oil pump gears were intact and the drive shaft of the wet type vacuum pump was not failed. When rotated, suction and pressure were noted from each respective opening. The propeller governor, throttle and fuel control, and both magnetos were removed for examination and/or bench testing which revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the right engine propeller revealed that both propeller blades were separated from the impact damaged propeller hub. One of the two propeller blades was found adjacent to the initial impact point with the ground and a fence. The blade face exhibited imprints from the fence and the blade was bent forward with torsional twisting near the blade tip. Examination of the second blade revealed chordwise scratches on the blade with slight torsional twisting. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION Postmortem examinations of the pilot and passenger were performed by Marie A. Herrmann, M.D., of the Volusia County Medical Examiners Office, Daytona Beach, Florida. The cause of death for both was listed as blunt force impact. Toxicological analysis of specimens of the pilot and passenger were performed by the FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory (CAMI) and the University of Florida Diagnostic Referral Laboratories (U of F). The results of analysis by CAMI of specimens of the pilot were negative for tested drugs and volatiles. Carbon monoxide and cyanide testing was not performed due to lack of a suitable specimen. The results of analysis by the U of F of specimens of the pilot was positive for ethanol in the blood (.02 g/dL), and the urine (.01 g/dL). The results were also positive in the urine for acetaminophen. According to the Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR), acetaminophen is found in numerous non-prescription medications. The results of the comprehensive drug screen was negative. The results of analysis of specimens of the passenger by CAMI was negative for volatiles. Atenolol was detected in the liver and kidney fluid. According to the PDR, atenolol, is prescribed for the treatment of hypertension. Carbon Monoxide and Cyanide testing was also not performed due to a lack of a suitable specimen. The results of analysis by the U of F was negative for ethanol and for the comprehensive drug screen. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The directional gyro and attitude indicator were removed from the airplane for examination and disassembly. Examination of the directional gyro revealed scoring of the rotor housing and rotor; the rotor housing was intact. Examination of the attitude indicator revealed that the rotor housing was loose inside the case. The rotor was free to turn and no scoring was noted on the rotor housing. Acoustic analysis of a digital tape that recorded conversations from the pilot and the Daytona Beach Approach Control facility was performed by the Vehicle Recorders Laboratory of the NTSB, in Washington, D.C. The results of the analysis for each of the 3 transmissions from the pilot revealed engine rpm for both engines was recorded to be from 2,601 and 2,631 for the first transmission, 2,631 and 2,640 for the second transmission, and 2,610 and 2,640 for the final recorded transmission. The document is an attachment to this report. Review of the airplane type certificate data sheet revealed that the maximum rpm for each engine is 2,625 rpm. Review of Title 14 CFR Part 91.155 revealed that the basic VFR weather minimums to operate an airplane in Class G airspace below 1,200 feet agl in the daylight requires flight visibility of 1 statute mile and the airplane is to remain clear of clouds. The wreckage and the retained components were released to Mr. Craig Walker of Marco Flite Services, Inc., on December 29, 1998.
The pilot's inadequate weather evaluation and his continued visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions which resulted in in-flight collision with trees. A related factor was the fog.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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