OLIVE BRANCH, MS, USA
N83396
Piper PA-32R-301
While executing a localizer/dme approach, the pilot executed a missed approach before the missed approach point and advised the controller, 'we was look like we just about had it there ah I think I'd like to try it one more time to see if we can make it.' The flight was cleared for the second localizer/dme approach and the airplane remained at 2,400 feet msl, for 1.3 miles past the FAF, then descended to only 1,400 feet at the missed approach point. The airplane continued to descend from that point to where the airplane was lost from radar .8 nautical mile past the departure end of the runway. The airplane collided with trees, the ground, and came to rest with both wings separated. Post accident examination of the engine, and flight controls revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. A non-TSO'd altimeter was found in the airplane which when tested, revealed no discrepancies. Weather observation taken 3 minutes before the accident at the Memphis International Airport, located 10.9 nautical miles from the accident airport, indicates an overcast ceiling at 300 feet with visibility of 4 statute miles mist.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 14, 1998, about 2054, central standard time, a Piper PA-32R-301, N83396, registered to a private individual, collided with trees about 1.5 miles south of the Olive Branch Airport, Olive Branch, Mississippi. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated about 1926, from Pryor Field Regional Airport, Decatur, Alabama. Review of a chronological summary of flight revealed that at 1925, while on the ground at Pryor Field Regional Airport, the pilot contacted Huntsville Approach requesting IFR clearance to Olive Branch Airport. The IFR clearance was issued at 1926, and at 1929, the pilot contacted Huntsville Approach and advised that the flight was airborne. The aircraft was radar identified and the pilot was advised by the controller to climb to 6,000 feet and to proceed on course. The flight continued and at 1936, the pilot was advised to contact Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center. Air traffic control communications were then transferred to Memphis Approach Control. Review of a transcript of communications with that facility revealed that at 2016.32, the pilot radioed the facility and advised that the flight was at 6,000 feet. The controller acknowledged the contact and advised the pilot that there was no weather available for the destination airport. The controller also advised the pilot that the weather conditions at the Memphis International Airport included ifr conditions "...visibility four with mist ceiling 300 overcast wind calm altimeter's two niner niner six...." The controller asked the pilot his intentions and the pilot responded, "let's use the ah localizer one eight." The controller advised the pilot that the flight would be vectored to the Localizer/DME approach to runway 18 at the Olive Branch Airport and asked the pilot his intentions if the pilot executed a missed approach. The pilot advised that he would "...try ah ah runway two seven at memphis." The controller radioed to the pilot that "alright in the event of a missed approach you can probably expect one of the parallels at memphis due to the ah low ceilings i'll keep you advised." The pilot acknowledged this and the controller advised the pilot to descend and maintain 4,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the descent clearance and review of radar data from Memphis Approach Control revealed that at that time, the recorded altitude was 6,000 feet. The controller advised the pilot to turn to a heading of 310 degrees for a vector to the Localizer/DME approach to runway 18. The pilot acknowledged the clearance then the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet. The radar data from Memphis Approach Control indicated that the airplane at that time was at 4,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the descent clearance and the controller vectored the flight then at 2035.02, the flight was cleared to descend and maintain 2,500 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and at 2036.29, the controller advised the pilot to turn left heading 200 degrees to join the runway 18 Localizer approach to the Olive Branch Airport. At 2036.35, the pilot radioed the controller and stated "two zero zero and join the localizer three niner six." At 2037.14, the controller advised the pilot "piper three niner six you're four miles from mandd cleared for the localizer dme approach runway 18 at olive branch in the event of missed approach fly heading one eight zero climb and maintain two thousand and return to this frequency." The pilot acknowledged the transmission from the controller and 2 seconds after the pilot acknowledged the clearance, the controller advised the pilot to change to advisory frequency and to cancel IFR with him if the airport in sight or as soon as practical on frequency one two one point three. The pilot acknowledged this then there were no communications with the airplane for 4 minutes 6 seconds. Radar data from Memphis Approach Control revealed that between 2037.14 and 2040.31, the flight descended from 2,500 to 700 feet mean sea level (msl). Review of the instrument approach procedure for a straight in Localizer approach to runway 18 revealed that the minimum descent altitude for the accident airplane category is 800 feet msl. The radar data indicates that between 2040.31 and 2041.41, the altitude increased from 700 to 1,300 feet msl. At 2041.43, the pilot radioed the controller and stated "memphis eight three three niner six back with you ah i'd like to ah go back around and try that one more time before we come over there." The controller acknowledged the request and advised the pilot to climb and maintain two thousand five hundred and to fly heading zero nine zero degrees. The pilot acknowledged only the heading to fly. The controller radioed the pilot and stated "piper three niner six what were the flight conditions in the ah olive branch area." The pilot responded at 2042.43, "we was look like we just about had it there ah i think i'd like to try it one more time see if we can make it." The controller acknowledged this and vectored the flight to a "base" leg. At 2048.48, the controller advised the pilot "piper three niner six turn left heading two zero zero join the runway one eight localizer at olive branch and advise when you're established." The pilot acknowledged this and at 2049.47, the controller stated "piper three niner six you're two miles from mandd cleared for the localizer dme approach runway 18 at olive branch change to advisory frequency is approved in the event of missed approach fly heading one eight zero just continue south bound climb and maintain two thousand and return to this frequency." The pilot acknowledged the approach clearance and there were no further recorded radio communications with the accident pilot. Radar data from Memphis Approach Control revealed that between 2049.49 to 2053.26, the flight descended from 2,400 to 700 feet msl. The last radar target indicated that the airplane was at 700 feel msl. There was no mention by the controller during any time that the flight was in contact with Memphis Approach Control that the altitude displayed on the controllers scope was different from the requested altitude to be flown. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Review of the pilot's second pilot logbook which began with the first entry dated July 14, 1994, through the last entry dated October 23, 1998, revealed that on the inside page, handwriting indicates a Biennial Flight Review (BFR) was accomplished in September 1994. The logbook indicates that on March 30, 1996, two flights lasting a documented 5.4 hours in the accident make and model airplane were documented for the wings program. The logbook also indicates that on October 25, 1997, an entry indicates that the pilot completed the ground portion only of the flight review required by FAR 61.56. An entry dated September 9, 1998, contained a signature with the column of dual instruction marked. The entry does not specifically indicate that a BFR flight review was accomplished. Between March 14, 1998, and the last entry dated October 23, 1998, the pilot recorded 35 hours of actual instrument flight time which included a total of 27 instrument approaches. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Federal Aviation Administration records indicate that the airplane registration paperwork was signed by the pilot on June 1, 1994. The permanent aircraft maintenance records were not located; they were requested several times from the attorney who represents the estate of the pilot. According to a work order, in February 1994, the altimeter was found to be "defective" during a test of it and the pitot static system. A non-Technical Standard Order (TSO) altimeter, serial number M5998, was installed by Des Moines Flying Service, Inc., a FAA certified repair station, to replace the "defective" altimeter. Another work order that was located indicated that on March 16, 1998, the non TSO'd altimeter was certified to 20,000 feet, the static system, and blind encoder were certified in accordance with 14 CFR Part 91.411, by Olive Branch Avionics, a FAA certified repair station located in Olive Branch, Mississippi. The transponder was certified that same day by the same facility in accordance with 14 CFR Part 91.413. According to the owner of the repair station that tested the altimeter in March 1998, the altimeter was removed from the airplane. The airplane was inspected last in accordance with an annual inspection in September 1998. According to the FAA certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic with inspection authorization who performed the inspection, at that time the airframe total time and tachometer indicated 3,025.7 hours, and the engine time since overhaul was 824.5 hours. He used the Piper inspection form and reported changing the induction air filter, changed the engine oil and oil filter, cleaned and regapped and tested all spark plugs, replaced the Emergency Locator Transmitter battery, and stop drilled a cracked lower tail cone. He also replaced the static wick on the left stabilator, repaired a bonding strap on the right flap, and replaced the main battery. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION On the day of the accident about 1100 central standard time, a person using the registration number of the accident airplane phoned the Jackson Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) and requested an outlook weather briefing for the afternoon and the evening for a planned IFR flight from Olive Branch, to Decatur or the Huntsville, Alabama, area. The person advised the briefing specialist that the flight would depart about 1400 hours and would return between 1800 and 2000 hours. The briefing specialist advised the caller that the freezing level started at 12,000 feet, and "...the only thing i've got for you then is an airmet sierra for ifr conditions and thats probably gonna be ah remaining you know most the day appar." The caller questioned the ceiling and the weather conditions at Memphis, to which the briefing specialist responded that an overcast ceiling existed at 300 [feet], and the surface visibility was 4 miles. The specialist also provided the weather conditions at Muscle Shoals which indicated a visibility of 1.25 miles and a ceiling at 200 [feet] broken. The weather conditions for Decatur was provided which indicated that the surface visibility was 1.5 statute miles with light rain and mist, and an overcast ceiling existed at 500 feet. The Huntsville weather was also provided which indicated that the surface visibility was 2 statute miles with light rain and mist, and an overcast ceiling existed at 300 feet. Additionally, the forecast for the Memphis area that was valid from 1800 UTC through 0300 UTC, which was about 6 minutes after the accident, was provided. That forecast called for unrestricted visibilities and ceilings of 1,500 overcast, occasionally, 600 feet broken. The specialist also provided the forecast for Huntsville and stated that review of the radar indicated moderate precipitation was detected from Muscle Shoals to Huntsville, moving east-northeast. The specialist advised the caller "but uh but just low pretty much low ifr all day and and at least light to moderate rain." That was acknowledged by the caller and the briefing was concluded at 1104.04. At 1222.41, a person using the registration number of the accident airplane called again to the Jackson AFSS, and stated that he had received a briefing "a little bit ago" but didn't recall the tops of the clouds and requested that information for a IFR flight to Decatur, Alabama. The briefing specialist responded "...do you need the winds aloft do you just need an update on the on the weather." The caller responded "just the weather" and the briefing specialist questioned when was the last briefing; the caller responded "oh about an hour ago." The specialist advised the person of the weather conditions at Memphis which indicated a surface visibility of 2 miles in mist, and an overcast ceiling at 500 feet. The specialist advised the caller that a special weather observation taken 22 minutes earlier at Decatur indicated that the surface visibility was 4 miles with light rain showers and mist, ceilings 400, and 800 broken and 1,500 feet overcast. The ceiling varied between 200 and 600 feet. There were no reports of any pilot reports and the caller who later identified himself as Ernie Hamilton, filed an IFR flight plan for the flight from Olive Branch, Mississippi, to Decatur, Alabama. At 1912.44, a person using the registration number of the accident airplane called the Anniston AFSS, and advised the specialist that the flight was "...ifr off of decatur for uh olive branch, mississippi, that's olv oscar lima." The specialist questioned when the flight was leaving and the caller responded "oh as soon as uh you can get me a uh flight plan on file and about one hour flying time." An IFR flight plan was filed with the accident pilot listed as the pilot in the flight plan. The specialist stated "(unintelligible) blue and red all right gotcha flight plan anything else." The caller responded with a mostly unintelligible comment. The specialist then advised the caller "it's an airmet for ifr all along there did you want an alternate," to which the caller responded "uh just (unintelligible) i'm ifr" to which the specialist responded 4 seconds later "yeah but uh normally when it's forecast ifr you file an alternate but i (unintelligible) if you don't want one that's fine." The caller responded "...i need an update just on the weather." The specialist questioned when was the last briefing and the caller responded about 2 hours earlier. The specialist advised the caller of the weather conditions at the departure airport, the weather conditions at the Memphis Airport which indicated that the surface visibility was 6 miles in mist, scattered clouds existed at 600 feet and overcast clouds existed at 1,500 feet. The caller was also provided the weather conditions for the airport in Tupelo, Mississippi. The called advised the specialist that Memphis would be the alternate and the specialist advised the caller that the forecast for Memphis occasionally included a visibility of 2 miles and an overcast ceiling of 600 feet, through 2200 that evening. The call was concluded at 1915.05. A METAR weather observation taken at 2051 (approximately 3 minutes before the accident), from the Memphis International Airport (KMEM), indicates that the wind was from 250 degrees at 4 knots, the visibility was 4 statute miles, mist, overcast ceiling at 300 feet, temperature and dewpoint of 14 degrees Celcius (57.2 degrees Fahrenheit), altimeter 29.96 inHg. The KMEM airport is located about 297 degrees and 10.9 nautical miles from the accident site. According to the Olive Branch Airport Manager, he was notified on the evening of the accident about 2118, that the accident airplane was lost from radar. He drove to the airport and during the trip, noted heavy fog with visibility of 1/8 mile or less. Transcriptions of the weather briefings are attachments to this report. COMMUNICATIONS The pilot was in contact with Memphis Approach Control and a transcription of communications is an attachment to this report. AERODROME INFORMATION Runway 18 is 6,000 feet long and 100 feet wide. The surface is asphalt and the runway elevation is 401 feet mean sea level. The runway is equipped with medium intensity runway lights (MIRL), runway end identifier lights (REIL) which are pilot activated on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), and a visual approach slope indicator (VASI) which consists of four lights on the left side of the runway. Runway 18 is served in part by a localizer approach which operates on the frequency of 109.3 MHz, and has a minimum descent altitude of 800 feet msl, for a straight in approach to runway 18 for category A, B, and C, aircraft. The MANDD intersection which is the final approach fix (FAF) is identified by ra
The pilot's failure to follow IFR procedures when he descended below the published minimum descent altitude.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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