HORTENSE, GA, USA
USA
SIKORSKY UH-60A
THE HELICOPTER WAS REGISTERED TO THE U.S. ARMY AND BEING OPERATED BY THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE. A WITNESS LOCATED ABOUT 5 MI SOUTH OF THE ACCIDENT SITE STATED HE HEARD A HELICOPTER FLY OVERHEAD TOWARDS THE NORTHEAST, UP THE ALTAMAHA RIVER, AT ABOUT 1030. THE HELICOPTER WAS TRAVELING FASTER THAN MOST HELICOPTERS, AND WAS FLYING VERY LOW AT TREETOP LEVEL. A POWER OUTAGE OCCURRED AT 1033. THE HELICOPTER HAD COLLIDED WITH UNMARKED WIRES 82 FT ABOVE THE RIVER. THE PIC DID NOT COMPLETE A RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET FOR THE ASSIGNED MISSION NOR WAS IT APPROVED BY THE APPROVING AUTHORITY. THE COPILOT'S INJURIES WERE CONSISTENT WITH BEING ON THE FLIGHT CONTROLS AT THE TIME OF IMPACT.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 14, 1993, at about 1033 eastern daylight time, a Sikorsky UH-60A, serial No. 81-23577, call sign Omaha 77 (OM77), registered to the U.S. Army, operated by the U.S. Customs Service, on a public-use flight, searching for clandestine airstrips and suspected drug drop sites in the south Georgia area, collided with power transmission lines and crashed. The helicopter was destroyed. The airline transport pilot-in-command, copilot, air officer, and one passenger were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Brunswick Glynco Jetport at an undetermined time. The UH-60A helicopter was last observed on the ground at the Brunswick Glynco Jetport at about 0915 by a member of the Georgia National Guard. The owner of the Altamaha Park Fish Camp, located about 5 miles south of the crash site, stated he heard a helicopter fly overhead towards the northeast, up the Altamaha River at about 1030. The helicopter was traveling faster than most helicopters, and was flying very low at treetop level. An employee of the Georgia Power Company, from the Brunswick District, stated to the NTSB investigator-in-charge at the crash site, that Macon Control Center records indicate that a power outage occurred at the West Brunswick Ludowici 115KV at about 1033. An airplane was sent from the Brunswick Glynco Airport to search for the source of the power outage, and located the downed wires at about 1135. Ground personnel arrived at the power outage at about 1245 and walked down to the river to investigate the cause of the outage. While looking up the river through a pair of binoculars, aircraft wreckage was located on a sandbar. Personnel were immediately dispatched to the crash site by boat, and returned a short time later with some personal effects that had been recovered from the crash site. The local authorities were notified of the accident by telephone. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Information pertaining to the pilot-in-command, Carl R. Talafous, and copilot, Alan J. Klumpp, is contained in NTSB Form 6120.1/2 and NTSB Form 6120.4. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Information pertaining to aircraft information is contained in NTSB Form 6120.4. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. For additional information, see NTSB Form 6120.4. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Examination of the crash site revealed the helicopter collided with three conductor wires located about 82 feet above the Altamaha River, and two static wires located about 95 feet above the river in a nose-up attitude. The blue and yellow main rotor blades, main rotor head, main rotor pylon, right engine, left and right horizontal stabilator and tail rotor pylon separated. The helicopter continued forward about 975 feet, colliding with trees and the river in a nose-down attitude. The helicopter came to rest inverted. The nose section and mid fuselage area was destroyed. The main fuel cells and internal auxiliary fuel bladders were not ruptured. Examination of the wire strike protection system revealed no evidence of wire engagement. Examination of the main rotor system, transmission, and tail rotor system revealed no evidence to indicate a precrash failure or malfunction. The blue and black main rotor blades separated from the main rotor hub and were not recovered. The blue and black pitch change rods were fractured at the blade end. Wire marks were present on the blue pitch change rod. The blue and black spindle assemblies, spindle bolt, and all dampers were fractured at the blade end, except for the yellow damper which was fractured at the hub. There was no lead/lag damage on the blue and black elastomeric bearings, or evidence of droop stop or flap restrainer crushing on the blue, black, and yellow main rotor blade assemblies. The yellow main rotor blade was attached to the main rotor hub by the spindle through bolt. The trailing edge of the yellow blade was damaged about 46 inches outboard of the cuff and about 99 inches inboard from the blade tip. The end of the yellow main rotor blade was crushed inward, and no damage was present along the leading edge of the rotor blade. The yellow pitch change rod was fractured at the swashplate end. The red main rotor blade was fractured completely through in a chordwise direction 27 inches inboard of the expandable pin. No damage was present along the leading edge of the red main rotor blade. The red droop stop was fractured and the red flap retainer was not located. The bifilar assembly was attached to the hub with all bifilar weights attached. One bifilar arm was bent upward. The stationary swashplate was fractured through 360 degrees with the rotating swashplate. Wire strike marks were present on the lower side of the blue hub arm. The rotating scissors were fractured at the swashplate end. The upper housing of the transmission was separated. The lower portion of the transmission was attached with all mounting bolts. The tailrotor gearbox, tailrotor head, and tailrotor blades were not recovered. Tailrotor driveshaft continuity was confirmed from the oil cooler blower aft to the intermediate gearbox. The thomas coupling at the output of the intermediate gear box drive shaft separated from the tail pylon in an upward direction. Examination of the airframe revealed no evidence to indicate any precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the flight control system revealed no evidence of preimpact malfunction or failure. Examination of the left engine assembly and engine accessories revealed no evidence to indicate a precrash failure or malfunction.(See Corpus Christi Army Depot Analytical Investigation Branch Report Number USASC 93-328). Examination of the right engine assembly and accessories revealed no evidence to indicate a precrash failure or malfunction. The engine compressor case was fractured aft of the first stage compressor blisk. A significant amount of rollover was present on the first stage compressor blades in the opposite direction of rotation. Compressor blade tip rubbing was present on the compressor case halves at the six o'clock position. The gas producer turbines, nozzles, power turbines and nozzles revealed no evidence of operation at elevated temperatures. Capture marks were present inside the compressor case, adjacent to the stage 1 and stage 2 vane locations. The capture marks formed a scallop shaped pattern corresponding to a vane range of 300 to 500. (See Corpus Christi Army Depot Analytical Investigation Branch Report Number USASC 93-328). MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION Postmortem examination of the pilot-in-command, Carl R. Talafous, was conducted by Dr. Gerald T. Gowitt, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Division of Forensic Sciences, Decature, Georgia, on July 15, 1993. The cause of death was generalized trauma. Post-mortem toxicology studies of specimens were performed by the Forensic Toxicology Research Section, Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. These studies were negative for neutral, acidic, and basic drugs. Postmortem examination of the copilot, Alan J. Klumpp, was conducted by Dr. Mark A. Koponen, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Division of Forensic Sciences, Decature, Georgia, on July 15, 1993. The cause of death was multiple extensive blunt force injuries. Injuries sustained during the crash sequence were consistent with an individual on the flight controls at the time of impact. Post-mortem toxicology of specimens were performed by the Forensic Toxicology Research Section, Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. These studies were negative were neutral, acidic, and basic drugs. TEST AND RESEARCH Review of mission records on file at Jacksonville Air Branch, Communications Command Control Intelligence Center (3CI- EAST), and written procedures contained in the Aviation Operations Handbook, revealed the pilot-in-command (PIC) did not complete a risk assessment worksheet for the assigned mission nor was it approved by the approving authority. The PIC did not make required position reports or establish flight following with 3CI- EAST, sector communications, or the Jacksonville Aviation Branch. The Jacksonville Sectional Chart, 51st edition, dated March 4, 1993, indicates the power transmission lines that the UH-60A helicopter collided with are not marked in accordance with the criteria listed in the United States Government Specifications, IACC NO.2, Sectional Aeronautical Tactical Pilotage VFR Terminal Aera Charts, dated July 1986. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The helicopter wreckage was released to Mr. Dennis E. Lindsay, Safety Program Manager, U.S. Customs Service on July 17, 1993. The engines were released to Mr. Dennis E. Lindsay, on October 19, 1993. Additional parties to the NTSB investigation were MW4 John Allmer, United States Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.
THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF THE FLIGHT, THE CO-PILOT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE ALTITUDE, AND THE FAILURE OF BOTH PILOTS TO SEE AND AVOID THE WIRES. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND'S INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT PREPARATION AND PLANNING OF THE ROUTE OF FLIGHT.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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