LAS VEGAS, NV, USA
CGIUX
Cessna 172N
During each of the three attempted landings the pilot received surface wind information from the tower that was reporting variable wind conditions from 160 degrees to 210 degrees, with the velocity from 12 knots to 22 knots, including higher gusts to 25 knots. The pilot was cleared to land on runway 12, but was unable to maintain runway alignment due to the winds and performed a go-around. The tower subsequently cleared the pilot to land on runway 25; however, the pilot was unable to complete the second landing attempt and performed another go-around. He reported that on the third landing he compensated for the crosswind condition, but as the airplane touched down it was blown right of centerline. He aborted the landing, applied full power, and rotated at 45 knots. Due to obstructions, he did not lower the nose of the airplane to gain airspeed. After clearing the obstructions, he made a turn to the right and lowered the nose; however, the airplane continued to descend. The pilot said that as the airspeed decayed through 40 knots, he knew the airplane was going to stall. During the accident sequence he did not recall hearing the stall warning horn. The airframe and engine were examined on-scene. No discrepancies were noted with the engine. Examination of the stall warning horn system revealed that the reed assembly was missing and could not be located at the accident site. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane at a low altitude and then saw the right wing drop prior to striking the chain link fence. The maximum factory demonstrated crosswind capability for the Cessna 172 is 15 knots.
On May 8, 1999, at 1418 hours Pacific daylight time, a Canadian registered Cessna 172N, CGIUX, collided with a fence and the ground following an in-flight loss of control during an aborted landing attempt at the North Las Vegas airport, Las Vegas, Nevada. The aircraft, owned and operated by Victoria Flight Training, Inc., Victoria, British Columbia, and rented by the pilot for a personal flight under 14 CFR Part 91, was destroyed. The Canadian private pilot and a passenger, the sole occupants, received serious injuries. The flight originated from Albuquerque, New Mexico, at 0930 mountain standard time. A refueling stop was made at the Grand Canyon, Arizona, airport, and the flight was scheduled to terminate at the North Las Vegas airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight plan had been filed. Reported winds at North Las Vegas airport at the time of the accident were from 180 degrees at 15 knots, variable from 140 degrees to 220 degrees. Two weather observation facilities, one located 8 nmi south of the accident site reported wind velocities at 14 knots gusting to 29 knots. The other facility located 8 nmi east reported wind velocities at 16 knots gusting to 29 knots. The pilot received a weather briefing prior to departure from Albuquerque, which indicated clear skies with winds from the northwest at 10-15 knots. They arrived at the Grand Canyon approximately 45 minutes after their scheduled arrival time due to stronger than anticipated head winds. The pilot stated that he and his passenger had some coffee, and he then called the Flight Service Station (FSS) to obtain an updated weather brief and amend their arrival time into North Las Vegas. The updated weather forecast predicted clear skies, but there was a "stronger wind and the temperature [was] slightly higher than anticipated in the morning." The pilot reported that the flight from the Grand Canyon to North Las Vegas was uneventful. After receiving ATIS information, the pilot heard the tower "notifying each plane intending to land to do so at their own risk." The pilot said he "had never heard this before and this concerned me." He was then cleared to land on runway 12. The pilot further stated that he was concerned about being unfamiliar with the region and not being used to the unusual weather conditions "which seemed to change rapidly." He noted the winds at the time of his arrival were from the northwest at 17 knots, gusting to 25 knots. He reported hearing radio communications with an airplane landing in front him questioning the tower about moderate to severe turbulent crosswind conditions for runway 12. He stated that this made him nervous, but he kept it in mind during his approach. The pilot reported that he was on centerline approximately 20 feet above the touchdown point when the airplane was blown to the right side of the runway. At this point he did not feel a correction would be possible and he aborted the landing and informed the tower of his intentions. The tower informed him that he was cleared to land runway 25, which might be a little better from the standpoint of the winds. The pilot stated that he made a tight turn to enter the base leg for runway 25, and on the transition from base to final, he was right of the runway and had to correct back to the left to realign himself with centerline. He reported that he thought it was a very "sloppy" approach and he did not feel comfortable. He aborted the landing a second time and informed tower of his intentions, setting up again for runway 25. He stated that there were no discrepancies noted with the approach, the airspeed, or the rate of descent. The pilot reported that if he had to go around again, he would request to land at McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada, because they "have wider runways that would [accommodate] for wind direction." He stated that he input rudder and aileron to correct for the "severe" crosswind. As soon as the airplane touched down, it was blown to the right. He attempted to straighten the airplane before applying the brakes, but before he was able to correct the alignment, the airplane was blown off the runway. He did not apply the brakes because of the sideways motion of the airplane at a high rate of speed, and instead he applied full power to abort the landing. He was aware that there was fence to his right and hangars on the other side. He noted that it was taking longer than usual to obtain takeoff speed due to the airplane travelling on the dirt, and he rotated at 45 knots. After liftoff the airplane was still being blown to the right. The pilot stated that the airplane barely cleared the buildings and he started calling mayday. He reported that his attention was divided between attempting to correct for wind, watch his airspeed, trying to attain best rate of climb, looking out the window to avoid other objects, and communicating his intentions to the tower along with a distress call. He noted that the airspeed was decreasing and he did not want to lower the nose because he was not sure if he had cleared all the buildings. He made a slight turn in the direction of the downwind leg and lowered to attempt to pick up airspeed, but the airplane began to descend. The pilot reported that as the airspeed decayed through 40 knots he knew "we were going into a stall." The pilot further noted that the stall warning horn was not operating during the accident sequence. According to North Las Vegas airport air traffic control personnel, the airplane had been cleared to land runway 12, and was observed performing a go-around. The airplane was then cleared to land runway 25 and they observed the airplane initiate another go-around. On the third approach, tower personnel noted that the airplane was about 1/3 of the way down the runway when it appeared to make a right turn and gain altitude. The maneuver did not appear steady, and tower personnel noted the airplane's wings were rocking back and forth with "pronounced movement." They noted that the aircraft leveled slightly and continued into a right crosswind with "no appreciable gain in altitude." They stated that the nose pitched forward slightly and the right wing dropped. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane at a low altitude when the right wing struck the chain link fence. They further stated that they observed fuel on the ground at the accident site. The airplane and powerplant were inspected on airport property, approximately 150 yards south of the actual accident site, by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector with technical assistance provided by Cessna Aircraft Company and Textron-Lycoming, who were parties to the investigation. No discrepancies were noted with the engine or airframe systems. The airplane manufacturer applied vacuum pressure to the stall warning horn vent at the accident site. He did not hear any sound emanating from the stall warning horn. The stall warning horn was removed from the airplane, and the manufacturer's representative observed that the reed assembly was missing. He was unable to locate the reed assembly during the ensuing search of the accident location. According to the regulations under which the airplane was certificated (Civil Air Regulations, Part 3) a stall warning device is a required item of equipment. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook provided by Cessna Aircraft Company for the Cessna 172, the airplane's maximum demonstrated crosswind component is 15 knots.
The pilot's premature rotation during the aborted landing and his failure to attain and maintain sufficient airspeed, which resulted in a stall mush. Factors in the accident were the pilot's decision to attempt a landing in adverse wind conditions beyond the crosswind capability of the airplane and an inoperative stall warning horn system.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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