MCGRATH, AK, USA
N4811T
Piper PA-32-300
The commercial pilot was returning to his company base after dropping passengers and freight at two intermediate stops. The distance on the route from the company base airport to the accident site, was about 243 nautical miles. The pilot said he landed at his last intermediate stop with the fuel selector on the right main tank, and departed with the fuel selector on the left main fuel tank. Both the left and right wing tip fuel tanks were full of fuel. While descending toward the company base, the engine quit. The pilot selected the right wing tip tank, turned on the fuel boost pump, and attempted to restart the engine without success. He selected the left wing tip tank, but the engine did not start. The pilot made an emergency landing in a small opening in the trees about 15 miles south of the company base airport. During the landing, the airplane collided with several small trees, and then touched down in soft, boggy terrain. The director of operations for the company responded to the accident scene. He reported the left main fuel tank was empty. Fuel was present in the right main tank, and in each wing tip tank. For flight planning purposes, the director of operations said the company uses a fuel burn of 20 gallons per hour, and an airspeed of 125 knots. An FAA inspector inspected the airplane. The inspector reported the left main tank was empty. Fuel flowed from each fuel tank to the engine, except from the left main tank. After replacing the propeller, the engine was started, and it ran normally. The airplane owner's handbook notes that the fuel selector should be changed to another tank before fuel is exhausted from the tank in use. The handbook also notes that it may take up to ten seconds, after switching fuel tanks, to restore power if fuel exhaustion has occurred.
On July 22, 1999, about 1600 Alaska daylight time, a wheel equipped Piper PA-32-300 airplane, N4811T, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing about 15 miles south of McGrath, Alaska, at latitude 62 degrees, 42.6 minutes north, and longitude 155 degrees, 38.3 minutes west. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country positioning flight under Title 14 CFR Part 91 when the accident occurred. The airplane was operated by the Bidzy Ta Hot Aana Corporation, doing business as Tanana Air Service, Fairbanks, Alaska. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. A VFR flight plan was filed. The flight originated at the Sparrevohn Long Range Radar Station (LRRS), Alaska, about 1508. During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on July 22, 1999, the director of operations for the company reported the pilot was returning to McGrath after dropping passengers in Nikoli, Alaska, and freight in Sparrevohn. The total distance on the route of flight, to the accident site, is about 243 nautical miles. During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on July 23, 1999, the pilot said he was slowly descending from 8,500 feet msl toward McGrath. He said the left main fuel tank of the airplane was empty, and he was operating from the right main fuel tank. Both the left and right wing tip fuel tanks were full of fuel. About 3,500 feet msl, the engine quit. The engine did not run rough, sputter, or vibrate. The pilot selected the right wing tip tank, turned on the fuel boost pump, and attempted to restart the engine without success. He selected the left wing tip tank, but the engine did not start. He then switched back to the right wing tip tank without success. The pilot said he selected an emergency landing area in a small opening in the trees. During the landing, the airplane collided with several small trees, and then touched down in soft, boggy terrain. The airplane received damage to the wings, empennage, landing gear, and fuselage. In the Pilot/Operator report (NTSB form 6120.1/2) submitted by the company, the pilot included a statement about the accident. The pilot reported that prior to departing McGrath, the airplane's wing tip fuel tanks were full. They each contain 17 gallons. The right main fuel tank was full. The main fuel tanks each have a capacity of 25 gallons. The left main fuel tank was filled to the filler neck tab. The pilot said in his written statement that he departed Sparrevohn LRRS with the fuel selector on the left main tank. He was operating on the left fuel tank when the engine quit. He then switched to the right wing tip tank, and then to the left wing tip tank. According to personnel at the New Piper Aircraft, the quantity of fuel at the filler neck tab would correspond to 18 gallons. The director of operations for the company responded to the accident scene. He reported by telephone to the NTSB IIC that the left main fuel tank was empty. Fuel was in the right main tank, and in each wing tip tank. For flight planning purposes, the director of operations said the company uses a fuel burn of 20 gallons per hour, and an airspeed of 125 knots. On July 29, 1999, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness inspector, Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), traveled to McGrath and inspected the accident airplane. The inspector reported the left main tank was empty. Fuel flowed from each fuel tank to the engine, except from the left main tank. After replacing the propeller, the engine was started, and it ran normally. In Section III, Operating Instructions contained in the Piper PA-32-300 owner's handbook, the cruise section of the book states, in part: "In order to keep the airplane in best lateral trim during cruise flight, the fuel should be used alternately from each tank, and when they are nearly exhausted, from each tip tank...The following list contains, as a reminder, a few of the more highly recommended fuel operation procedures." 4. "Fuel tank selection at low altitude is not recommended, since little time is available in the event of an error in tank selection. When switching tanks, make sure that the selector drops into a detent, and is lined up with the desired tank." 6. "To preclude making a hasty selection, and to provide continuity of flow, it is desired that the selector be changed to another tank before fuel is exhausted from the tank in use." In Section IV, Emergency Procedures, the Engine Power Loss In-Flight section states, in part: "Complete engine power loss is usually caused by fuel flow interruption, and power will be restored shortly after fuel flow is restored. If power loss occurs at low altitude, the first step is to prepare for an emergency landing. NOTE - If engine failure was caused by fuel exhaustion, power will not be regained after tanks are switched until empty fuel lines are filled, which may require up to ten seconds."
The pilot's improper management of the fuel supply, and subsequent fuel starvation. A factor in the accident was unsuitable terrain for a forced landing.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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