CHESAPEAKE, VA, USA
N721CB
Schweizer 269-C1
The student pilot was conducting a magneto check with a 90-degree gusty crosswind. As she raised the collective for the check, the helicopter started to wobble and then rolled over. The helicopter was parked on terrain that sloped away from the wind. The student pilot reported that she tried to move the cyclic into the wind to control the wobbling, but she had applied friction to the collective to the point that she could not move it while raising the collective for the magneto check. The FAA approved checklist called for the cyclic and collective frictions to be removed prior to the magneto check. The operator's checklist did not require the removal of the cyclic friction prior to magneto check. However, the operator reported that students were taught never to tighten the cyclic or friction to a degree that it could be moved if needed.
On June 3, 2000, at 0950 Eastern Standard Time, a Schweizer 269-C1, N721CB, was substantially damaged at Hampton Roads Airport, Chesapeake, Virginia. The certificated student pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the instructional flight. No flight plan had been filed for the flight that was operated under 14 CFR Part 91. The student pilot stated: "...Getting ready to do the mag check. RPM 2000, MP was up to 12 - 13 inches. Helo starts wobbling, felt like right side wanted to pick up. Kept feet on pedals, little left, then right, started to push coll[ective] down, started to roll." The flight instructor reported: "I was watching the magneto check when suddenly helicopter came off the ground and was about 2 feet high. At the same time it started to roll to the left and blades hit the ground. I ran to the helicopter, pulled the fuel valve and mixture and turned mags off. After that I helped...[the student pilot] out." A nearby witness reported: "...I stood at the fence approx. 30 to 40 yards to observe the student's pre-flight, run-up, and lift off of the helicopter N721CB. The student was at the stage of the run-up where you check the magnetos. I could tell because the blades were pitched upward. I saw the helicopter get light on the skids enough where the rear of the skids moved towards the fence. The front of the skids appeared to pretty much stay in one position. The rear skids looked to be approx. 2 - 3 inches off the ground. Before the rollover, the front stayed down. It looked like it kind of slid around, about 8 - 12 inches, at the same time, a gust of wind hit and immediately began to roll over toward the fence. At this point I turned to run away from helicopter. It happened fast enough where I saw the blade strike the ground while I was turning to run." In an interview, the operator reported the helicopter was parked on a hard surface ramp that was sloped. The helicopter was on a heading of 270 degrees, with the left side about 2 to 3 degrees lower due to the slope. The helicopter was parked at that location because a new fuel service was operating at the airport, and they were parking their fuel trucks in the area previously used by the helicopters. The flight instructor reported that the helicopter was in the same position it had been left after its last flight. He did not rotate the helicopter into the wind because the move would have placed the tail rotor in close proximity with a nearby fence. However, he added that there were wheels on the skids, and they could have been lowered and the helicopter pushed to another area where the tail rotor would not be close to a fence. The flight instructor also reported that he was outside of the helicopter to allow the student to build confidence in performing her pre-takeoff checks. The student pilot reported that she had previously flown solo twice. On the accident flight she had started the engine, engaged the rotor, and was conducting her preflight checks while her flight instructor observed from outside the helicopter. The magneto check was to be conducted at 2,000 engine rpm, and 15 inches of manifold pressure from the collective. She had pulled the collective to 12 to 13 inches when she felt the helicopter wobbling and then it tried to rotate nose right. She applied left pedal and there was no effect. The nose then tried to rotate to the left and she applied right pedal, again with no affect. The helicopter was still wobbling and as she lowered the collective, and it rolled over. The student pilot also reported that she had conducted takeoff and touchdown practice in stronger winds than were present. However, she added that she had never performed her pre-takeoff checks with a direct crosswind of the velocity present. When the helicopter started to wobble, she tried to move the cyclic into the wind but was unable due to the previously applied friction. According to the Schweizer 269-C1, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), approved flight manual, the friction on the collective and cyclic are tightened prior to rotor engagement. However, they are released and proper movement of the cyclic checked, prior to raising the collective for the magneto check. According to the checklist used by the operator, the friction on the collective and cyclic were tightened prior to rotor engagement. Prior to the magneto check, the friction on the collective was loosened. No mention was made of loosening the friction on the cyclic prior to the magneto check. In a telephone interview, the co-owner of Chesapeake Bay Helicopters, who was also a helicopter flight instructor, reported he had soloed the student pilot and her height prevented her from restraining the collective with her knees while conducting the magneto check. He had instructed her to friction the cyclic while conducting the magneto check, but not to tighten it to the point that it could not be moved. He added that when he checked the friction on the cyclic after the accident, it was tight enough to prevent inadvertent movement, but could still be moved. The student pilot reported her total flight experience as 19.9 hours with 1.1 hours as pilot-in-command. The flight instructor reported his total helicopter flight experience as 248 hours with 33.8 hours as a helicopter flight instructor. Following are the winds from three nearby airports: Suffolk Municipal (SQF) 0943 EDT Winds from 040 @ 11 knots, gusts to 17 knots Chesapeake Municipal (CPK) 0941 EDT Winds from 030 @ 10 knots, gusts to 16 knots NAS Norfolk (NGU) 0955 EDT Winds from 010 @ 21 knots, gusts to 25 knots
the failure of the student pilot to reduce the friction on the cyclic prior to raising the collective for the magneto check. A factor was the failure of the company to adequately define the steps in the checklist.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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