Swanton, OH, USA
N2429B
Globe GC-1B
The pilot reported that at the time he was landing, multiple runways were being used and he was sequenced between two jets. He was dividing his time and attention between the other airplanes and his airplane. He remembered that he rotated the landing switch to the down position, and believed the landing gear had extended. However, when he flared to land, the propeller contacted the runway, and at that point he realized the landing gear was not down and locked. The airplane slid to a stop on the runway with the landing gear retracted. Examination of the airplane revealed the rotary switch which initiated the electro/hydraulic extension of the landing gear was worn and it was necessary to ensure that the switch was rotated fully to make the electrical contacts necessary for landing gear extension. A check of the warning light that illuminated with a closed throttle, and landing gear not extended, revealed it would illuminate only of the throttle was pulled forcibly to the throttle closed position. The airplane was also equipped with a pair of red painted wires on the top of the wing which were visible when the landing gear was retracted, and not visible when the landing gear was extended. The pilot also reported that due to the volume of air traffic, he failed to verify the landing gear was down and locked prior to landing.
On April 18, 2001, at 1651 eastern daylight time, a Globe Swift GC-1B, N2429B, was substantially damaged while landing at Toledo Express Airport, Swanton, Ohio. The certificated commercial pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight. No flight plan had been filed for the flight that was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported that when he arrived in the area, he was sequenced behind a DC-9 for runway 34. Additional traffic was landing on runway 25, and the pilot was advised of a possible go-around if there was a conflict with that traffic. In addition, a Cessna Citation, also landing on runway 34, had been sequenced behind the pilot. The pilot reported that when he was on base leg, he placed the landing gear switch in the down position, and planned to make a wheel landing. However, due to the volume of air traffic, he failed to verify the green light that would have indicated both main landing gear were down and locked. His first indication that the landing gear was not down, occurred when the propeller struck the runway, followed by the airplane sliding on the runway. After the airplane came to rest, he checked the landing gear switch and it was in the down position. According to an airworthiness inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the landing gear was electrically controlled, and hydraulically actuated. The landing gear up/down selector was a rotary knob mounted on the instrument panel. When rotated to the proper position, contacts allowed electric power to flow to an electrically driven hydraulic pump, which then raised or lowered the landing gear. The airplane was equipped with a warning light that illuminated when the throttle was closed and the landing gear was not extended. In addition, there was a single green light on the instrument panel that was illuminated when the landing gear was down and locked. Red painted wires on the top of each wing were extended when the landing gear was retracted, and not visible when the landing gear was extended. Further, the inspector reported: "...The throttle had to be in the full aft, idle, position and an extra pull given to the throttle to activate the warning micro switch [for the landing gear warning light]...the landing gear selector could be carefully rotated from the up to the down position, just clearing the rod spring loaded anti-retraction safety button, without energizing the extension cycle. However, when the selector was further rotated towards the full down position there was a positive 'snap' feeling in the selector knob as it entered the full down selection position and the extension cycle was energized...." When the throttle was fully closed, and the landing gear switch rotated fully to down position, all appropriate mechanical and electrical warning systems worked. Additionally, during the gear up landing, two structural bulkheads located on the bottom of the fuselage, at 32 and 36 inches behind the firewall had been ground down on the bottom and would require replacement.
the failure of the pilot to verify the landing gear was extended prior to landing, due to diverted attention.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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