Kill Devil Hill, NC, USA
N1670U
Cessna 207
The fuel tanks were fueled the night before the accident date and were confirmed to be full during a preflight the morning of the accident date. The airplane was then repositioned and flown on 10 sightseeing flights by a company pilot other than the accident pilot, all with the mixture full rich. The fuel quantity gauges indicated decreasing quantity of fuel during the flights and the gauges indicated more than 1/2, and less then 1/4 respectively sometime during the last flight. The accident pilot relieved the pilot who had flown the 10 sightseeing flights, at that time the airplane had been operated for 3.75 hours since fueling. The accident pilot reported he visually checked the fuel tanks though all the adult passengers stated he did not. The flight departed and at 200 feet msl, the pilot later stated that the engine quit when he reduced power to 25 inches manifold pressure. He maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in a field, and touched down with full flaps at an indicated airspeed of 80 knots. The airplane touched down, the nose landing gear separated from the airplane, and the airplane then collided with a 6-8 feet high sand dune. The airplane came to rest inverted on top of the sand dune. Examination of the fuel lines at the fuel selector valve, at each reservoir fuel tank, and at the fuel control unit revealed no fuel. No fuel was found in the auxiliary fuel pump, engine driven fuel pump, or reservoir tanks. The fuel selector was found positioned to the right fuel tank which was calculated to contain 7 gallons of fuel; the unusable amount of fuel in the tank is 3.5 gallons. The engine was placed on a test stand, impact damaged components were replaced or repaired and the engine was started and found to operate normally, no discrepancies were noted. Testing of the fuel gauges revealed they were operative. Testing of the fuel transmitters revealed several discrepancies. The average fuel consumption over a 9-day period was 15.14 gallons per hour; the airplane had been operated for 3.79 hours since fueling at the time of the accident. The operator had a procedure in place that required the pilot to dip the tanks during preflight and the chief pilot to randomly dip the tanks during the day; the pilot did not dip the tank before the flight and the chief pilot did not randomly dip the tanks throughout the day. The dipstick used to dip the tanks was in fact a wooden paint stirrer with a "full" mark annotated. No graduate marks beneath the full mark was noted. The Service Manual indicates that the fuel quantity indicators and transmitters are required to be checked every 50 hours and also during a complete inspection of the airplane. The airplane was inspected last on May 11, 2001, using an approved checklist that consisted of the inspection chart found in the Service Manual. The airplane had accumulated 48 hours since the inspection at the time of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On June 7, 2001, about 1532 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 207, N1670U, registered to and operated by Kitty Hawk Aero Tours, experienced a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from First Flight Airport, Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina, and was substantially damaged during the forced landing. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 sightseeing flight. The commercial-rated pilot and two passengers sustained minor injuries. Three passengers sustained serious injuries. The flight originated about 3 minutes earlier from the First Flight Airport. Both fuel tanks of the airplane were fueled the day before the accident date. On the morning of the accident date, another company pilot preflighted the airplane and visually confirmed both fuel tanks were full; he also confirmed that the tachometer time was the same as the tachometer time when the airplane was fueled. That pilot then flew the airplane from the airport where fueled to the airport where the sightseeing flights depart, and then on 10 local sightseeing flights. The accident pilot relieved him about 1500 hours to fly another sightseeing flight. At that time, the airplane had been operated for 3.75 hours since fueling as indicated by the tachometer. The accident pilot stated to an FAA inspector that before takeoff of his first flight that day in the accident airplane for a local sightseeing flight, he visually checked the fuel tanks but did not use a dipstick that was located in the airplane. He indicated that both fuel tanks contained approximately 30 gallons total and the left and right fuel gauges indicated approximately 1/2 and 1/4 capacity, respectively. The fuel selector was positioned to the right fuel tank and after engine start he back taxied to the runway. He reported cycling the propeller one time and checked the magnetos while turning around in the engine run-up area. He lowered the flaps to 10-15 degrees, then, during the initial climb at 200 feet msl after reducing power to 25 inches manifold pressure, the engine "cut-out." He turned the auxiliary fuel pump to "high" and maneuvered the airplane towards a field. He lowered the flaps to 30 degrees, and turned off the auxiliary fuel pump before landing in the field. The airplane was landed at an indicated airspeed of approximately 80 knots, rolled a short distance, then collided with a berm and nosed over. Postaccident he noted fuel leaking from what he thought was the right fuel cap; he did not notice fuel leaking from the left fuel cap. Two of the occupants were airlifted to a hospital. All of the adult passengers reported to the FAA 1 or 2 days after the accident that the accident pilot did not perform any external inspection of the airplane. Several passengers later reported that they could not discern an engine run-up being performed before the flight departed by the absence of power being applied while stationary. All of the adult passengers reported being advised that the flight would include a stop at another airport for fuel; however, the pilot advised the FAA that he did not intend to stop in Manteo for fuel with the passengers but would fuel after completion of the tour. Copies of the FAA Record of Conversations forms with the passengers and the pilot are attachments to this report. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was equipped with two long-range fuel tanks, each having a total and usable capacity of 40 and 36.5 gallons, respectively. The airplane was inspected last on May 11, 2001, in accordance with an annual inspection using an approved checklist, and had accumulated approximately 48 hours since at the time of the accident. Review of the inspection guidelines in the Service Manual for the airplane indicates that movable parts are inspected in part for binding, proper operation, proper adjustment, and correct travel. The Service Manual also indicates that a complete inspection includes all items listed in the 50, 100, 200 plus the special inspection items due at the time of the inspection. The fuel quantity indicators and transmitters are listed in the 50-hour column. Excerpts from the Service Manual are an attachment to this report. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane came to rest inverted on the top of a sand dune located 159 degrees and .9 nautical mile from the center of the airport. Examination of the accident site by the FAA and an investigator from Cessna Aircraft Company revealed the first ground scar made by the nose landing gear was located approximately 38 feet before the 6-8 feet high sand dune. The ground scar continues from the first contact point to the sand dune; the nose landing gear was found on the ground along the ground scar approximately 17 feet from the first ground contact point. The airplane came to rest inverted on top of the sand dune approximately 100 feet from the first ground contact mark (see photograph 1). Examination of the airplane revealed all components necessary to sustain flight were attached to the airplane or in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed. The left wing was separated from the fuselage at the wing attach points and at the inboard lift strut attach point. The left wing fuel cap was not secured and an unknown quantity of fuel was observed in the tank following recovery of the wing. The right wing remained attached though fuel leakage was noted. By calculations, the right fuel tank contained approximately 7 gallons of fuel; the unusable fuel capacity for each main fuel tank is 3.5 gallons. The fuel selector was found positioned to the right tank. No obstructions were noted in either fuel tank vent or supply ports and no fuel was found in any of the fuel lines at the fuel selector valve or at the lines at the two fuselage mounted reservoir tanks which were also found to be empty. The fuel strainer filter bowl was crushed/broken but the fuel line from the strainer to the engine driven fuel pump did not contain fuel. Initial electrical testing of the auxiliary fuel pump revealed the unit operated for approximately 1-2 seconds then quit; no fuel exited the unit during the short operation. A wooden paint stirrer used as a dipstick for determining the quantity of fuel in the fuel tanks was located in the wreckage. The stirrer was marked "full", but there were no graduated marks indicating capacity in gallons when the tank is less than full. Both fuel transmitters, the instrument gauge cluster, and the auxiliary fuel pump were retained for further examination (see Tests and Research section of this report). Examination of the engine revealed no fuel was found in the engine driven fuel pump, or in the fuel line from the engine driven fuel pump to the fuel/air control unit. The inlet screen at the fuel/air control unit was clean. Impact damaged components listed in a report from the engine manufacturer representative were either replaced or repaired, and the engine was placed on a test stand and found to operate normally, no discrepancies were noted. TESTS AND RESEARCH The left and right fuel transmitters and the instrument gauge cluster were examined with FAA oversight revealing both transmitters would stick where stopped but would move with slight pressure to the empty tank stop. The float of the right transmitter was bent at a down angle which according to Cessna Aircraft Company personnel, could affect the proper fuel reading. Additionally, the right transmitter displayed an open or break in the circuit when positioned on the empty stop, and both transmitters displayed an open or break in the circuit at numerous float arm positions from empty to full. Expected readings on the gauges at the low, medium, and high positions of the float arms were achieved when the indicator and transmitters were electrically connected. A copy of the report from Cessna Aircraft Company and a statement from the FAA are attachments to this report. Examination of the auxiliary fuel pump was performed at a FAA certified repair station with NTSB present which revealed the unit did not operate when electrical power was applied. Disassembly revealed that one of the nylatron vanes was lodged between the rotor and the spacer (see photograph 2). Additionally the rotor pin was fractured in three pieces. The pump motor operationally checked good. The operator had a procedure in place requiring pilot's to visually inspect the fuel tanks and also dip the tanks during the preflight. The procedure also specified that the chief pilot would randomly dip aircraft throughout each day. On the day of the accident, the president of the operator was also the chief pilot and he stated that he recalled dipping the tanks in the early part of the day but did not recall dipping the tanks any other time. A copy of his statement is an attachment to this report. Additionally, the pilot was not observed by any of the adult passengers to perform any exterior check of the airplane and the pilot reported to the FAA that he did not dip the tanks. The pilot who repositioned the airplane and flew 10 sightseeing flights the day of the accident reported that during level flight of the sightseeing flights, he increased the rpm from the typical setting of 2,200 to 2,300, and he increased the manifold pressure also from the typical setting of 21 inches to 22 inHg, to maintain the desired airspeed of 105 to 110 miles-per-hour. He further reported that the fuel gauges indicated decreasing quantities during the day and he last looked at the fuel quantity gauges during his last flight and recalled that one indicated, "...more than 1/2 quantity and the other gauge indicated 1/4 or less quantity...", though the needles were bouncing above and below those readings due to turbulence. He also stated that he, "...did not use the dipstick to check the quantity of fuel on either 6-5-01 or on 6-7-01; rather, I relied on the tach time elapsed and the fuel gauges, which, on the 3 occasions I flew the accident plane prior to the accident date, provided well in excess of any required fuel reserves." A copy of the statement from the pilot is an attachment to this report. A review of the elapsed tachometer time over a 9-day period in the accident airplane compared with fuel purchased at the end of each of the 9 days revealed the average fuel consumption was 15.14 gallons per hour. The accident airplane had been operated for 3.79 hours elapsed time since fueling as indicated by the tachometer. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The airplane minus the retained components were released to James T. Brewer, insurance adjuster for Inflite Aviation International Adjusters, Inc., on October 10, 2001. The retained components were also released to Mr. James T. Brewer, on January 24, 2002.
The loss of engine power due to fuel starvation for undetermined reasons resulting in the forced landing and subsequent on-ground collision with a sand dune with a resulting nose over. A factor in the accident was the unsuitable terrain encountered during the forced landing.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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