Watch Hill, RI, USA
N4063R
Piper PA-32-300
The airplane taxied to the active runway, and departed with approximately 15 to 20 gallons of fuel in each main tank and approximately 5 gallons of fuel in each tip tank. Between 800 and 1,000 feet agl, the pilot retracted the flaps, selected the electric-driven fuel pump to off, set manifold pressure to 25 inches of mercury, reduced propeller RPM to 2,500, and leaned the mixture control to 18 GPH. While operating on the right main fuel tank, and climbing through 2,800 to 3,000 feet over the water, the pilot experienced a sudden loss of engine power. He described the change as if the propeller rpm had gone from low pitch to high pitch. He added that the propeller continued to rotate at 2,300 rpm, and engine manifold pressure stabilized around 15 to 17 inches of mercury. The pilot set the mixture control to full rich and placed the electric-driven fuel pump to "ON," but the engine did not recover. The pilot changed the fuel selector from the right-main tank to the left-main tank, and then waited, but still the engine did not recover. During the descent the engine and system instruments were in the normal operating range. The pilot pulled the throttle control all the way out, and manifold pressure dropped to 10 to 12 inches of mercury. He then pushed it pack in, and the manifold pressure returned to 15 to 17 inches. The pilot selected the left magneto and then the right magneto to "OFF." He then placed them back "ON" in the opposite order. Still the engine did not respond. The pilot then ditched the airplane, and the occupants exited into the water. The pilot did not get a chance to select an alternate air source during the descent. About a month after the accident, the engine was recovered from the ocean, and then examined by the Safety Board. During the examination, no preimpact failures or malfunctions were identified.
On June 26, 2001, about 1910 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32-300, N4063R, was substantially damaged when it ditched in the ocean near Watch Hill, Connecticut, after a partial loss of engine power. The certificated commercial pilot received minor injuries, and the passenger was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the charter flight that departed Block Island State Airport (BID), Block Island, Rhode Island, destined for the Groton-New London Airport (GON), Groton, Connecticut. The airplane was on a company visual flight rules flight plan, and was conducted under 14 CFR Part 135. On the day of the accident, the pilot conducted six flights in the accident airplane prior to the accident flight. The first flight was from Goodspeed Airport (42B), East Haddam, Connecticut, to the Elizabeth Field Airport (0B8), Fishers Island, New York. There were no passengers on board, and the pilot was accompanied by a check-airman, who was administering a 14 CFR Part 135 flight evaluation. The pilot executed the VOR "A" approach into Fishers Island, and then landed without incident. The flight took approximately 30 minutes. The pilot loaded two passengers at Fishers Island, and then flew to Groton, which took about 15 minutes. At Groton, the two passengers deplaned, and one boarded. The airplane then departed Groton and flew to Block Island, which also took about 15 minutes. The passenger deplaned at Block Island, and the pilot, along with the check-airman, flew to the Theodore Francis Green State Airport (PVD), Providence, Rhode Island, where the pilot executed the ILS 24 Approach, before landing. The flight took approximately 30 minutes, and the pilot's Part 135 flight evaluation was considered complete. The check-airmen deplaned, and the pilot conducted the rest of the flights single pilot. At Providence, the pilot loaded one passenger, and then flew to Fishers Island, which took about 20 minutes. At Fishers Island, the passenger deplaned, and the airplane departed for Block Island. The flight to Block Island took about 7 minutes, and the pilot's next passenger was waiting for the airplane at the terminal. The pilot taxied the airplane to the terminal, and secured the engine. He briefed and loaded his passenger, with part of the briefing covering ditching procedures. The pilot started the engine on the first attempt, and taxied the airplane to Runway 28. Once on the runway, he held the brakes, and applied full throttle. The engine responded, and the pilot noted that all the engine and system instruments were in the "normal" operating range. The pilot released the brakes, and the airplane accelerated. About halfway down the 2,501 foot-long runway, and with 10 degrees of flaps, the pilot rotated the airplane. The airplane lifted off the runway, and the pilot flew the departure phase of the direct flight to Groton at 90 KIAS. Between 800 and 1,000 feet over water, the pilot retracted the flaps, selected the electric-driven fuel pump to off, set manifold pressure to 25 inches of mercury, reduced propeller RPM to 2,500, leaned the mixture control to 18 GPH, and lowered the nose to accelerate to 110 KIAS. After selecting the electric-driven fuel pump to "OFF" the pilot checked the fuel pressure gauge, which was still in the "normal" operating range. While operating on the right main fuel tank, and climbing through 2,800 to 3,000 feet over water, the pilot experienced a sudden loss of engine power. At first, the pilot though about returning to Block Island, but he was not sure of the distance, and if there were any boats between his position and the Island. Because of the uncertainties of returning to Block Island, the pilot elected to continue on towards Groton. The pilot described the change in power as if the propeller rpm had gone from low pitch to high pitch. He added that the propeller continued to rotate at 2,300 rpm, and engine manifold pressure stabilized around 15 to 17 inches of mercury. The pilot set the mixture control to full rich and placed the electric-driven fuel pump to "ON," but the engine did not recover. The pilot changed the fuel selector from the right-main tank to the left-main tank, and then waited, but still the engine did not recover. During the descent the pilot noted that the engine and system instruments were in the normal operating range. Also during the descent, the pilot pulled the throttle control all the way out. Manifold pressure dropped to 10 to 12 inches of mercury. He then pushed it pack in, and the manifold pressure returned to 15 to 17 inches. The pilot selected the left magneto and then the right magneto to "OFF." He then placed them back "ON" in the opposite order. With the likelihood of regaining engine power diminishing, the pilot redirected his attention from restarting the engine to ditching the airplane. Because the weather was warm and the seas were calm, the pilot elected to ditch the airplane next to a barge rather then attempt a forced landed to an unimproved area. The pilot made a shallow right turn to maneuver for the barge, and announced his intentions to the Groton Air Traffic Control Tower. The pilot then had the passenger open the door, and both of them removed their seatbelts prior to impact. The airplane touched down, the windscreen broke, and the passenger egressed into the water via the door. The pilot then removed two 5 gallon buckets from the airplane to be used as personal flotation devices (PFD's). The pilot entered the water, and approximately 2 minutes later, the airplane sunk below the surface. The pilot added that the airplane was not equipped with PFD's or any pyrotechnic signaling devices. In addition he did not get a chance to select alternate air prior to ditching the airplane. He also stated that when the airplane departed on the accident flight there were approximately 15 to 20 gallons of fuel in each main tank and approximately 5 gallons of fuel in each tip tank. According to the operator, the airplane had approximately 25 gallons of fuel in each main tank, and 12-15 gallons in each tip-tank when the airplane departed on the first flight of the day. He also stated that the engine burned approximately 15 gph of fuel. In addition, the airplane was on a 14 CFR Part 135 certificate, and had received a 100-hour inspection approximately 12 flight hours prior to the accident. When asked about the lack of PFD's on the airplane, the operator responded that the PFD's had been shipped to Florida approximately 3 weeks prior to the accident to be inspected. He added that he has tried to develop a rotation so there would always be current PFD's available, but was unsuccessful. On July 24, 2001, a fishing boat accidentally snagged the engine with a net, and the entire wreckage was dragged to the surface. But before it could be secured, the airframe broke away from the engine, and sank. The engine was hauled onboard, and transported to a dock in Newport, Rhode Island, for examination by the Safety Board. On July 27, 2001, the engine was examined. All three propeller blades were attached to the propeller hub, and the hub was attached to the engine crankshaft. No "S" bending was identified on any of the propeller blades. A portion of the propeller governor was attached to the engine. The rest of the governor was not recovered. Both magnetos were attached to the engine accessory section, and both displayed impact and corrosion damage. The top sparkplugs were removed, and found contaminated with algae and sand. The propeller was then rotated by hand, and compression was obtained on all six cylinders. Also, The accessory gear section rotated, along with the magneto input gears, but no spark was observed on any of the magneto towers or leads. The fuel servo was attached to the engine. The throttle plate was intact, and would open and close when the throttle arm was actuated. The throttle cable had separated from throttle arm, and the fracture surface was consistent with overload. The mixture control arm would articulate when manipulated. The mixture control cable was broken and the fracture surface was also consistent with overload. Continuity of the fuel system was verified from the engine-driven fuel pump to each individual fuel nozzle. According to the Climb Distance Chart in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the airplane would have traveled approximately 8.0 nautical miles before the partial loss of power occurred, and would have been approximately 4.5 nautical miles to the southeast of Watch Hill. According to the Glide Performance Chart in the POH, at 3,000 feet above the water on a standard day and at maximum gross weight, the airplane would glide approximately 5.0 nautical miles in a no wind condition. A weather observation taken 14 minutes before the accident at Groton recorded the wind as 230 degrees at 3 knots, 10 miles of visibility, clear skies, temperature 77 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 66 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter 30.26 Hg.
Loss of engine power for undetermined reason.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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