Rochester, NY, USA
N5265T
Piper PA-28-140
The student pilot departed on a local flight, staying in the traffic pattern to practice landings. After two hours of flight, the engine lost power. The pilot made a forced landing to rising terrain, and the airplane struck a fence. The left fuel tank was ruptured, and there was a small fuel spill on the ground. The fuel selector was found selected to the right tank, which was intact, and contained 18 ounces of fuel. Records indicated that after the airplane was last refueled, it was flown on a local flight for 2.2 hours prior to the student pilot's accident flight. The student pilot also indicated that he was aware of the previous flight. The student pilot reported that when he preflighted the airplane, there was sufficient fuel onboard for 3 hours of flight. In addition, the student pilot also reported that he did not track his fuel quantity by looking at the fuel gauges. When power was applied to the airplane, both fuel gauges indicated empty tanks.
On June 25, 2001, at 2054 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-140, N5265T, was substantially damaged while landing at the Greater Rochester International Airport, Rochester, New York. The certificated student pilot received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local training flight No flight plan had been filed for the flight that was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According to a written report from an inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot had been conducting solo takeoff and landing practice for about 2 hours on runway 07. The airplane touched down prior to the runway, on rising terrain and struck the airport perimeter boundary fence. It came to rest about 1,000 feet short of the approach end of runway 07, near extended runway centerline. Further, the FAA inspector reported that the left wing fuel tank was ruptured, and the right wing fuel tank was intact. There was a small of a fuel spill at the accident site, and the fire department elected not to foam down the accident site due to a lack of fuel fumes. The right wing fuel tank contained 18 ounces of fuel. No fuel was found in the carburetor bowl, the fuel strainer, the engine driven fuel pump, or the fuel lines. The spark plugs were not sooty. There was no blockage in the fuel lines from the fuel tanks to the fuel selector, or from the fuel selector to the carburetor. The FAA inspector also reported that according to records from the operator, the pilot had flown the airplane in the morning, and upon its return to Rochester, the fuel tanks were, "topped off" (filled to capacity). Later in the day, another instructor and student pilot flew the airplane for 2.2 hours, conducting touch and go landings at local area airports. The student pilot then took the airplane and had flown it for 2.0 hours when the accident occurred. The airplane had flown a total of 4.2 hours at the time of the accident since last being refueled. The fuel capacity of the wing tanks was 25 gallons each, with 1 gallon unusable in each fuel tank. Tabs were located in the fuel tanks, and were visible through the filler necks to indicate up to18 gallons remaining in each tank. According to the FAA inspector, the student pilot's logbook revealed a total fight experience of 76.4 hours, with 75.6 hours in make and model, and 30.3 hours in the preceding 90 days. The pilot had accumulated 11.4 hours of pilot-in-command flight experience at the time of the accident. In an interview on July 17, 2001, with the FAA inspector, the pilot reported that he had preflighted the airplane, and although he did not remember the amount of fuel in the tanks, he thought he had sufficient fuel for about 3 hours of flight. He said he figured traffic pattern work would burn about 9 gallons per hour. When asked about the tabs in the fuel tank, he said he thought the tabs indicated the fuel tanks were at 1/2 capacity. He also said that he did not monitor the fuel consumption using the fuel quantity gauges in the airplane. During the interview, the pilot reported that the power loss occurred as he turned final. He was asked if he had considered landing on runway 04, or taxiway ALPHA, but reported that he had not considered those landing areas. In an interview, on October 12, 2001, with the Safety Board investigator, the pilot reported that he had preflighted the airplane which included removing the fuel caps and looking in the tanks. He found the fuel level at or slightly above the tabs. When asked how much fuel was onboard he said it was about 18 gallons a side. He said there was sufficient fuel onboard for his planned flight of about 2 hours. He said that although he did not monitor the fuel quantity with the fuel gauges, he did not remember the fuel gauges being lower than 1/4 in either tank. He also said that he had known about the previous flight in the airplane, between his first flight earlier in the day, and his accident flight. Further, he said that he had planned to terminate the flight on the landing following the one in which the accident occurred. When asked if he wearing a shoulder harness, the pilot replied that he was not. When asked why, he reported that some of the airplanes at the flight school had shoulder harnesses, while others did not. He did not think about it on the accident flight. In a follow-up telephone interview, the FAA inspector reported that the refueling ports were located on the outboard section of each wing mounted fuel tank, about 12.5 inches from the aft edge of the tank, about 18 inches from the leading edge of the tank, and about 2.5 inches inboard from the outboard edge. The tab used to monitor the fuel at the 18-gallon level was mounted on the leading edge of the refueling port. Use of fuel tank tab was only accurate if the airplane was in a level attitude. Both lateral and fore or aft changes in the attitude of the airplane could change the fuel level against the tab. Although the line person reported the airplane was filled on the flight prior to the accident flight, the FAA inspector was unable to determine if it was filled to capacity or some lesser amount due to being refueled in a non-level position. The FAA inspector further reported that the fuel selector had three positions, OFF, LEFT and RIGHT. There was no middle position to burn from both tanks simultaneously. The actual fuel load, and distribution between fuel tanks at the time of departure on the accident flight was not determined. The FAA inspector also reported that when electrical power was applied to the airplane, both fuel gauges read zero or empty.
Fuel exhaustion, due to the student pilot's failure to monitor his fuel supply.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
