Jacksonville, FL, USA
N7701J
Piper PA-32-260
The airplane crashed during the missed approach segment of the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 7 at Jacksonville International Airport (JAX). This was the third airport the pilot tried to land after unsuccessful attempts due to low clouds and visibilities at two other airports. During the ILS approach to JAX, the air traffic controller advised the pilot that two flights had landed earlier with each reporting breaking out of the clouds 50 to 100 feet above the decision height and initially only the approach lights being visible. The pilot subsequently radioed he was on a missed approach. The controller, and another flight on the ground later heard a partially unclear transmission with the pilot indicating his instruments were malfunctioning. Witnesses either heard or saw the airplane over fly the airport. Two witnesses stated they heard the sounds of the engine increase and one reported he thereafter heard the airplane turn north, circle several times, and descend followed by the sound of a crash. Recorded radar data indicate that before radar contact was lost the airplane did complete circling turns to the left while at the same time climbing to 1000 feet and then descending to 300 feet. Radar contact of the airplane was lost 2 miles south of the accident site. The airplane crashed in a wooded area and came to rest about 200 feet from the initial tree impact point. The examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 12, 2001, about 1941 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-32-260, N7701J, registered to DWW Plane, Inc., crashed while making a missed approach at Jacksonville International Airport, Jacksonville, Florida, while on a 14 CFR Part 91 business flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot and 3 passengers received fatal injuries. The flight originated from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the same day, about 1650. At about 1535, a person identifying themselves as the pilot of N7701J, called the FAA, Gainesville, Florida, Automated Flight Service Station, requesting a weather briefing and to file an instrument flight rules flight plan for a flight from Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to St. Augustine, Florida, and with Craig Airport, Jacksonville, Florida, as the alternate airport. The weather briefing was given and the flight plan information was taken by the Flight Service Personnel. The telephone call ended at 1545. At 1650, N7701J departed Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport on an instrument flight rules clearance to St. Augustine, Florida. At 1809, the pilot of N7701J called the FAA Miami Automated International Flight Service Station via aircraft radio. The pilot reported he was at 9,000 feet, south of Daytona Beach, Florida, destination St. Augustine, Florida, and then to Craig Airport, Jacksonville, Florida. The pilot requested the current weather conditions at both St. Augustine and Jacksonville. The pilot was given the current weather and then gave a pilot report to the Flight Service Station personnel. The radio call ended at 1811. Transcripts of communications show that at 1835:35, the pilot of N7701J reported to the FAA Jacksonville Approach Control Controller that he was at 3,000 feet. The controller inquired if the pilot had received the current weather at St. Augustine, and the pilot responded yes. At 1836:05, the pilot was cleared by the controller to fly direct to the St. Augustine VOR and then cleared for the VOR Approach to runway 13 at St. Augustine. At 1858:11, the pilot of N7701J reported to the Jacksonville Approach Control controller that he had performed a missed approach at St. Augustine. The pilot was told to climb to 3,000 feet and state his intentions. The pilot stated he would like to go to Craig Airport, Jacksonville, Florida. The controller later asked the pilot if he wanted to go to Jacksonville International Airport if misses the approach at Craig. The pilot replied yes. At 1909:44, the pilot of N7701J was cleared by the Jacksonville Approach Controller for the instrument landing system approach to runway 32 at Craig Airport. At 1911:41, the controller instructed the pilot to contact the Craig Airport Control Tower. At 1916:51, the pilot of N7701J contacted the Jacksonville Approach Controller and reported he had made a missed approach to the Craig Airport. The controller told the pilot to fly heading 280 degrees and climb to 2,000 feet for an instrument landing system approach to runway 7 at Jacksonville International Airport. The controller then asked the pilot to change to another controller. The pilot made contact with the next controller at 1919:50. The new controller asked the pilot if he had the Jacksonville Automated Terminal Information Service weather report "Mike". The pilot replied affirmative. At 1920:20, the controller then asked the pilot to contact the next controller. The pilot contacted the next controller at 1921:08. At 1929:06, the controller reported to the pilot of N7701J that he was 10 miles from the "Dinns" locator outer marker, to turn right to heading 040 degrees, to maintain 2,000 feet until established on the localizer, and that he was cleared for the instrument landing system, runway 7 approach. The pilot was then told to contact the Jacksonville International Airport Control Tower local controller. The pilot responded to the request. The Jacksonville International Airport Control Tower was operating from a temporary facility and had no recording capability for the control tower frequency. No additional communications with the pilot of N7701J were recorded. The local controller stated that two other single engine airplanes made the approach to runway 7 ahead of N7701J. The pilot's of these airplanes reported that they broke out of the clouds about 50-100 feet above the decision height of 200 agl. The pilot's reported that at this point they could see the approach lights, but not the runway lights. He did not see the airplanes until they passed the temporary control tower and touched down about 1,500 feet from the approach end of the runway. Each of these airplanes landed without the landing light on. He gave the pilot reports to the pilot of N7701J when that flight was passing the "Dinns" locator outer marker. He did not see N7701J come out of the clouds. As he was attempting to contact the Approach Controller, the Approach Controller contacted him and told him the radar flight path for N7701J showed the flight was initiating a missed approach. He then heard the pilot of N7701J report he was making a missed approach. He next heard some crackling sounds on the radio followed by the pilot of N7701J transmit something about his instruments malfunctioning. He called the Approach Controller to determine if he was in contact with the pilot of N7701J and was told no. He then attempted to contact the pilot of N7701J with no success. He was then told by the Approach Controller that radar contact with N7701J had been lost. Search and rescue operations were begun and on December 13, 2002, about 1230, the wreckage of N7701J was located. (See ATC Group Chairman Factual Report). Two persons from the Florida Air National Guard Facility, located to the southwest of the approach end of runway 7, at Jacksonville International Airport, reported hearing N7701J, and one reported seeing a red navigation light from N7701J, as the airplane passed over the alert aircraft area. The one person reported losing sight of the red navigation light and both persons reports hearing the engine increase in power as the airplane approached the end of runway 7. The airplane then appeared to start climbing and turn hard to the north. The airplane then continued to make several circles and descend, followed by the sound of the airplane crashing through trees. (See Witness Statements). The pilot of another airplane that was taxing to runway 7 for takeoff at the time of the accident reported that the ground and local control positions were combined and he could hear the pilots of airplanes on approach talking to the local controller. He heard the pilot of N7701J report on the approach to runway 7, followed by the pilot reporting he was making a missed approach. This pilot reported he could hear stress in the voice of the pilot of N7701J. The local controller did not respond to the pilot of N7701J reporting a missed approach. After a time the local controller then asked the pilot of N7701J what his position was. About 5 seconds later the pilot of N7701J transmitted something like his instruments were "haywire or goofy", with stress in his voice. This was the last transmission he heard from the pilot of N7701J. As they waited at the departure end of runway 7, visibility was about 1/2 mile. (See Witness Statements). Recorded radar data shows that N7701J approached runway 7 at Jacksonville International Airport. The flight maintained a straight flight path on the localizer course until about 1939:04, when it was about 2 miles from the runway approach end. At this point the flight was at about 500 feet and turned slightly to the right. The flight continued to descend to 300 feet and turned back to the left. At about 1939:59, when about 2,000 feet from the end of the runway, the flight turned left to the north and began to climb. The flight completed one 360-degree left turn, climbing to 1,000 feet. The flight then completed another 360-degree left turn, while descending, to 300 feet. The flight was last observed on radar at 1941:23, while at 300 feet, while south of the accident site. (See Maps and Charts of Accident Area). PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a FAA private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land and instrument airplane ratings, last issued on February 8, 2001, when the instrument airplane rating was issued. The pilot held a FAA second class medical certificate issued on August 28, 2001, with the limitation that the holder wear correcting lenses for distant vision while exercising the privileges of the certificate. Pilot logbook records obtained by NTSB after the accident were complete until October 11, 2001. The logbook records and information about flights the pilot took in the week before the accident show the pilot has accumulated about 965 total flight hours, 442 flight hours in the Piper PA-32-260, 17 hours of instrument flight time, 24 hours of simulated instrument flight time, and 225 flight hours at night. It could not be determined from the logbook records if the pilot met the FAA recency of experience requirements for instrument flight. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was a Piper PA-32-260, serial number 32-1068, registration number N7701J, manufactured in October 1968. At the time of the accident the airplane had accumulated about 7,850 total flight hours. The airplane and engine were last inspected on November 21, 2001, about 35 flight hours before the accident, when they received a 100-hour inspection. The airplane was equipped with a Lycoming O-540-E4B5, 260-horsepower engine. The engine was last overhauled on August 1, 1997, 1,267 flight hours before the accident. The engine was disassembled, inspected, and reassembled following a propeller ground strike, on March 27, 1998, 1,068 flight hours before the accident. The airplane was equipped with a Hartzell HC-C2YK-1BF propeller. The propeller was overhauled on March 18, 1998, 1,068 flight hours before the accident, at which time a serviceable hub and 2 new propeller blades were installed. The airplane received a transponder check on March 7, 2000, and a static system and altimeter system check on May 9, 2000. The engine-driven vacuum pump, an Airborne Dry Air Pump, model 211CC, serial number 10986, was installed on the engine after the vacuum pump was overhauled, on August 2, 2001, 136 flight hours before the accident. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1920:04, the pilot confirmed to the approach controller that he had received the Jacksonville International Airport, Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) information "Mike". Information "Mike" was the Jacksonville International Airport 1756 surface weather observation. The weather observation was wind from 070 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 1 and 1/2 statute miles in mist, clouds 200 feet broken, 500 feet overcast, temperature 68 degrees F, dew point temperature 67 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.17 in. Hg. At 1924:39, ATIS information "November" was issued, which contained the Jacksonville International Airport, 1916, special surface observation. The special observation was wind from 050 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 1/2 statute mile in fog, clouds 100 feet broken. 500 feet overcast, temperature and dew point temperature 68 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.20 in. Hg. At 1940:07, ATIS information "Oscar" was issued, which contained the Jacksonville International Airport, 1930, special surface observation. The special observation was wind calm, visibility 1/4 statute mile in fog, clouds indefinite ceiling vertical visibility 100 feet, temperature and dew point temperature 68 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.20 in. Hg. The local controller stated the pilot's of two airplanes that approached and landed just prior to N7701J reported that they broke out of the clouds about 50-100 feet above the decision height of 200 agl. The pilot's reported that at this point they could see the approach lights, but not the runway lights. He did not see the airplanes until they passed the temporary control tower and touched down about 1,500 feet from the approach end of the runway. Each of these airplanes landed without the landing light on. He gave the pilot reports to the pilot of N7701J when that flight was passing the "Dinns" locator outer marker at about 1937. A review of meteorological information conducted by an NTSB Senior Meteorologist showed for the time of the accident, a stationary front stretched across the northern Florida Panhandle to just south of the Jacksonville area before continuing off eastward into the southwestern Atlantic Ocean. There were saturated conditions and widespread reduced visibilities along and north of the frontal boundary. Visibilities south of the front were mostly unrestricted. (See Meteorological Factual Report). WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The main wreckage of N7701J was located in a wooded area about 1 mile north-northwest of the approach end of runway 7 at the Jacksonville International Airport. The main wreckage was located at coordinates 30 degrees, 30 minutes, 22.2 seconds north latitude and 81 degrees, 42 minutes, 22.2 seconds west longitude. Examination of the crash site showed the airplane initially collided with the tops of about 75-tall pine trees, while in a left wing low attitude, while on a northerly heading. The airplane continued to the north, descending through the trees, separating the left and right wings, and coming to rest about 200 feet from the point of initial tree impact. The cockpit and cabin area came to rest inverted, on an easterly heading. Additional components of the airplane separated and were located up to 50 feet north of the main wreckage. Multiple tree impact and separation points were located along the wings of the airplane. All components of the airplane which are necessary for flight were located at the crash site. There was no inflight or postcrash fire. Examination of the flight control and stabilator trim systems of the airplane showed that there was extensive impact damage to the control surfaces and multiple separation points in the cable systems. All separation points within the flight control and stabilator trim system cables was consistent with overstress separation. The stabilator trim was found set to 8 degrees tab down or full nose up trim. Cables in the stabilator trim system had been separated by impact forces. The wing flaps were found set to 10 degrees extended position. The landing gear on this model airplane is not retractable. The pitch trim servo, pitch servo, and roll servo in the autopilot system were found disengaged. Testing of each servo was conducted at the manufacturers facilities under NTSB supervision. Each servo motor operated when tested and slip clutch settings were within manufacturers specifications. Each servo was found to be capable of operation at the time of the accident. Examination of the autopilot control module showed it had received impact damage. Testing of individual components within the module showed no evidence of pre-impact failure or malfunction. (See NTSB Investigator's Statement Autopilot System Examination). Examination of the engine showed that the right front or No. 1 cylinder had separated due to impact forces. The engine assembly rotated and continuity of the crankshaft, camshaft, and all accessory drives was confirmed. The valve train action was confirmed and compression was produced by cylinders No. 2 through No. 6. The No. 1 cylinder showed no evidence of failure or malfunction. Bore scope inspection of No. 2 through No. 6 cylinders showed no evidence of failure or malfunction in the combustion cambers. Oil was found in the engine. Each magneto was separated from the mounting pad by impact forces. Each magneto produced spark at the spark plug lead towers when rotated by hand. The deposits on each spark plug was a gray color, consistent with normal engine operation. Aviation 100LL fuel was found in the engine fuel lines, engine-driven fuel pump, and carburetor. The engine fuel pump was separated from the mounting pad by impact forces. The pump operated normally when actuated by hand. The carburetor bowl was clean and contained fuel. T
The pilot becoming spatially disoriented and losing control of the airplane during a missed approach resulting in the airplane descending uncontrolled and colliding with trees and the ground.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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