Hawthorne, CA, USA
N300PS
Aviat Pitts S-2B
On the landing rollout the airplane veered to the right of runway centerline and struck a taxi light with the left wing. The purpose of the flight was to practice full stall touch-and-go takeoffs and landings. The student had conducted five touch-and-go takeoffs and landings to a full stall with no discrepancies noted. The sixth touch-and-go landing was the accident landing. The CFI observed that the student had the control stick full aft and was applying left rudder to correct for the drift to the right. As the airplane continued to drift to the right the CFI applied full left rudder; however, the left wing struck the taxi light. During the airplane inspection it was observed that the tension of the right main landing gear bungee cord was slack. No further mechanical anomalies were noted.
On February 2, 2002, at 1119 Pacific standard time, an Aviat Pitts S-2B, N300PS, veered off runway 25 and ground looped after landing at the Jack Northrop Field/Hawthorne Municipal Airport (HHR), Hawthorne, California. The airplane was operated by Hart Air of Long Beach, California, as an instructional flight under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The certified flight instructor (CFI) and the CFI student were not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local area flight that departed the Long Beach/Daugherty Field Airport (LGB), Long Beach, California, about 1030. No flight plan had been filed. The Safety Board Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) interviewed the CFI student pilot. The CFI student stated that there was no wind. The landing was normal, and on centerline, when the airplane started to drift to the right of centerline. He moved the control stick to the full aft position and engaged the left rudder; however, the airplane continued off the runway, ground looped, and struck a taxi light. In the CFI's written statement, he reported that this was a training flight with a student who had accumulated about 15 hours of dual instruction from him in this airplane. The purpose of the flight was to perform full stall landings at LGB and HHR. They performed three touch-and-go landings at LGB with no discrepancies noted. On the third touch-and-go landing they requested a straight out departure for HHR. Upon reaching HHR they were given permission by the local tower controller to remain in left traffic for the touch-and-go's. The CFI reported that the first two landings were uneventful. Initially the third landing was also uneventful. The touchdown was at a full stall with the tail wheel contacting the runway first, followed by the main landing gear. The CFI stated that as the airplane transitioned to the landing rollout, the airplane began to turn to the right. He did not think this was unusual, and verified that the student had the control stick full aft, and was applying left rudder to correct the turn to the right. About 8 degrees from centerline the airplane was still departing to the right of the runway. The CFI began to apply left rudder; however, the airplane continued to the right and the left wing struck a runway light. After securing the airplane, the CFI and student got out of the airplane to inspect it. The CFI noted that the right bungee door was extended open about 2 inches. They got back into the airplane and taxied to a local fixed based operator (FBO). After getting out of the airplane, the CFI again looked at the right wing. He lifted up and pulled down on the wing to check the wing tension. He stated that the bungee "did not act in a normal manner, and did not provide stiffness to the right gear." A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the airplane and landing gear assembly. According to the FAA inspector, he did note that the right landing gear assembly had more "play" than the left side. He further stated that there were no mechanical anomalies noted with the airplane. In reviewing the Aviat maintenance manual, there is not a time life specified on the bungee cord. However, the manual does make reference to checks of the shock cords/bungees on a daily basis when the airplane is in operation, and at the 50-, 100-, 1000-hour inspections. The maintenance manual also indicated that on every flight and every 50-hour inspection the shock cords/bungees should be inspected for proper tension. At the 100-hour inspection the landing gear should be serviced. Prior to the accident Hart Air had ordered a new set of bungee cords; however, they had not received them at the time of the accident.
Failure of the student to maintain directional control of the airplane on the landing rollout and failure of the CFI to adequately supervise the flight. A contributing factor was the decreased tension of the right main landing gear shock cord/bungee.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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