Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary ATL02FA074

Lakeland, FL, USA

Aircraft #1

N5293H

Piper PA-16

Aircraft #2

N3333S

Betts RV6A

Analysis

The RV6A and PA-16 pilots were in the traffic pattern for landing to runway 27 right. The controller called the base leg for the RV6A pilot and the pilot was slow to respond to the controller's instructions. The controller called the base leg for the PA-16 pilot. The controller subsequently observed the PA-16 pilot overtaking the RV6A pilot on final and instructed the RV6A pilot to side step to runway 27 left. The RV6A pilot did not respond to the controller's instructions. The controller instructed the PA-16 pilot to keep it up higher, but the PA-16 pilot did not respond to the controller's instructions. The controller observed the nose of the RV6A pitch up violently and both airplanes collided with the ground. Examination of both airplanes revealed the PA-16 left main landing gear collided with the upper surface of the RV6A empennage behind the cabin area and the PA-16 propeller collided with the RV6A cockpit area.

Factual Information

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 5, 2002, about 1505 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-16, N5293H, and a Betts RV6A, N3333S, registered to private owners, operating as 14 CFR Part 91 personal flights, collided in flight while landing to runway 27 right at Lakeland-Linder Regional Airport, Lakeland, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for either airplane. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage. The private pilot in the PA-16 was seriously injured injuries and the private pilot in the RV6A was fatally injured. The PA-16 flight originated from Perry, Florida, on April 5, 2002, at 1330. The RV6A flight originated from Cross City, Florida, on April 5, 2002, at an undetermined time. The Sun N' Fun Fly-In, Lakeland, Florida, Notice to Airman, effective April 7-13, 2002, states that controllers will contact pilots on the aircraft radio using the pilots aircraft color and type of aircraft to provide sequencing and other arrival and traffic information. The controllers may ask the pilots to rock their wings as an acknowledgement for instructions. The air traffic controller working as the local controller in the Lakeland tower stated that several airplanes were approaching from the north. The maroon RV6A was in front of the gray PA-16 on the downwind for runway 27 right. He called the base leg for the RV6A and the pilot was slow to respond. He called the base leg for the PA-16 and the separation looked good between the two airplanes. He observed the PA-16 overtaking the RV6A on final and instructed the RV6A to side step to runway 27 left, but the pilot did not respond to his instructions. He repeated the instructions but the RV6A pilot did not respond. He then informed the PA-16 pilot, "blue and white high wing keep it up keep it higher cause there's someone behind you keep it higher." The PA-16 pilot did not respond to the instructions. The nose of the RV6A was observed to pitch up violently and both airplanes collided in flight about 100 feet above the ground. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Review of information on file with the FAA Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the pilot of the PA-16 was issued a private pilot certificate on October 24, 1997 with ratings for airplane single engine land, and airplane multiengine land. The pilot held a third class medical certificate issued on November 3, 2001 with a special restriction and waiver issued on a basis of demonstrated medical fitness. The pilot stated on his application for the FAA third class medical certificate that he had accumulated 1,300 hours. The pilot stated on the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report that he had accumulated 1,336 total flight hours with 1,086 in the PA-16. The pilot's last recorded biennial flight review was conducted on July 3, 2001. Review of information on file with the FAA Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the pilot of the RV6A was issued a private pilot certificate on July 25, 1996, with ratings for airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed the last recorded biennial flight review was on May 1, 2001. The last recorded entry in the pilot's logbook was on March 24, 2002, and 1,605.2 hours had been recorded. The pilot held a third class medical certificate issued on March 21, 2002, stating he must wear corrective lenses. The pilot stated on his application for the FAA third class medical certificate that he had accumulated 1,700 hours. The pilot was issued a statement of demonstrated ability on October 7, 1988 with the limitation must wear corrective lenses with the following physical defects, no useful vision in the right eye. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Review of airplane logbooks for the PA-16 revealed the last recorded engine overhaul was conducted on September 3, 1977, and the engine had accumulated 1,525 hours since major overhaul. The last recorded annual inspection was conducted on April 4, 2001. The total recorded airframe hours at the time of the accident were 3,134. Review of the airplane logbooks for the RV6A revealed the last recorded condition inspection was conducted on November 5, 2001 at 310.9 hours. The hour meter at the crash site indicated 343.1 hours. The airplane had flown 32.2 hours since the last recorded condition inspection. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The nearest weather reporting facility at the time of the accident was Lakeland-Linder Regional Airport, Lakeland, Florida. The 1455 surface weather observation was: wind 350-degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 miles, 5,000 scattered, temperature 79 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point temperature 57 degrees Fahrenheit, and altimeter 30.04. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The wreckage of the PA-16 and the RV6A was located in the grass 38 feet south of the runway center line adjacent to runway 27 right and about 480 feet from the taxiway A sign. Plexiglas was noted on the runway 81 feet down the crash debris line. Numerous pieces of RV6A cockpit canopy were along the crash debris line. A propeller blade strike was present on the runway, and an indentation from the propeller spinner of the PA-16 was noted on the runway 446 feet down the crash debris line and about 30 feet south of runway centerline. Examination of the crash site revealed the RV6A was heading about 268-degrees magnetic descending to the left while the PA-16 was on a heading of 270-degrees magnetic, and the left main landing gear of the PA-16 collided with the upper surface of the RV6A empennage behind the cabin area. The propeller blades struck the cockpit area. Both airplanes collided with the runway in a right wing low attitude. The RV6A came to rest on a heading of 328-degree sitting up right. The PA-16 came to rest in a nose down right wing low attitude on a heading of 012-degrees magnetic with its left wing above the tail section of the RV6A. Examination of the PA-16 revealed the engine assembly was displaced to the left and pushed aft into the left side of the engine firewall. The forward fuselage tank sustained impact damage. The fuel tank and fuel lines were not ruptured, but fuel was leaking on the grass. The propeller spinner exhibited evidence of rotational scoring. Both propeller blades remained attached to the propeller hub. One propeller blade tip was curled aft with numerous propeller blade strikes/impact marks noted on the leading edge of the propeller blade, and chordwise surface scratches were present. The remaining propeller blade tip was curled aft and twisted with a propeller blade strike present on the trailing edge of the propeller tip. The cabin windshield was broken and the forward windshield support mounts were displaced to the left. The forward fuselage skin forward of the right windshield pillar was crushed inward and displaced to the left. The main landing gear remained attached to the fuselage. The lower fuselage aft of the cabin area on the right side was displaced upward and rearward. Both horizontal stabilizers, elevators, rudder, and vertical stabilizer were not damaged. No damage was noted to the lower fuselage aft of the cabin area on the left side. The right wing was displaced aft. The leading edge of the right wing sustained compression damage extending inward to the forward spar and extending outboard from the wing root to the right wing tip. The right wing struts were attached to the forward and aft spar and to the fuselage attach points. The left wing leading edge sustained leading edge compression near the center wing section 4- feet 4-inches outboard of the wing root extending outboard 8-feet 5-inches. The compression damage extended inward to the leading edge spar. A faint paint transfer of maroon paint was noted on the leading edge skin. A fuel stain was present on the top of the left wing in the vicinity of the fuel filler cap. The left wing main fuel tank and lines were not ruptured. The forward lift strut on the left wing was bent downward 12-inches from the wing attach point. A gray paint transfer was noted on the leading edge of the lift strut. The left main landing gear had a gray paint transfer on the tire. All components necessary for flight were present at the crash site. Continuity of the flight controls was confirmed for pitch, roll, and yaw. There were no separated or disconnected flight control cables. Control continuity was established to the primary and secondary flight controls. The control stick assembly, elevator tube and elevator bell crank were intact and attached to one another. The aileron cables were routed around the bell cranks in the left and right wing through pulleys to the control stick. Examination of the engine assembly revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. The crankshaft was rotated by hand and internal engine continuity was confirmed. All four cylinders produced compression. Fuel was present in the carburetor and in the fuel lines forward of the engine firewall. All spark plugs exhibited light gray carbon deposits in color. Both magnetos sparked at all towers. The ignition harness sustained impact damage. Examination of the wreckage of the RV6A revealed the engine assembly and the propeller assembly remained attached to the airframe. The engine assembly was displaced to the left. The nose wheel was collapsed and displaced to the left. The composite spinner exhibited evidence of rotation. One propeller blade was bent aft about 15-degrees with some twisting towards the low pitch, a blue paint transfer was present and chord wise scoring was present. The remaining propeller blade was not damaged. A blue paint transfer was present on the upper right side of the engine cowling. A blue paint transfer was present on upper right side of the lower engine cowling. The cabin windshield was broken and four propeller strikes were present on the upper windshield support brace which was displaced to the right. The aft sliding canopy was broken; the support brace separated and had evidence of a propeller strike. The fuselage skin forward of the right windshield brace was crushed inward and displaced to the left. The right side of the cabin area was crushed downward on the right side level with the right wing. The lower fuselage aft of the cabin area on the right side was displaced upward and inward. The upper surface of the empennage located behind the cabin area was crushed inward on the top 3 feet aft of the cabin. A gray paint transfer was present. The left and right horizontal stabilizer and elevators were compressed downward. The vertical stabilizer was displaced to the left. The lower fuselage aft of the cabin area on the left side was compressed inward to the right. The right wing was bent aft and sustained upward and outward diagonal crushing along the leading edge of the wing 3 feet 5 inches outboard of the wing root. The right wing tip was partially separated. The right main fuel tank was ruptured and fuel leaked on the grass. The right main landing gear was compressed upward into the lower surface of the right wing. The flaps were extended one notch and the flight control surface was attached. The left wing was bent downward 5 feet outboard of the wing root. The left main fuel tank was not ruptured. The flaps were extended one notch and the flight control surface was attached. The left main landing gear was compressed upward. All components necessary for flight were present at the crash site. Continuity of the flight controls was confirmed for pitch, roll, and yaw. There were no separated or disconnected flight control cables. Control continuity was confirmed to the primary and secondary flight controls. Examination of the engine assembly revealed no evidence of a pre-crash mechanical failure or malfunction. The crankshaft was rotated by hand and internal engine continuity was confirmed. All four cylinders produced compression. Fuel was present in the carburetor and in the fuel lines forward of the engine firewall. All spark plugs exhibited light grayish brown carbon deposits in color. The bottom spark plugs exhibited heavy lead deposits. Both magnetos sparked through the ignition leads. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION The Associate Medical Examiner, District 10, Bartow, Florida, conducted a postmortem examination of the RV6A pilot on April 5, 2002. The cause of death was blunt force trauma. Postmortem toxicology of specimens from the pilot was performed by the Forensic Toxicology Research Section, Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide and ethanol. Atropine, lebetalol, lidocaine, pentobarbital, glucose and hemoglobin were detected and attributed to treatment provided by emergency medical personnel. The pilot of the PA-16 was transported to Lakeland Regional Medical Center with serious injuries. No toxicology specimens were taken from the pilot. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Review of a video taken by a spectator revealed the PA-16 was behind and above the RV6A. The RV6A was about the height of the trees on final approach. The initial collision between the PA-16 and the RV6A was not captured on video. The RV6A was subsequently observed in about a 45-degree nose up attitude and a left 45-degree bank. The PA-16 was in about a 5 to 10-degree right bank above the RV6A in the vicinity of the tail section. Both airplanes were observed in a steep nose up attitude. The RV6A left wing was down about 45-degrees. The PA-16 wings were at about a 15-degree left bank. Following the collision, both airplanes descended intermeshed while rotating to the left around the vertical axis. The RV6A collided with the ground upright right wing low. The PA-16 collided with the ground in a nose-down right wing low attitude. A waiver to FAA Order 7110.65 Air Traffic Control, for the Lakeland Temporary Air Traffic Control Tower was approved on March 6, 2002. The waiver requested deviation to Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-9-6a1 and 2, Same Runway Separation (departures), Paragraph 3010-3a1a and b, Same Runway Separation (arrivals), and Paragraph 3-8-3c, Simultaneous Same Direction. The waiver authorizes Lakeland temporary Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) personnel to conduct operations using reduced same runway separation and same direction centerline minima between arriving and departing categories I and II aircraft in support of the activities associated with the Experimental Aircraft Association's (EAA) annual Sun n' Fun Fly-In, at the Lakeland Linder Regional Airport in Lakeland, Florida. Review of 14 CFR Part 91.123 Compliance with ATC clearances and instructions states in Para (a), "When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in command may deviate from the clearance unless an amended clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory." Review of 14 CFR Part 91.113 Right-of-way rules: Except water operations states in Para (b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of weather an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. (f) Overtaking. Each aircraft that is being overtaken has the right-of-way and each pilot of an overtaking aircraft shall alter course to the right to pass well clear. (g) Landing. Aircraft while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of this rule to force an aircraft off the runway surface which has already landing is attempting to make way for an aircraft on final approach. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is on final approach to land or to overtake that aircraft." The wreckage of the PA-16 and t

Probable Cause and Findings

The failure of PA-16 pilot to maintain a visual lookout and to yield the right-of-way to a lower airplane while on final approach resulting in a midair collision. Contributing to the accident was the failure of both pilot's to adhere to an ATC clearance while landing, and the subsequent in-flight collision of both airplanes with terrain.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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