TRUCKEE, CA, USA
N78053
Globe GC-1B
During the takeoff initial climb while in a high nose pitch attitude, the airplane banked to the right and impacted the runway. Several witnesses at the airport, who are pilots, observed the accident sequence. As the airplane lifted off the runway surface, the airplane's nose was in an unusually high pitch attitude. Several feet above the surface, the airplane's landing gear folded into the retracted position as the angle of attack continued to increase. The airplane stalled, and the right wing and nose impacted the ground simultaneously. Examination of the engine and airframe revealed no evidence of pre-mishap catastrophic mechanical malfunction or failure of any system. The airplane has a maximum gear retraction operating speed of 80 mph and does not have a stall warning horn or light. The landing gear system is operated by a hydraulic pump driven by an electrical motor. The mechanic who worked on this airplane said the gear pump motor was the original factory installed one, which was underpowered and resulted in slow gear retraction times. The pilot had recently installed a more powerful engine, which would require a steeper climb attitude to maintain a speed at or below the maximum gear operating speed while the landing gear completes the retraction cycle. The density altitude was calculated to be about 7,700 feet.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 4, 2003, about 1115 Pacific daylight time, a Globe GC-1B, N78053, banked to the right and collided with the runway during takeoff at the Truckee-Tahoe Airport, Truckee, California. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The private pilot sustained fatal injuries, and one passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The personal cross-country flight was originating with a planned destination of Nevada County Air Park, Grass Valley, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed. In a written statement, a witness, who also held a commercial pilot certificate, stated that after egressing from a glider, he was standing adjacent to runway 19, about 1,300 feet from the departure end of the runway. He first noticed the Globe when it was several feet above the runway surface and departing on runway 19. He noted that the airplane's nose appeared to be in an unusually high pitch attitude. With the airplane still several feet above the runway, he witnessed the landing gear fold into the retracted position, and the airplane start a gradual right turn. He thought that the airplane's attitude seemed unusual, and opined that the airplane would not be able to climb in such a configuration. The witness further stated that the Globe was unable to sustain a positive climb rate and as it gained altitude, it settled back down. The airplane continued the slight right bank resulting in the right wing and nose impacting the ground simultaneously. He estimated that the maximum altitude the airplane attained was 100 to 200 feet above ground level. He noted that the engine sounded smooth, and he didn't observe or hear any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane. In a written statement, another witness, who was also a certified flight instructor, reported that while taxiing an airplane back from refueling, he saw the Globe on the takeoff roll on runway 19. He thought that the takeoff configuration was consistent with that of the pilot attempting a high performance takeoff. The airplane lifted of the runway surface in a three-point attitude, and appeared to be slow for the airplane's configured angle of climb. As the angle of attack continued to increase, the airplane became slower. The airplane appeared to drop to the right side, and it subsequently impacted runway 28. During a telephone interview with a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, the pilot's son stated that he witnessed the accident sequence. He recalled that prior to the flight, he and his father pulled the airplane out to the taxi area. He noticed that his father seemed winded and thought that the physical undertaking of moving the airplane overexerted him. The airplane began the departure roll and continued to a normal departure. As the landing gear retracted, the airplane rolled to the right and he thought it appeared as though his father stopped flying the airplane. The airplane continued in the banked configuration and collided with terrain about 2,000 feet from the runway centerline. PERSONNEL INFORMATION A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land. The pilot held a third-class medical certificate issued on November 28, 2001, with a restriction that the pilot was not valid for any other class of medical certificate. No personal flight records were located for the pilot, and the aeronautical experience listed in this report was obtained from a review of the airmen FAA records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. These records indicated a total time of 380 hours with 35 hours logged in the last 90 days. During a conversation with a Safety Board investigator, the pilot's mechanic indicated that the pilot had about 80 total hours of both dual and solo time in the airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Investigators did not locate airplane or engine maintenance records. A Safety Board investigator reviewed the material maintained by the FAA in the Aircraft and Registry files for this airplane. The airplane was a Globe GC-1B, serial number 2053, which was manufactured in 1946, and purchased by the pilot on March 16, 1998. On the last major repair and alteration FAA form 337, dated February 03, 2003, the airplane's total time was logged as 1,347.6 hours. The airplane had a Textron Lycoming O-360-A1A engine (210 horse power), serial number RL-328-36, installed. Total time on the engine since remanufacture was 34.7 hours. During a telephone conversation with a Safety Board investigator, a mechanic who regularly works on Swift airplanes and who also worked on the accident airplane, stated that he and the pilot underwent the project of restoring the airplane for about 1 1/2 years. After completing the restoration, the pilot had been flying the airplane several months, and then was involved in an accident in September 2002, where he experienced a loss of directional control during takeoff. The mechanic and the pilot together completed the repairs from that accident in February 2003. The mechanic further stated the airplane was equipped with electric trim. He reported that he had previously tested the electric trim systems on the same model airplane, and found that with the airplane configured with full up or full down trim he could overcome the elevator pressure with about 17 pounds of force on the control stick. He also noted that during the last repair, the pilot opted to install a three-blade propeller, rather than the original two-blade propeller. In an effort to compensate for the nose-heavy installation, the mechanic installed a lightweight starter, which made the weight and balance shift negligible. The mechanic added that the landing gear system is hydroelectric. Of the numerous Swifts that he has maintained, he noted a notorious problem of a worn out motor in the landing gear system, as most of the airplanes are equipped with the original motor. He thought that this underpowered motor could make the airplane's landing gear retraction difficult. The prescribed maximum gear retraction speed was 80 miles per hour (mph). He noted that the accident airplane had a larger motor installed, making the maximum gear retraction speed 100 mph. The mechanic stated that the airplane's stall speed with the landing gear and flaps in the retracted position was about 53 mph; at maximum gross weight it was between 56 and 58 mph. He noted that the stalling characteristics at low altitudes (100 feet and above) were negligible, with very little buffet and a slow break; while in ground effect, there are virtually no stalling characteristics. He added that the airplane was not equipped with a stall warning horn or light. METEROLOGICAL INFORMATION A routine aviation weather report (METAR) for Truckee was issued at 0950. It reported a temperature of 21 degrees Celsius and an altimeter setting of 30.25 inHg. Based upon the atmospheric conditions provided by the METAR, a Safety Board computer program calculated the density altitude to be 7,694 feet. AIRPORT INFORMATION The Airport/ Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicates Truckee runway 19 is composed of asphalt and stretches 4,650 feet long and 75 feet wide; the listed airport elevation is 5,900 feet. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION An FAA inspector examined the wreckage at the accident scene and reported that the airplane's first identified point of contact (FIPC) was located about 3 feet to the left of the centerline for runway 28. The airplane came to rest about 120 feet from the FIPC and was inverted, with the airplane's nose facing 100 degrees magnetic. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION The Nevada County Sheriff/Coroner Office completed an autopsy of the pilot. The autopsy stated that the cause of death was "multiple blunt force trauma (minutes)." Also noted in "other significant conditions" were "atherosclerotic coronary artery disease" and "hypertensive cardiovascular disease." The FAA Bioaeronautical Research Laboratory, Okalahoma City, performed toxicological testing of specimens of the pilot. The results of analysis of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and ethanol. Atenolol was detected in the blood and urine samples. A review of the pilot's FAA medical records disclosed that on March 18, 2003, the pilot was deemed ineligible for a medical certificate under Title 14 CFR Part 67.111 (a) (2) (3), 67.211 (b) (c), and 67.311 (b) (c). This was due to a history of angina pectoris and coronary artery disease requiring coronary artery bypass graft surgery and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty. However, he was granted authorization for a special issuance of a third-class medical under 14 CFR Part 67.401. The Safety Board's Medical Officer reviewed the medication records from the pilot's physicians and the FAA medical records, as well as the medical examiner's autopsy report. For additional information relating to the pilot's medical condition, see the Medical Officer's summary, which is contained in the docket for this accident. TESTS AND RESEARCH The Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) and Textron Lycoming examined the wreckage at Plain Parts, Sacramento, California, on July 7, 2003. The engine sustained impact damage, which was predominately concentrated in the right forward section, where the engine case was cracked in several locations. Visual examination of the engine revealed no evidence of pre-mishap catastrophic mechanical malfunction or fire. Investigators removed and examined all top spark plugs, which were clean with no mechanical deformation. The spark plug electrodes were gray in color, which corresponds to normal operation according to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug AV-27 Chart. A borescope inspection through the spark plug holes revealed no mechanical deformation on the valves, cylinder walls, or internal cylinder head. Despite several attempts, investigators could not rotate the engine. An examination through a crack in the front of the engine case revealed that the crankshaft had been displaced aft about 1/8 inch. Investigators drilled holes in the engine case oriented in-line with the rotational plane of each connecting rod. Investigators observed the internal engine components with a lighted borescope. The IIC did not observe any mechanical damage and noted that all internal surfaces appeared moist. Investigators manually rotated both magnetos, which produced spark at all ignition leads. The vacuum pump drive gear remained unbroken, and the vacuum pump turned freely. The fuel pump's rubber diaphragm was unbroken. The carburetor bowl contained a clear blue fluid that smelled like aviation gasoline. Fuel squirted up several feet when the IIC operated the throttle lever. The throttle and mixture controls moved freely from stop to stop at the carburetor. The IIC established control continuity. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The wreckage was released to the owner's representative.
an in-flight loss of control due to the pilot's rotation to an excessive pitch up attitude after takeoff and his failure to maintain an adequate airspeed, which resulted in a stall. Factors in the accident were the high density altitude and the lack of stall warning devices on the airplane.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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