Pittston, PA, USA
UNREG
Hawker T Mk 7A
The pilot of the Hawker Hunter performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. A witness reported that each time, the pilot reported the brakes were dragging. The pilot also reported the engine was running "cool", but was OK. On the fourth attempted takeoff, witnesses reported the engine did not sound as loud as they expected and the airplane appeared slow. At the end of the 7,500 foot runway, the airplane abruptly pitched up, became airborne with wings rocking from side to side, and then disappeared below the level of the runway. The airplane impacted in an open field, below the level of the runway, in a nose high attitude and traveled into a wooded area. The pilot initiated ejection; however, the canopy did not separate from the airplane and the seat went through it. Three of the four canopy locks were found still locked. Water was found in the fuel filter. The airplane had received a replacement engine a month earlier, but was not signed off as airworthy. When the engine was ground run after the change, it was found to not meet two separate acceleration tests. The owner reported the maintenance records were on the airplane; however, none were found, and he never produced any documents to determine the airworthiness of the airplane. The last known annual inspection occurred 13 months prior to the flight. The airplane had been in non-preserved storage for over a year. The owner had de-registered the airplane with the FAA, with the intent of moving it to Canada; however, he had not applied for Canadian registration. After each aborted takeoff, the airplane was worked on by two non-certificated mechanics.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 22, 2003, at 0859 eastern daylight time, an unregistered Hawker Hunter T Mk. 7A, was destroyed when it struck terrain in Pittston, Pennsylvania, after it departed from Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Avoca, Pennsylvania. The airplane was owned and operated by Northern Lights Aerobatic Team, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the positioning flight. No flight plan had been filed for the flight that was destined for Burlington International Airport (BTV), Burlington, Vermont, and was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The owner reported that the purpose of the flight was to position the airplane from Wilkes-Barre, to Burlington, where he planned to apply for an import certificate to bring the airplane into Canada. The owner further reported that he had not applied to Transport Canada, for a Canadian registration and airworthiness certificate. The pilot had performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. The people on scene during the aborted takeoffs and accident flight were the owner, and two non-certificated mechanics. The air/ground communication tapes received from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), control tower were reviewed, and transcripts prepared for each aborted takeoff. Each aborted takeoff was preceded by the departure of a Piper Navajo, PA-31-350, Canadian registration C-GULM, which was registered to the operator. The Navajo was piloted by the owner, and in addition carried the two non-certificated mechanics. Each flight was announced as a flight of two, proceeding to Burlington in visual meteorological conditions. The first aborted takeoff occurred on July 18, with the airplane using runway 04. The pilot reported the engine was a little cool, but there were no problem with it. He did report that the brakes appeared to be dragging. Air was subsequently found in the brake lines, and they were bleed. The second aborted takeoff occurred on July 19, 2004, with the airplane using runway 04. The pilot used the drag chute; however, the airplane overran the departure end of the runway. Again the pilot reported no problems with the engine, and that the brakes were dragging. A check of the airplane revealed the brake cables in the cockpit were out of adjustment, and they were adjusted. The assistant airport director reported that after the second aborted takeoff, he was called to the airport due to an observed fuel leak on the Hawker Hunter. He stated: "...[the pilot] stated that the anti-skid system, called the 'Maxarrets' system, had started to cycle or pulse at high speed giving him the feeling that the brakes were cycling 'on-off' at this higher speed without input from the pilot. At that time, I directly expressed my concern that this abort was a close call and I asked the pilot if he realized that we had very little RSA [runway safety area] and that even if he went over the end at 1 mph he was in trouble as it was a substantial drop off. His response was that he would worry about flying the aircraft, or 'I'll fly the aircraft...' and I[assistant airport director] should worry about, or be concerned about airport matters. The pilot said that the brake system was the problem and that his mechanics were coming back to address the problem that evening. He did express his frustration with the fact that he had apparently had several aborts or attempts to depart and that he had commercial tickets to get back home as he has other commitments and that this ferry flight was dragging out. He said he had rescheduled his commercial tickets at least twice and had current departure reservations in hand. He said he would have departed commercially except that the aircraft owner had asked that he stick with it and give it another try. He definitely was ready to leave one way or the other...." The third aborted takeoff occurred on July 21, 2003, with the airplane using runway 22. The pilot reported the engine was OK, and the brakes were dragging. The airplane was examined, and nothing was found. No further maintenance was performed on the airplane. The pilot then performed a high speed taxi, and said that he would take the airplane the next morning. On the day of the accident, a FAA operations inspector reported that he had a general conversation with the pilot earlier in the morning. At one point, the FAA inspector asked the pilot if he knew how long it had been since the airplane had flown. The pilot reported that he thought it was 2 or 3 months. The FAA inspector reported that he turned to a mechanic who was familiar with the airplane and the mechanic reported that it had been over a year. At that point, the pilot exhibited a facial expression that the FAA inspector interpreted as surprise. The conversation terminated shortly thereafter, and the two parted company. The FAA inspector reported that he was left with a feeling that the pilot was confident that the airplane was airworthy, and that he could handle any emergency, which might arise in the flight. The pilot added that he had made several high-speed aborts, the reason for which were not specified. The airplane taxied to runway 22 for departure as the second airplane in a flight of two. The radio communications for both airplanes was being handled by the pilot of the Navajo, which was the lead airplane for the flight. At 0856:46, the pilot of the Navajo reported that he was ready for departure, and that the Hawker Hunter would back taxi for departure. The flight was cleared for takeoff at 0856:48. At 0859:54, the pilot of the Navajo transmitted: "...scranton tower declaring an emergency, we have a hunter, it is down." The pilot of the Navajo returned for landing. However, he was held until the runway was checked, after which he was cleared to land. The takeoff on runway 22 was observed by several witnesses. They were consistent in reporting that the engine did not sound as loud as they expected; the airplane did not seem to be accelerating like they expected, and the airplane did not rotate until it was near the end of the runway. One witness, also a pilot, reported the nose of the Hawker Hunter came up abruptly to between 20 and 30 degrees, and the airplane became airborne. However, once airborne, the wings started to rock from side to side, and then the airplane disappeared from view as it descended below the level of the terrain, beyond the departure end of the runway. Additional witnesses saw the airplane in a nose high pitch attitude as it descended toward terrain near the accident site. One witness described the pitch attitude of the airplane as near a normal take off when first observed. As he continued to watch, the pitch of the airplane continued to increase to about 30 degrees nose up as the airplane continued to descend. The witness said he could hear the engine running. The airplane descended below his view, and then he heard a loud bang, and saw smoke and flames rising from a wooded area. A non-certificated mechanic onboard the Navajo reported that he observed the takeoff roll, and when the airplane was about halfway down the runway, it appeared to slow, as if the pilot was aborting the takeoff, and then as it moved further down the runway, the airplane appeared to be accelerating again. The airplane appeared slow as it approached the end of the runway, and then he saw the nose come up. As the airplane passed the departure end of the runway, he saw the pilot make a shallow left turn to avoid the opposite direction approach lights that were located beyond the departure end of the runway. He saw the airplane intact as it went into the woods except for the drop tanks, and then he saw a big ball of fire. He never observed the ejection seat come out the airplane. An FAA airworthiness inspector reported that after the Navajo landed, he approached the occupants and asked who they were. After identifying themselves, he then asked if they owned the Hawker Hunter that just crashed, and the owner said yes he did. He then asked that individual if he knew where the maintenance records were for the airplane, and the owner reported that they were on the crashed airplane. The FAA inspector further reported that he asked the owner if he could remain in the area until the FAA had a chance to interview him, and he replied that he would. The FAA inspectors then traveled to the accident site and were there about 1 to 2 hours. Upon returning to the airport, the Navajo, along with the owner and the two other people had departed. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at 41 degrees 18.949 minutes north latitude, and 75 degrees, 44.415 minutes west longitude. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single engine and instrument airplane ratings. He was last issued a second class FAA airman medical certificate on September 4, 2002. He held a current Letter of Authority for the Hawker Hunter, which expired December 11, 2003. In his last request for renewal, the pilot reported that he was a Hawker Hunter demo instructor pilot for Aero Group, and F-104 demo/instructor pilot for Starfighters, Inc. The Letter of Authority required that the pilot have three takeoffs in the Hawker Hunter or comparable aircraft within the preceding 6 calendar months. In addition, it stated that after a 6 calendar month period of inactivity, the pilot was to obtain a flight review, including normal and emergency procedures and maneuvers in the Hawker Hunter and have his pilot logbook endorsed. At the time of the accident, the pilot was also flying a Lockheed F-104 in the air show circuit. According to records from the pilot's electronic pilot logbook, which was current through March 10, 2003, the pilot's total flight experience was 6,574.2 hours, which included 235.2 hours in the Hawker Hunter. His total flight experience in single engine military type turbojet airplanes was 4,214.2 hours. The pilot's recency of experience in the Hawker Hunter and the date of his last flight review were not determined. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Airplane Registration History The accident airplane was a two-seat variant of a single engine, tactical air fighter used by the Royal Air Force (RAF), in the United Kingdom (UK). The airplane carried UK military registration XL 614, and was purchased from the UK government on February 13, 1996. It was then imported into the United States, and registered to Hunter One, with the registration number N614XL. The airplane was issued Phase I operations specifications on June 26, 1996, and Phase II operations specifications on October 26, 1996. In addition, maintenance specifications that were tied to the airplane, not the owner, were issued. The maintenance specifications referenced various manuals required to be available for reference, including, but not limited to the Hawker Hunter maintenance manuals, Rolls-Royce Avon engine maintenance manuals, and the Martin-Baker ejection seat manual. The engine was a Rolls-Royce Avon 122, which developed 7,575 pounds of thrust at takeoff. The airplane was based at Wilkes-Barre, and was configured with two - 100 imperial gallon (120 US gallon) external fuel tanks, which were located under the wings, and outboard of the main landing gear. The original owner reported that in September of 2001, the airplane had a total time of about 4,789 hours, and he did not fly the airplane after that. The last annual inspection was conducted in June 2002. On June 21, 2002, the original owner sold the airplane to Aero Group, and turned over all maintenance records to them. The FAA Aircraft Bill Of Sale listed the new owner to be OneSource Financial Holdings, LLC. On June 29, 2002, a pilot attempted to deliver the airplane to Aero Group/OneSource Financial Holding LLC; however, he experienced an engine fire warning light after takeoff, and retuned to Wilkes-Barre. The airplane was then placed in non-preserved storage until the engine change on June 11, 2003. On June 13, 2003, the airplane was first sold to Resource Financial Holdings, LLC, where the same name and signature appeared as on the previous bill of sale. The airplane was then sold to Northern Lights Aerobatic Team on the same day. When interviewed, the owner, who was also the president of Northern Lights Aerobatic Team said he purchased the airplane from Aero Group. No application for airplane registration had been made after the three transactions, and the FAA airplane registration still listed the owner as Hunter One. On June 18, 2003, the owner sent a letter to the FAA, which stated in part: "...Enclosed you will find four bill of sales. I would like you to remove these four aircraft from the FAA registry for exportation to Canada. Please advise Transport Canada in Ottawa once the de-registration is completed...." Included in the list was N614XL. On July 11, 2003, the FAA approved the de-registration, with a box checked, "Exported To Canada." The FAA then sent notification to Transport Canada that the airplane had been de-registered. There was no information in the FAA registration file about the use of an alternate date for de-registration of the airplane. Engine Change. The current owner rented hanger space at Wilkes-Barre Scranton from June 11, through June 13, 2003, for the purpose of changing the engine. The existing Avon 122 engine was replaced with another Avon 122 engine. According to the FAA licensed A & P mechanic who oversaw and supervised the engine change, he did not sign off any maintenance records to return the airplane to an airworthy status. He said that he conducted the engine change in accordance with maintenance manuals for the airplane. He supplied a copy of the documentation used during the engine change and subsequent engine runs which showed what was conducted. He also reported that during engine runs, the engine was found to not meet two specific tests. The first test was engine acceleration from approach power (4,500 rpm) to maximum governed rpm (8,100 rpm). The specified time for the acceleration was 5 seconds, and he reported that it took the engine 9 seconds to complete the acceleration. The second test was engine acceleration from ground idle to the maximum governed rpm. The specified time for the acceleration was 7 to 9 seconds, and he reported that it took 14 seconds to complete the acceleration. Use of the Ejection Seat The airplane was equipped with an ejection seat. According to the aircrew manual, the recommended minimum height and speed for safe ejection in straight and level flight was ground level at 90 knots. If the aircraft was in a nose-down or banked attitude, additional height was required. If the aircraft was descending, the minimum safe height was about 100 feet AGL for every 1,000 feet/minute rate of descent. The ejection seat was fired by either by pulling up on the "D" ring between the pilots leg, or pulling the face screen forward and down, from its location, above and behind the pilot's head. When either method was used, a timer started, and the canopy was immediately jettisoned. At 0.5 seconds, the cartridges in the ejection seat were fired, and the seat starts to move. The drogue chute extends, and then dependent upon airspeed and altitude pulls the main parachute out of the backpack and the three-point harness is released with pilot/seat separation. If the ejection was commenced when operating below 10,000 feet, the seat separation would take place 1.25 seconds after the seat had decelerated to a safe speed for parachute opening. Flight Authorization According to 14 CFR Part 91.203 Civil Aircraft Certifications Required, and 14 CFR Part 91.715, Special Flight Authorization For Foreign Civil Aircraft, the airplane was required to be registered either in the United States, or another country. In the case of a foreign registered airplane, a special flight permit issued by the FAA may be used in lieu of an airworthiness certificate. The departure airport was supervised by the Allentown Flight Standards District Office. There was no record that the
The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff, after the engine experienced a partial power loss for undetermined reasons. Factors were the pilot's improper preflight planning by his failure to determine if the airplane was airworthy, and the operators inadequate maintenance on the airplane, the use of non-certificated mechanics to perform the work on the airplane, and his failure to ensure the airplane met the minimum standards necessary for flight.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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