SKAGWAY, AK, USA
N4317S
Beech V35-B
The private certificated pilot departed from a near sea level runway situated in a narrow valley. The runway is 3,550 feet long by 75 feet wide. Steep mountains are located on either side of the departure path, which places the airplane in an increasingly narrowing canyon. The accident airplane was observed to takeoff on runway 02 and began a tight, climbing left turn. The direction of the turn placed the airplane near rising terrain to the northwest of the airport. The airplane was observed to descend, nose down, into the trees, followed by a fire. The location of the accident was along a steep hillside, at an elevation of about 260 feet msl. A postaccident examination of the airplane disclosed that it collided with the ground in a steep, nose down attitude. A postcrash fire consumed the cockpit/cabin area. Witnesses described the airplane's engine as running at all times. Evidence of numerous cut tree limbs at the scene were consistent with engine power. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no observed preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The FAA's Airport Facility Directory entry for the airport, states, in part: "Recommended daylight operations only. ...Approach to runway 20 in [a] narrow canyon. Turbulence and high obstructions. ...When departing runway 02, maintain runway heading for at least 1/2 mile to avoid nearby school and playground." Local users of the airport have developed a takeoff procedure for runway 02. The takeoff procedure recommends that airplanes make a slight right turn during climb-out to hug the right side of the canyon wall, then make a left climbing turn to clear the ridgeline northwest of the airport. The pilot was making a long distance cross-country flight and was not familiar with the airport.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 8, 2003, about 1645 Alaska daylight time, a wheel-equipped Beech V35-B airplane, N4317S, was destroyed when it collided with tree-covered terrain following a loss of control during the initial climb after takeoff, about .5 mile north-northwest of the Skagway Airport, Skagway, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The airplane was operated by the pilot. The private certificated pilot, and the two passengers, received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The intended destination was Yakutat, Alaska. No flight plan was filed, nor was one required. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel reported that the pilot purchased fuel in Juneau, Alaska, on August 8. The airplane then departed from Juneau, for a flight to Skagway. A witness reported that the airplane arrived in the Skagway area about 1330. The airplane entered what appeared to the witness to be a landing pattern for runway 20. At that time, the witness described the wind as 20 to 30 knots, and favoring runway 02. The witness said he called the airplane on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) to alert the pilot of the wind. The pilot broke off the landing pattern for runway 20, and completed a landing on runway 02. At 1557, the pilot contacted the Juneau Automated Fight Service Station (AFSS) facility, Juneau, Alaska, and received a weather briefing for a flight from Skagway to Yakutat. Witnesses reported that the airplane departed about 1645 from runway 02 at Skagway, and then began a tight, climbing left turn. The direction of the turn placed the airplane near rising terrain to the northwest of the airport. The airplane was observed to descend, nose down, into the trees, followed by a fire. The location of the accident was along a steep hillside, at an elevation of about 260 feet msl. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. The most recent third-class medical certificate was issued to the pilot on April 15, 2003, and contained the limitation that the pilot must have available glasses for near vision. The pilot's partially burned personal flight log book was located in the burned wreckage. Examination of the damaged logbook revealed that the pilot recorded about 2,600 hours of total flight experience. On the pilot's application for medical certificate, dated April 15, 2003, the pilot indicated that his total aeronautical experience consisted of about 3,000 hours, of which 30 were accrued in the previous 6 months. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION A review of maintenance information provided by a family member, indicated the airframe and engine had a 100 hour/annual inspection on December 18, 2002. At that time, the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of 3453.9 hours. The engine had accumulated 371.9 hours since a major overhaul on May 17, 2000. The propeller had also accrued 371.9 hours. Since the annual inspection, a review of the pilot's hand-written notes indicated the airplane had accrued an additional 41.5 hours. During the investigation, FAA personnel established that the aircraft was last fueled in Juneau, Alaska, on August 8, 2003, before departing for Skagway, with the addition of 46.1 gallons of fuel, which topped-off the fuel tanks. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1653, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) at Skagway was reporting, in part: Wind, 040 degrees (true) at 13 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, clear; temperature, 73 degrees F; dew point, 42 degrees F; altimeter, 30.16 inHg. COMMUNICATIONS Review of communications tapes maintained by the FAA at the Juneau AFSS facility, revealed that the pilot of the accident airplane communicated with the position of Preflight 5 on August 8. He requested information about the weather in route to Yakutat. A transcript of the communications between the airplane and the Juneau AFSS facility is included in the public docket of this accident. AERODROME AND GROUND FACILITIES The Skagway Airport, elevation 44 feet msl, is equipped with a single hard-surfaced runway on a 020 to 200 degree magnetic orientation. Runway 02 is 3,550 feet long by 75 feet wide. The remarks section of the FAA's Airport Facility Directory, Alaska Supplement, states, in part: "Airport condition not monitored, ...recommend visual inspection prior to using. Recommended daylight operations only. ...Approach to runway 20 in [a] narrow canyon. Turbulence and high obstructions. ...When departing runway 02, maintain runway heading for at least 1/2 mile to avoid nearby school and playground." The Skagway Airport is situated in a valley, next to the Skagway River. Steep rising mountains are located on either side of the departure path for runway 02, which places the airplane into a narrowing canyon. Air taxi operators utilizing Skagway have a locally developed departure path when taking off on runway 02. The takeoff procedure recommends that airplanes make a slight right turn during climb-out to hug the right side of the canyon wall, then make a left climbing turn to clear the ridgeline northwest of the airport. The pilot of the accident airplane was conducting a cross-country flight from California to Alaska, and was not familiar with the Skagway airport. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) examined the airplane wreckage at the accident site on August 9 and 10. The airplane collided with numerous birch and spruce trees, each about 30 feet tall, before striking the ground. Broken tree tops and tree limbs were observed nearly directly above the wreckage point of rest. At the point of rest, the nose of the airplane was observed on a 180 degree heading. (All heading/bearings noted in this report are oriented toward magnetic north.) All of the airplane's major components were found at the main wreckage area. A postcrash fire incinerated most of the cabin/cockpit area. The cabin area and the empennage were resting at an approximate 70 degree nose down attitude. The engine was displaced aft and upward from the cabin. The firewall was crushed forward and folded around the aft end of the engine. The throw-over yoke was positioned to the left seat position. The landing gear was found retracted. The fuel selector was positioned on the left tank. The right "V" stabilizer remained attached to the fuselage. It had areas of thermal damage and skin burn-through on both sides of the assembly. The right ruddervator and right trim tab remained attached to the stabilizer and each had thermal damage. The left "V" stabilizer had extensive fire damage at its attach point to the fuselage and the outboard half was destroyed. The outboard end of the left ruddervator was completely destroyed by fire. The inboard half remained attached to the trailing end of the stabilizer. The left wing had extensive fire damage with destruction of the wing area from the root to about the outboard end of the left flap. The outboard end of the wing was folded upward and inboard, from about 12 inches outboard of the outboard end of the left aileron. The left aileron and left flap remained attached to their respective wing attach points. The left flap appeared to be retracted. The right wing had extensive fire damage from the root to the inboard end of the aileron, between the aft wing spar and the leading edge. The leading edge of the wingtip had aft crushing and folding. The right aileron and right flap remained attached to their respective wing attach points. The right flap appeared to be retracted. The propeller assembly was fractured at the front of the engine crankshaft and almost completely buried in the ground. One propeller blade tip was initially visible and was extensively curled. Excavation of the propeller assembly revealed that all three blades were loose in the hub and had extensive gouging, chordwise scratching, "S" bending, and torsional twisting. The propeller spinner exhibited rotational twisting, and was crushed aft around the propeller dome. Due to impact and postimpact fire damage, the flight controls could not be moved by their respective control mechanisms. The continuity of the flight control cables was established to the cabin/cockpit area. The engine sustained impact damage to the underside/front portion of the engine. The exhaust tubes were crushed and folded, producing sharp creases that were not cracked or broken along the crease. The magnetos sustained fire damage. Removal of the top sparks plug from each engine cylinder revealed that the massive electrodes were dry, and had a gray appearance. The fuel manifold's fuel lines were fire damaged. Examination of the interior of the manifold revealed that the diaphragm was intact, but brittle. The inner screen was free of contaminants. In the area around the wreckage point of rest, numerous sections of cut trees were found. These segments averaged about 3 inches in diameter, and were between 21 to 15 inches long. Each end of the cut limbs were sliced at parallel angles to the long axis of the section, each resembling a parallelogram. In addition, several trees, about 10 to 12 feet long, were found severed and lying on the ground, adjacent to the wreckage. Their cut ends were diagonal to the long axis of the tree, and appeared similar to the cut sections of the previously observed tree segments. One fallen tree had several diagonal slice marks on the outer surface of the tree bark. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION A postmortem examination of the pilot was conducted under the authority of the Alaska State Medical Examiner, 4500 South Boniface Parkway, Anchorage, Alaska, on August 11, 2003. The examination revealed the cause of death for the pilot was attributed to blunt force impact/deceleration injuries. A toxicological examination was conducted by the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) on October 30, 2003, and revealed the presence of ethanol in the blood. The FAA reported that the ethanol found in this case was from postmortem formation. No other drugs were detected. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The Safety Board released the wreckage, located at Skagway, Alaska, to the owner's representatives on August 10, 2003. No parts or components were retained by the Safety Board.
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed and subsequent inadvertent stall, which resulted in a collision with trees during takeoff-initial climb. Factors contributing to the accident were terrain features consisting of a ravine and rising terrain on either side of the departure runway.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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