Odessa, FL, USA
N129YE
Robinson Robinson R22 Beta
The accident flight was the certified flight instructor (CFI) applicants initial CFI checkride. The CFI applicant stated in writing immediately after the accident that after they had exited the helicopter, the designated pilot examiner (DPE) stated to him "...we should say that when the [throttle] was rolled [off] the engine stopped running and to stick to that story." The CFI applicant stated in writing with the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report form that after obtaining his commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft helicopter rating, he attended the Robinson factory in California where he completed the Robinson Safety Course. He also described the events leading up to the checkride and what occurred during the oral examination, the preflight inspection, and the flight portion of the checkride immediately before the accident. Following several autorotative landings which he describes in detail, the DPE then asked him to perform a 180- degree autorotation to a power recovery and entered the maneuver. While flying on the downwind leg with the airspeed and main rotor rpm steady, he looked to his intended spot then back to the gauges. At that time the low main rotor horn came on; the rpm was at 96 percent. He (CFI applicant) said, "rpm is stable" and started the turn knowing the rpm would increase during the turn. The airspeed was 60 knots and the main rotor rpm was steady at 96 percent. About 90 degrees into the 180-degree turn, the DPE advised, "you're too slow" and took the controls. He (CFI applicant) thought the DPE was going to roll on throttle and recover but he continued the descent. The helicopter landed hard, slid across the runway, and came to rest in the grass adjacent to the runway. He indicated on the report that there was no mechanical failure or malfunction. The CFI applicant later stated verbally that the DPE did not apply throttle input when he took the controls. The DPE stated in writing immediately after the accident that, "As I attempted to recover, it seemed as though the engine did not respond. However I am not sure if it stopped since this all happened within 1 second or two." The DPE stated in writing with the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report form what he asked during the oral examination. Following that he conducted a preflight briefing with the CFI applicant which included discussion of various procedures they would follow and the guidelines for executing the required maneuvers. Following the preflight inspection of the helicopter, the CFI applicant performed airwork followed by several straight-in autorotations to a power recovery, then one straight-in autorotation to touchdown. He reminded the CFI applicant sometime during the autorotations the main rotor rpm was falling below safe limits and he should keep it closer to the normal limits of 102-104 percent. The CFI applicant responded that he understood but his CFI had taught him that way to avoid any overspeeds during the flare. The DPE then "directed" the applicant to perform a normal takeoff and try a "required" 180-degree autorotation to a power recovery. The flight departed and the CFI applicant entered the autorotation. During the left turn the low main rotor horn came on at approximately 97 percent, and the CFI applicant continued the descending turn until he was between 100-200 feet above ground level, at 40 knots airspeed, and a nose down attitude. When the flight was about 1/2 way into the 180-degree turn he felt the aircraft descending rapidly and he stated, "the rpm is too low" as he observed it descending through 80 percent. He heard a response from the CFI applicant and he took the controls when he observed the main rotor rpm "...decreasing through 80%...." He grabbed the controls and felt the applicant pulling up even further on the collective. He (DPE) simultaneously pushed the collective full down, rolled on full throttle and applied left cyclic control input. He was only able to turn the helicopter 40 degrees and the helicopter contacted the runway near the centerline at about a 40-degree angle while in a level attitude. He estimated the helicopter skidded approximately 125 feet before coming to rest upright. They both exited the helicopter and he asked the CFI applicant if he remembered whether or not the engine was running when he opened full throttle since he did not get the expected response from the engine when he opened full throttle. The CFI applicant responded, "I don't remember what should I say." He advised the CFI applicant to stick to your story about not remembering. He indicated on the report that there was no mechanical failure or malfunction. Review of a document provided by Robinson Helicopter Company pertaining to a flight evaluation by the CFI applicant 6 days before the accident revealed the instructor indicated the CFI applicant was average in all areas, which included 180-degree autorotations. Review of the procedures for practice autorotation with a power recovery revealed, "Keep RPM in green arc and airspeed 60-70 KIAS."
On August 20, 2003, about 1252 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R22 Beta, N129YE registered to Heli-Venture, Inc., operated by Clearwater Air Park, Inc., landed hard during a practice 180-degree autorotation at the Tampa Bay Executive Airport, Odessa, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 check-ride flight. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the pilot-in-command/certified flight instructor applicant (CFI applicant) sustained minor injuries while the designated pilot examiner (DPE) reported no injuries. The flight originated about 1215, from the Tampa Bay Executive Airport. The accident flight was the CFI applicant's initial certified flight instructor (CFI) checkride. The CFI applicant stated in writing immediately after the accident that after they had exited the helicopter, the DPE stated to him "...we should say that when the [throttle] was rolled [off] the engine stopped running and to stick to that story." The CFI applicant stated in writing with the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report form that after obtaining his commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft helicopter rating, he attended the Robinson factory in California where he completed the Robinson Safety Course. He also described the events leading up to the checkride and what occurred during the oral examination, the preflight inspection, and the flight portion of the checkride immediately before the accident. Following several autorotative landings which he describes in detail, the DPE then asked him to perform a 180- degree autorotation to a power recovery and entered the maneuver. While flying on the downwind leg with the airspeed and main rotor rpm steady, he looked to his intended spot then back to the gauges. At that time the low main rotor horn came on; the rpm was at 96 percent. He (CFI applicant) said, "rpm is stable" and started the turn knowing the rpm would increase during the turn. The airspeed was 60 knots and the main rotor rpm was steady at 96 percent. About 90 degrees into the 180-degree turn, the DPE advised, "you're too slow" and took the controls. He (CFI applicant) thought the DPE was going to roll on throttle and recover but he continued the descent. The helicopter landed hard, slid across the runway, and came to rest in the grass adjacent to the runway. He indicated on the report that there was no mechanical failure or malfunction. The CFI applicant later stated verbally that the DPE did not apply throttle input when he took the controls. The DPE stated in writing immediately after the accident that, "As I attempted to recover, it seemed as though the engine did not respond. However I am not sure if it stopped since this all happened within 1 second or two." The DPE stated in writing with the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report form what he asked during the oral examination. Following that he conducted a preflight briefing with the CFI applicant which included discussion of various procedures they would follow and the guidelines for executing the required maneuvers. Following the preflight inspection of the helicopter, the CFI applicant performed airwork followed by several straight-in autorotations to a power recovery, then one straight-in autorotation to touchdown. He reminded the CFI applicant sometime during the autorotations the main rotor rpm was falling below safe limits and he should keep it closer to the normal limits of 102-104 percent. The CFI applicant responded that he understood but his CFI had taught him that way to avoid any overspeeds during the flare. The DPE then "directed" the applicant to perform a normal takeoff and try a "required" 180-degree autorotation to a power recovery. The flight departed and the CFI applicant entered the autorotation. During the left turn the low main rotor horn came on at approximately 97 percent, and the CFI applicant continued the descending turn until he was between 100-200 feet above ground level, at 40 knots airspeed, and a nose down attitude. When the flight was about 1/2 way into the 180-degree turn he felt the aircraft descending rapidly and he stated, "the rpm is too low" as he observed it descending through 80 percent. He heard a response from the CFI applicant and he took the controls when he observed the main rotor rpm "...decreasing through 80%...." He grabbed the controls and felt the applicant pulling up even further on the collective. He (DPE) simultaneously pushed the collective full down, rolled on full throttle and applied left cyclic control input. He was only able to turn the helicopter 40 degrees and the helicopter contacted the runway near the centerline at about a 40-degree angle while in a level attitude. He estimated the helicopter skidded approximately 125 feet before coming to rest upright. They both exited the helicopter and he asked the CFI applicant if he remembered whether or not the engine was running when he opened full throttle since he did not get the expected response from the engine when he opened full throttle. The CFI applicant responded, "I don't remember what should I say." He advised the CFI applicant to stick to your story about not remembering. He indicated on the report that there was no mechanical failure or malfunction. Review of a document provided by Robinson Helicopter Company pertaining to a flight evaluation by the CFI applicant 6 days before the accident revealed the instructor indicated the CFI applicant was average in all areas, which included 180-degree autorotations. Review of the procedures for practice autorotation with a power recovery revealed, "Keep RPM in green arc and airspeed 60-70 KIAS."
The failure of the pilot to maintain the proper airspeed during the practice 180-degree autorotational landing and his failure to maintain main rotor rpm resulting in a hard landing. A contributing factor in the accident was the delay by the designated pilot examiner to take the controls from the pilot after recognizing that the airspeed and main rotor rpm were low.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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