Flushing, NY, USA
N733KR
Embraer EMB-135
As the airplane was being pushed out from the gate area, with only one wing walker positioned off of the right wing, the left wing and a refuse truck collided. There was no communication established between the tug operator, and the cockpit crew due to the lack of interphone headsets. The refuse truck operator stated he positioned the refuse truck behind the left side of the airplane to allow an assistant to exit from the truck to assure that there was adequate clearance to proceed backwards and outboard of the left wing of the airplane. The refuse truck operator then pulled forward approximately 4 feet to allow the airplane to be pulled back to the gate, and parked the truck. According to the American Eagle Embraer EMB Airplane Operations Manual, "Hand signals may be used at the Captain's discretion (e.g. inoperative interphone, inoperative headset or lightning in the area). In these cases, when hand signals are used, the following is required, an additional ground agent will be required, to communicate hand signals to the cockpit, as the push-out vehicle operator cannot safely operate the push-out vehicle and maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during push-out. This additional ground agent will maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during the push-out. A pre-push-out briefing must be held, between the Captain and ground agent, to thoroughly brief the hand signals to be used during push-out. This will ensure that both parties understand what is to occur before, during and after push-out." The captain did not coordinate push-out procedures with ground personnel prior to the pushback, and the additional ground agent was not present.
On September 27, 2003, about 1100 eastern daylight time, an Embraer EMB-135, N733KR, operated by American Eagle Inc., as flight 4873, was substantially damaged during pushback from Gate C/2, when it struck a refuse truck at the La Guardia Airport (LGA), Flushing, New York. The 2 flightcrew members, 1 flight attendant, and 27 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight that was destined for the Raleigh Durham International Airport (RDU), Raleigh, North Carolina. The scheduled passenger flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121. According to a representative of the operator, due to the location of the gate, the airplane was required to be pushed back at an angle. The tug was positioned off the right side of the airplane, canted at a 45-degree angle. A wing-walker was present off of the right wing; however, no wing-walker was present for the left wing area. Upon commencement of the pushback, and completion of the "Before Start Checklist" by the flightcrew, communication could not be established between the tug operator and the cockpit crew. After determining that the interphone headsets were not operating, the pushback was continued. During the pushback, the left wing of the airplane collided with a refuse truck. The representative added that the captain did not coordinate any pushback procedures with the ground personnel prior to the pushback. According to the tug operator, as he was commencing the pushback, the wing-walker positioned on the right wing of the airplane signaled him to stop. The tug operator then heard a collision and observed a refuse truck had "reversed and collided" with the left wing of the airplane. According to the wing-walker, while the airplane was at the gate, he observed a stationary refuse truck on the left side of the airplane. As the pushback commenced, the wing-walker observed the refuse truck backing up, and instructed the tug operator to stop. After the airplane came to a stop, the refuse truck started to backup and subsequently collided with the left wing. The refuse truck then pulled forward, and the airplane was re-positioned to the gate area. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector interviewed the refuse truck operator after the accident. The refuse truck operator stated that he observed two ground personnel in front of the airplane as he positioned the refuse truck behind the left side of the airplane. The refuse truck operator stopped the truck to allow an assistant to exit from the truck to assure that there was adequate clearance to proceed backwards to a dumpster located forward and outboard of the left wing of the airplane. The "stationary" refuse truck was then struck by the airplane as it was being pushed back from the gate area. The refuse truck operator pulled forward approximately 4 feet to allow the airplane to be pulled back to the gate, and parked. The refuse truck operator added that no wing walkers were present on the left side of the airplane as it was being pushed back. Examination of the airplane after the accident by the FAA inspector revealed substantial damage to the left wing. The inspector observed that the refuse truck was parked within the gate operating area, which was designated by painted yellow lines. The inspector also observed a painted roadway located to the right of the refuse truck. The roadway bordered the gate operating area. According to the American Eagle Embraer EMB Airplane Operations Manual: "Communications between Captain and Guideperson is based on the following procedure: All communications between the Captain and Guideperson will normally be by interphone, except when Guideperson gives departure signal. Hand signals may be used at the Captain's discretion (e.g. inoperative interphone, inoperative headset or lightning in the area). In these cases, when hand signals are used, the following is required: An additional ground agent will be required, to communicate hand signals to the cockpit, as the push-out vehicle operator cannot safely operate the push-out vehicle and maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during push-out. This additional ground agent will maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during the push-out. A pre-push-out briefing must be held, between the Captain and ground agent, to thoroughly brief the hand signals to be used during push-out. This will ensure that both parties understand what is to occur before, during and after push-out." The Operations Manual also stated that on the "Before Start Checklist," the rotating beacon was to be selected "ON" prior to engine start or push-out. According to the American Eagle Station Operating Manual: General "A push-out will generally warrant three (3) ground agents, comprised of two (2) wingwalkers and one (1) guideperson. However, in locations where the push-out area is clear of obstructions, excluding equipment parked within designated areas, only one (1) wingwalker and one (1) guideperson are required. Under these circumstances, the push-out area must remain free of obstructions, equipment or other aircraft. The one (1) wingwalker must be able to clearly see the perimeter around the aircraft. The wingwalker must also remain in visual site of the guideperson and be able to alert him/her of ramp activity occurring near the push-out area. If only one (1) wingwalker is utilized for the push-out of an aircraft then the wingwalker should be positioned towards the rear of the aircraft, but within site of the guideperson. The guideperson must advise the captain of the departure method (push-out, taxi-out or power-back)…" Cockpit to Ground Communications and Procedures "Normal procedures call for the push-out vehicle operator to be the communication link with the Captain through use of company supplied ground-to-cockpit headsets. In rare instances, when the headsets are inoperative or the ramp has been advise of lightning in the area, hand signals will be used for communication between ground personnel and the Captain. In these cases, when hand signals are to be used, the following is required: An additional ground agent will be required. The agent will communicate hand signals to the cockpit, as the push-out vehicle operator cannot safely operate the push-out vehicle and maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during push-out. This additional ground agent will maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during the push-out process. A pre-push-out briefing must be held, between the Captain and ground agent, to thoroughly brief the hand signals to be used during push-out. This will ensure that both parties understand what is to occur before, during and after push-out." Review of records from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey revealed that the operator of the refuse truck was appropriately trained, tested, and authorized to operate ground vehicles on airport property. Review of the Airport Ground Vehicle Operations training manual developed and utilized by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, revealed, "Aprons or ramps are the areas where aircraft park, load, and unload. Your work may require you to drive on an apron. If so, be careful. Watch for aircraft that are moving and always yield the right-of-way to them. Don't assume the pilot will see you and stop. He or she may be busy with other things such as radio communications or checklist items. In addition to watching for moving aircraft, be careful not to get too close to a parked aircraft. Aside from nicks and dents that are expensive to repair, you could be hurt if an aircraft suddenly started its engine and you were too close. You should also be aware of the problem of jet blast or prop wash. There have been several cases where vehicles have been overturned by jet blast. If a pilot is about to start the engine(s), or the engine(s) are running, the aircraft's beacon should be flashing." According to a representative from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, operators of vehicles who were required to drive on the airport ramp areas of the airport, received verbal "hands-on" type training as it pertained to ground markings and signage encountered on the ramp areas. The representative also stated that the operator leased the ramp area from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The makings painted on the ramp operating area was provided and maintained by the operator, under the approval of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. **This report was modified on March 19, 2008.**
The inadequate visual lookout by the driver of a ground vehicle, and by ground support personnel, which resulted in a subsequent collision between the airplane and ground vehicle. A factor related to the accident was the failure of the pilot-in-command and ground personnel to coordinate ground-handling procedures.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
