San Diego, CA, USA
N1147N
Mooney M20K
The airplane landed hard on a highway while attempting to perform a go-around from runway 28R. The pilot received a preflight weather briefing from 1120 to 1131 and was advised he could not file IFR into the destination airport due to the closure of the TRACON and the airport ATCT due to a major forest fire threatening the facilities. He was advised he "might be able to get in VFR." He filed IFR to an intersection located in the vicinity of his destination airport. Once the flight arrived in the general destination area, the pilot canceled his IFR clearance and flew visually to the airport. After attempting to land runway 28R, he applied power for a go-around. He retracted the flaps but left the landing gear down, and did not put the propeller control in the full forward position. As the pilot maneuvered during the go-around he turned into a tailwind situation and the airplane was unable to maintain a climb. The airplane descended to impact on a highway. A post crash fire erupted and consumed the airplane. The POH for the airplane states that the propeller control should be at a high rpm during landing. For a go-around procedure, the POH indicates that the pilot should apply power, retract the flaps to the takeoff position [10 degrees], and then retract the landing gear and remaining flaps once the airplane accelerates to 91 mph (77 knots) IAS. A post-accident inspection revealed that the propeller governor control arm was 3/8-inch from the low pitch stop. A METAR was issued at 1414 that noted the wind was from 070 degrees at 6 knots, gusting to 14 knots. No discrepancies were found duirng an examination of the engine.
On October 26, 2003, at 1419 Pacific standard time, a Mooney M20K airplane, N1147N, landed hard on a highway while attempting to perform a go-around from Montgomery Field (MYF), San Diego, California. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The private pilot was not injured; however, the airplane was destroyed. The flight departed St. John's Industrial Air Park (SJN), St. Johns, Arizona, about 1200 mountain standard time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) plan had been filed for the personal cross-country flight. In a telephone conversation, the pilot reported that he filed IFR to BARET intersection with the intention of landing visual flight rules (VFR) at Montgomery Field. The closure of the Southern California (SoCal) terminal radar approach control (TRACON) due to fires in the area, had restricted IFR flights into the area. He was not advised why the SoCal TRACON was closed. While en route to Montgomery Field, the pilot could see a large smoke cloud over Julian. To the south of Julian it looked like he could descend below the smoke layer, and continue westbound to Montgomery, where it looked like the visibility improved. He descended below the smoke layer and found turbulent conditions. He felt that he was unable to turn back because that would have required a climb. The pilot continued and was advised that he could land at Lindberg Field (SAN) in 15 minutes, or continue to Montgomery Field. He elected to continue to Montgomery Field because Lindberg was busy, and he could reestablish radio contact if he had any problems. Prior to landing, he canceled his IFR clearance and descended below the smoke layer. During the approach to runway 28R, the pilot executed a go-around. He applied the throttle and as the airplane began the crosswind turn, he felt that the engine lost partial power. He was unable to maintain a climb, and landed the airplane hard on Highway 163. As the airplane touched down, the right wing impacted a divider. The pilot further reported that he did not receive an updated weather briefing in flight. He was receiving satellite weather onboard, and also had access to updated aviation terminal forecasts (TAFS), aviation routine weather reports (METARS), airman's meteorological information (AIRMETS), and significant meteorological information (SIGMETS). The METAR for Montgomery Field indicated the winds were favorable to landing on runway 5L. Recorded transcripts of the weather briefing that the pilot received were reviewed by the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC). The pilot received a preflight weather briefing from 1120 to 1131. Initially, the pilot requested to file an IFR flight plan to Montgomery Field. He was then advised that IFR flights into the Southern California area were unavailable due to the closure of the SoCal TRACON. The briefer stated, "you might be able to get in VFR [visual flight rules]" because the smoke was "quite a bit less over the San Diego area." The briefer reported that the weather conditions at Montgomery Field were 8 miles visibility, clouds overcast at 4,100 feet, and wind 130 degrees at 10 knots. He also reported that Miramar MCAS (NKX), located 6 nautical miles north of Montgomery Field, was reporting special VFR conditions with 1 mile of visibility, clouds 1,300 overcast, and winds at 15 knots, gusting to 21. The Miramar weather observation was taken 10 minutes prior to the time it was given. As the closing of the briefing, the pilot filed an IFR flight plan to BARET intersection with the intent of flying the remainder of the flight VFR. The Montgomery Field tower was evacuated at 1115. A notice to airmen (NOTAM) advising the closure of the Montgomery Field tower was issued at 1152. An aviation routine weather report (METAR) was issued at 1414. It stated in part: wind from 070 degrees at 6 knots, gusting to 14 knots; visibility 1 1/4 miles; haze; smoke; overcast 1,400; temperature 31 degrees Celsius; dew point 7 degrees Celsius; and altimeter 30.08 inHg. An aviation routine weather report (METAR) was issued at 1453. It stated in part: wind from 040 degrees at 9 knots; visibility 3/4 mile; haze; smoke; vertical visibility 1,000 feet; temperature 31 degrees Celsius; dew point 8 degrees Celsius; and altimeter 30.08 inHg. The IIC and a representative from Teledyne Continental Motors, a party to the investigation, examined the engine on November 19, 2003. The top spark plugs were removed and visually examined. All electrodes were circular and gray in color. The bottom spark plugs were not removed. The magnetos sustained thermal damage in the post-impact fire and were not in a testable condition. The mixture control arm was in the midrange position. The governor control arm was 3/8 inch from the low pitch stop. The throttle control arm was in the closed position. In the pilot operating handbook (POH) for the airplane it states that the propeller control should be at a high rpm during landing. For a go-around procedure, the pilot should adjust the power to 20 inches of manifold pressure and 2,700 rpm. Then, retract the flaps to the takeoff position [10 degrees], and retract the landing gear and remaining flaps once the airplane accelerates to 91 mph (77 knots) indicated airspeed (IAS).
the pilot's failure to configure the airplane properly for the go-around which resulted in degraded climb performance, and his failure to maintain adequate airspeed which resulted in a stall. The tailwind was a contributing factor.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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