Wheeling, IL, USA
N789CN
Cessna 560XL
The airplane was substantially damaged when it overran the departure end of the runway during an aborted takeoff. The crew attempted to reject the takeoff when the pilot flying could not rotate normally. The aircraft is equipped with a two-position horizontal stabilizer system, which acts to reduce elevator control forces by repositioning the stabilizer two-degrees down for takeoff or landing. The normal (cruise) position corresponds to one-degree up. There are no intermediate positions. The stabilizer is commanded to move to the takeoff position when the crew moves the cockpit flap handle out of the 0-degree (flaps up) detent. The stabilizer was observed in the cruise position during the post-accident inspection. Two independent warning systems are designed to alert the flight crew in the event that the horizontal stabilizer is not properly positioned for takeoff or landing. A stabilizer mis-compare (STAB MIS COMP) annunciator warning is displayed when the flap handle and horizontal stabilizer are not in corresponding positions. In addition, a no-takeoff warning (NO TAKEOFF) will be displayed when the aircraft is on the ground and the horizontal stabilizer is not in the proper position for takeoff. As the throttles are advanced forward of the climb thrust setting, the no-takeoff annunciator light (NO TAKEOFF) will begin to flash and a master caution will be displayed. A warning horn will sound associated with the no takeoff indication. During the post-accident investigation, electrical power was applied to the aircraft. Without changing any cockpit control settings, the STAB MIS COMP and NO TAKEOFF lights on the annunciator panel were illuminated. Initial attempts to reposition the horizontal stabilizer were not successful. Subsequent inspection of the aft fairing feedthru connector revealed an unseated (pushed-back) pin. The pin provided electrical power to the hydraulic arming valve in order to allow repositioning of the horizontal stabilizer. Further examination of the pin showed black marks near the tip consistent with electrical arcing. When a new pin was installed, the horizontal stabilizer repositioned from cruise to takeoff/landing position as expected. The stabilizer miscompare and no-takeoff warning systems were subsequently tested and performed in accordance with the flight and operating manual parameters. The warning horn associated with the no-takeoff indication was heard over the cockpit speaker when the thrust levers were brought above the climb thrust setting. The flight manual BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist noted that all annunciator lights should be extinguished except the ground idle light prior to initiating a takeoff. The flight manual abnormal procedures checklist stated that when illuminated on the ground a STAB MISCOMP indication must be corrected prior to flight. In addition, a no-takeoff indication required the takeoff be aborted. The cockpit voice recorder was downloaded and transcribed. The transcript revealed that the crew was aware that the horizontal stabilizer was not in the takeoff position prior to initiating the takeoff roll. In addition, a sound similar to the no-takeoff warning horn was recorded over the cockpit area microphone during the takeoff roll and sounded for approximately twelve seconds before a rejected takeoff was initiated.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 11, 2003, at 1342 central standard time, a Cessna 560XL, N789CN, operated by West Coast Charters and piloted by an airline transport pilot (ATP), was substantially damaged when it overran runway 34 (5,000 feet by 150 feet, asphalt) during an aborted takeoff at Palwaukee Municipal Airport (PWK), Wheeling, Illinois. The charter flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 135 and was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The two pilots and three passengers reported no injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and had an intended destination of John Wayne-Orange County Airport (SNA), Santa Ana, California. In a written statement, the operator's director of operations stated: "Flight crew rejected [takeoff] at VR when pilot flying could not rotate normally. Crew was unable to stop on remaining runway (34). Aircraft ran off the end of runway onto grass area." The aircraft came to rest approximately 300 feet past the end of the pavement, striking eight approach lights before coming to rest. The right main landing gear and nose gear collapsed. A witness reported that he was looking out of a window, which viewed the last approximately 1,000 feet of the departure end of the runway. He stated that he saw the accident aircraft "traveling at a high rate of speed [and] attempting [a] hard deceleration." He reported that the engine thrust reversers, spoilers, and flaps were deployed. He observed occasional puffs of smoke from what appeared to be the left main wheel. The aircraft subsequently departed the end of the runway. A transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) recording was prepared. The transcription began about ten minutes prior to landing at PWK on the inbound flight. Times presented are elapsed time from the beginning of the recording, not the actual time of day. The complete CVR transcript is included in the docket material associated with this report. At 0122:13 elapsed recording time, the captain informed the passengers over the aircraft's public address system that the flight was approximately 17 miles from PWK and asked them to verify that their seatbelts were fastened. At 0128:39, air traffic control (ATC) stated that the flight was 4 miles from the final approach fix and cleared them for the approach. At 0129:30, the first officer stated: "So the HYD [hydraulic pressure] light won't go off?" The captain responded: "It will if the stab's [stabilizer] movin... what's wrong with that thing?" The flight was cleared to land by PWK tower at 0129:48. At 0130:58, the captain stated: "And yeah flaps full." At 0131:36, the first officer stated: "Yeah, its basically just a land as soon as practical," followed by "flaps are full, REF is twelve... damper to go." The captain replied: "When you bring the flaps up, bring them all the way up, I wanna make sure it goes out again." At 0133:29, after the aircraft had landed, the captain stated: "Gotta put that HYD PRESS light out, otherwise we got a problem... we can't go five hours with the hydraulic pump runnin." The transcript indicates that the flight subsequently taxied to the ramp. At 0155:28, the captain requested taxi clearance. He also stated: "Speedbrakes down, flaps are set at seven." At 0156:28, the captain stated: "its not gonna shut off, either... so uh, I don't wanna listen to that this whole time. I don't think its movin at all... you see how fast the HYD light just went out." The first officer replied: "Well we don't have flaps seven takeoff data. I'm sorry, flaps zero takeoff data." The captain stated: "We'll still go with seven... I'm just sayin we'll put 'em at seven once we get in position." At 0157:57, while the flight was taxiing for takeoff, the captain remarked: "Short runway, full fuel, with a stab [stabilizer] that's not moving, this could get interesting." At 0158:54, he stated: "Speeds are set, N1's in the box... flaps set, uh- will be set." At 0200:05, the captain stated: "I'm gonna uh, recommend that you make this more... of a static run up than we usually do. The first officer acknowledged "Ok," and the captain continued: "If this thing won't unstick, we gotta figure out how to stop it... I don't think it will be a problem, but." At 0202:36, PWK tower cleared the flight for takeoff. Subsequently, a sound similar to an increase in engine noise was recorded through the cockpit area microphone. The first officer stated: "You let me know when you want me to release." The captain replied: "I'd go up to about fifty percent." At 0203:04, a sound similar to the no takeoff warning horn begins. The captain stated: "Give it a chance, it'll catch up." Five seconds later, the first officer asked "What are we doin, man?", and the captain replied "That's cause of the stabilizer... it'll be allright though." At 0203:16, the captain called "V1 rotate," followed by to a sound similar to a decrease in engine noise. The sound similar to the no takeoff warning horn stopped. At 0203:27, the captain stated: "Get on it man, get on it... get on it... get on it." The first officer replied, "I'm on it." At 0203:32, a sound similar to an increase in engine noise begins. Three seconds later the captain stated: "watch * move * miss those lights. Miss 'em, miss 'em." Two seconds after that, the sound of loud bangs was recorded over the cockpit area microphone. At 0203:41, the captain stated: "We got a major problem (on our hands)," and a sound similar to a decrease in engine noise was recorded over the cockpit area microphone. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot-in-command held an ATP certificate with multi-engine land and single-engine land airplane ratings. His type ratings included the CE-560XL, CE-500, B-727, B-737 and BA-3100. He held a first class airman medical certificate with no limitations, issued May 6, 2003. His total flight experience was reported as 8,400 hours; 850 hours of which were in a CE-560XL. He completed CE-560XL recurrent training on June 16, 2003. The second-in-command held an ATP certificate with multi-engine land airplane, single-engine land airplane and glider ratings. His certificate included a CE-560XL type rating. He held a first class airman medical certificate with no limitations, issued September 25, 2003. His total flight experience was reported as 2,400 hours; 670 hours of which were in a CE-560XL. He completed upgrade training and earned a CE-560XL type rating on August 28, 2003. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The Cessna Citation Excel, CE-560XL, is a twin turbo-fan engine, pressurized, transport category aircraft. The aircraft design was approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on April 22, 1998, under Type Certificate A22CE. It was approved for flight to 45,000 feet and at a maximum mach number/airspeed of .750/305 knots. Two Pratt & Whitney PW-545A turbofan engines power the aircraft, each with a maximum thrust rating of 3,800 lbs. According to manufacturer's records, the accident aircraft, serial number 560-5070, was originally delivered on March 20, 2000. The current owner acquired the aircraft on May 24, 2002. The aircraft was subsequently brought under management of the operator, West Coast Charters, and was used for charter operations. The aircraft was being maintained under the manufacturer's inspection program. The most recent inspection was on August 30, 2003. The recording hour meter installed in the cockpit indicated 1060.5 hours at the time of the post-accident inspection. One maintenance record concerning the stabilizer mis-compare annunciator light was located. A maintenance discrepancy report dated December 23, 2002, stated the pilot had reported that the stabilizer mis-compare annunciator light had come on during flight. According to the discrepancy report, maintenance personnel performed a functional check of the stabilizer and could not duplicate the problem. No other discrepancy reports or maintenance write-ups were located concerning the two-position stabilizer, or the stabilizer miscompare or no-takeoff warning systems. The Citation Excel's flight controls are mechanically actuated by cables, with the exception of the flaps, speed brakes, and two-position horizontal stabilizer. The two-position horizontal stabilizer design provides a takeoff/landing setting, which is two degrees down, and a cruise setting, which is one-degree up. There are no intermediate settings. When the flap handle is moved out of the flap up (0-degree) position, a micro-switch in the pedestal commands a hydraulic pump and jackscrew assembly to position the stabilizer in the takeoff/landing (2-degree down) position. Cycle time to reposition the stabilizer is approximately 25 seconds. When the flap handle is returned to the up position, the system reverses the hydraulic circuit and the stabilizer is moved to the cruise (1-degree up) position. A pneumatic switch prevents inadvertent movement of the two-position stabilizer when the aircraft's airspeed is above 205 knots. Two independent warning systems were incorporated into the aircraft design to alert the flight crew in the event the horizontal stabilizer is not properly positioned for takeoff or landing. A stabilizer miscompare annunciator light (STAB MIS COMP) and master caution warning are displayed to the crew when the flap handle and horizontal stabilizer are not in corresponding positions (e.g., if the flap handle is up and the stabilizer is in the takeoff/landing position). The stabilizer miscompare warning provides approximately 30 seconds delay from the time the flap handle is moved (stabilizer up or down commanded) until a warning is displayed. This allows the stabilizer to complete its travel from one position to the other. A no-takeoff warning (NO TAKEOFF) will be displayed when the aircraft is on the ground and one or more of the following conditions exist: Flaps are not set in the takeoff range (7-15 degrees), elevator trim is not set in the takeoff range, the speed brakes are not retracted, or the horizontal stabilizer is not in the proper position for takeoff. As the throttles are advanced forward of the cruise thrust setting with any of the above conditions met, the no-takeoff annunciator light (NO TAKEOFF) will begin to flash and a master caution will be displayed. A warning horn will sound associated with the no takeoff indication. This horn is not silenced when the master caution is acknowledged/canceled. The BEFORE TAXI checklist included as item (2): "Flight Controls/Speed Brake/Flaps - CHECK/SET." The BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist included as item (1): "Flaps - SET" and as item (11): "Annunciator Panel - CHECK; NOTE: All annunciators should be extinguished except ground idle." In the event of a STAB MIS COMP annunciator light, the Flight Manual Abnormal Procedures checklist stated: STABILIZER POSITION MIS-COMPARE (STAB MIS COMP CAUTION LIGHT ON) ON GROUND 1. Correct prior to flight. IN FLIGHT If Landing 1. Flap Handle - CHECK in desired detent. 2. Use Normal Procedures. 3. Touch and go landings are prohibited. In the event of a NO TAKEOFF warning, the Flight Manual Abnormal Procedures checklist stated: NO TAKEOFF WARNING (NO TAKEOFF CAUTION LIGHT ON AND AURAL WARNING) 1. Takeoff - ABORT. 2. Flap Position - CHECK. 3. Speed Brakes - RETRACT. 4. Elevator Trim - CHECK. 5. STAB MIS COMP light - CHECK. 6. Parking Brake - RELEASE. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Routine aviation weather reports (METAR's) recorded at PWK were as follows: Time: 1253; Wind: 260 degrees at 10 knots; Visibility: 5 statute miles in haze; Sky condition: Overcast clouds at 900 feet agl; Temperature: 12 degrees Celsius; Dew point: 09 degrees Celsius; Altimeter: 29.86 inches of mercury. Time: 1353; Wind: 240 degrees at 9 knots; Visibility: 4 statute miles in mist; Sky condition: Overcast clouds at 900 feet agl; Temperature: 12 degrees Celsius; Dew point: 10 degrees Celsius; Altimeter: 29.86 inches of mercury. FLIGHT RECORDERS The CVR was removed and forwarded to the Safety Board's Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC. The CVR group factual report is contained in the docket material associated with this report. The CVR unit was labeled as follows: Manufacturer: Fairchild Model number: A200S Part number: S200-0012-00 Serial number: 02401 Date of mfg: 11/99 A flight data recorder was not installed, and was not required to be installed, on the aircraft. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The aircraft came to rest approximately 300 feet past the end of the runway pavement along the extended centerline and was oriented on a northeasterly heading. The nose landing gear collapsed in the aft direction allowing the nose of the aircraft to rest on the ground. Normal nose gear retraction is forward. The right main landing gear partially collapsed and the right wing was resting on the ground. The left main landing gear strut appeared to be intact. The left main landing gear wheel sunk approximately half of the wheel's diameter into the turf. The upper right wing skin was torn through, above the main landing gear. The upper flange of the outboard wheel well rib was torn. The right inboard flap was damaged. Multiple indentations were observed along the leading edge of both wings. The flaps were extended. However, the inboard flaps had been disconnected during recovery. Flap extension measured at the outboard track on the left outboard flap was consistent with 15 degrees of flap deflection. The horizontal stabilizer was observed in the 1-degree up (cruise) position. The cockpit flap selector handle was positioned at 15-degrees deflection. The flap position indicator indicated 15 degrees deflection. The elevator trim was set slightly aft (nose up) from the center of the takeoff range as indicated by the cockpit control pedestal placard. The brake system anti-skid switch was on. All circuit breakers were set; none were tripped. Flight control continuity was verified. Movement of the control column and elevator trim wheel produced corresponding movements of the elevator and trim tab flight surfaces. The elevator control movements were smooth with no binding. External electrical and hydraulic power were applied to the aircraft. Weight-on-wheels was simulated using a maintenance breakout box connected at the left wheel well connector due to the right main and nose landing gear damage. With application of electrical power and without movement of any flight controls, the STAB MIS COMP and NO TAKEOFF lights on the annunciator panel were illuminated. Initial attempts to reposition the horizontal stabilizer were not successful. Inspection of associated electrical wiring revealed an abnormally high resistance between the 3-way horizontal arming valve and the airspeed switch. Inspection of the aft fairing feedthru connector (PS002) revealed pin Y was unseated (pushed-back) approximately .100 inch when compared to the height of the other pins in the connector. Pin Y provided power to the arming valve in order to allow repositioning of the horizontal stabilizer. Subsequent electrical continuity testing of the circuits forward and aft of the JS/PS002 connector revealed no discrepancies. Further examination of pin Y showed black marks near the end. These marks were consistent with small burn marks as a result of electrical arcing damage. The pin was reseated and it locked in place within the connector. The original pin was removed, a new pin was installed in its place and the connector secured. The two-position horizontal stabilizer system was actuated by moving the cockpit flap handle out of the 0 degree detent and the stabilizer repositioned from cruise to takeoff/landing position as expected. Travel of the two-position horizontal stabilizer between the cruise and the takeoff/landing p
The flight crew's intentional operation with know deficiencies in the aircraft and their delay in aborting the takeoff when a no-takeoff warning was presented. An additional cause was the crew's failure to comply with flight manual procedures concerning stabilizer miscompare and no-takeoff indications. Contributing factors were the inoperative two-position horizontal stabilizer system due to the intermittent electrical connection at the aft fairing connector, as well as the runway approach lights impacted during the overrun.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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