Anchorage, AK, USA
N4126E
Piper PA-18
The private certificated pilot of a float-equipped airplane was the second of two, unrelated Piper airplanes that requested a special VFR (SVFR) clearance from a seaplane base within 1 minute of each other, for a local flight over an ocean inlet that was about 2.3 nautical miles wide. The weather conditions at the airport included overcast skies at 400 feet, and a visibility of 2 miles in mist. About 2 minutes after departure, the accident pilot requested to return to the seaplane base, stating in part, "it's really thick out here." No further communication was received from the pilot. The pilot of the first Piper airplane to depart also decided to return, and spotted the tail of the accident Piper protruding from the water about mid-channel of the inlet. The first Piper pilot notified air traffic control (ATC) of the situation, and then landed on the water to render any assistance. The first Piper was not equipped with any position locating equipment, consequently, the accident location was an estimate by the pilot. The accident Piper sank within about 2 minutes, and no survivor was observed. The accident pilot and the airplane have not been found. A witness located on the shore of the inlet saw the accident Piper appear from the base of a fog bank that was over the inlet. The airplane descended out of the fog about 100 feet above the water in a left bank of about 45 degrees, and about 20 degrees nose down. The airplane descended until it collided with the water about mid-channel, impacting the water with the left wing first, and immediately began to sink. Water search efforts were initiated that involved the use of a 2-crew hovercraft, a Coast Guard rigid-hull inflatable boat (RIB), a fire department rescue RIB, a commercial tug, and a volunteer underwater mapping vessel. The use of helicopters was unsuccessful because of low ceilings and low visibility. The search for the accident pilot and airplane was suspended by the fire department about 1.5 hours after the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 15, 2004, about 1406 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped Piper PA-18 airplane, N4126E, was destroyed when it collided with the ocean waters of Knik Arm and sank, about 1.6 nautical miles north of the southern shoreline bordering Anchorage, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) local area personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The airplane was operated by the pilot. The private certificated pilot, the sole occupant, is presumed to have received fatal injuries. Neither the airplane or the pilot have been located or recovered. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the Class D surface area of the accident. The flight originated at the Lake Hood Seaplane Base, Anchorage, about 1403. No flight plan was filed, nor was one required. The accident airplane was one of two, unrelated float-equipped Piper PA-18 airplanes that departed Lake Hood Seaplane Base within 1 minute of each other for local flights northbound across the Knik Arm of Cook Inlet. This route of flight is commonly used by light aircraft departing the Class D Airspace that encompasses the Lake Hood Seaplane Base. The weather at the time of departure was below VFR minimums. The first Piper airplane to depart Lake Hood, N40463, requested a special VFR (SVFR) clearance for a northbound departure. The departure route utilizes Point Mackenzie, or the hull of a boat located west of Point Mackenzie on the north shore of the Knik Arm, as a VFR reporting point. The distance between the north and south shorelines of the Knik Arm, between Point Mackenzie and Anchorage, is about 2.3 nautical miles. About 1 minute after the first request, the accident Piper airplane pilot made a similar request for a northbound SVFR clearance. About 1351, the first Piper was given SVFR clearance for a north departure by the Lake Hood Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller. About 1352, the pilot of the accident Piper contacted the Lake Hood ATCT and requested a SVFR departure, and was subsequently given the clearance: "26E, begin a taxi along the west shoreline for a north departure. Cleared out of the Lake Hood Tower Delta surface area north of Lake Hood Tower via the north shore departure. Maintain special VFR conditions at or below 1,100 feet. Departure frequency, 119.1, squawk 0122." At 1402:14, the first Piper was cleared for takeoff. The Lake Hood ATCT controller inquired from the pilot of accident Piper if he could maintain visual separation from the departing first Piper, and the accident pilot replied "...Yes I can." At 1403:04 the Lake Hood ATCT controller stated, "Piper 4126E maintain visual separation from the departing Piper, cleared for takeoff." At 1404:03, the Lake Hood ATCT controller advised the accident Piper to contact departure control, and at 1404:10, the controller stated: "and Piper 26E, not receiving your transponder, recycle it please." There was no response on the Lake Hood ATCT frequency from the pilot. At 1404:12, the accident Piper contacted the Anchorage Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) north radar approach controller, followed by the first Piper at 1404:20, as both airplanes proceeded across the inlet toward Point Mackenzie. Neither airplane reported clear of the Class D airspace. At 1405:16, the accident Piper contacted the TRACON controller and stated: "Piper 26E, I'm turning back, it's really thick out here." At 1405:21, the controller replied, "Piper 26E, I need you to hold outside the surface area and standby." There was no response from the pilot. At 1405:48, the TRACON controller contacted the Lake Hood ATCT controller and reported: "That Piper, 26E called me, said it's too bad, he's coming back. Now he won't answer me so I don't know where he is." At 1406:03, the first Piper contacted the TRACON controller and stated: "And departure, Cub 463, I'm also turning around, Point Mackenzie, headed back towards Lake Hood." The TRACON controller inquired if the first Piper had the accident Piper in-sight, to which the pilot replied, "negative, they were behind me, they were to keep me in sight." The controller asked if the first Piper could hold at Point Mackenzie, "for a few turns." The pilot replied, "I can hold along the south shore here. I'd prefer that I don't, I've got clear visibility of Lake Hood and the tower. I can maintain visual separation from that Cub." The TRACON controller inquired if the first Piper had visual sight of the accident Piper, to which the first Piper stated, "not at this time, but I can maintain visual separation from him." At 1406:52, the first Piper stated to the TRACON controller, "Hold on Lake Hood, hold on. Departure, I gotta check something out here. Do you have, did you talk to the other Cub. Has tower talked to him." The TRACON controller queried the Lake Hood controller, but no radio contact from the accident Piper was made with Lake Hood tower. Both controllers conferred about the location of both airplanes, and at 1407:11, the Lake Hood tower controller told the TRACON controller, "Alright, let me see if I can, I got, looks like I got something showing up right at mid-channel, but that may be something off Anchorage." The controller then stated, "Piper 26E, Lake Hood tower." There was no reply. At 1407:38, the Lake Hood tower controller established visual contact with the first Piper as the airplane flew along the south shoreline of the inlet. At 1408:03, the Lake Hood tower controller established radio contact with the first Piper and requested a position report. The pilot replied, "463 is landing in the inlet. Did you talk to that other Cub." The controller replied to the negative. At 1408:54, the first Piper informed the Lake Hood ATCT controller, "Okay, I have that Cub in sight. They are nose down in the inlet. I'm pulling up to them." The pilot reported his position as, "Directly midway between Point Mackenzie and Lake Hood," and then reported, "Okay, I see no, no people. The Cub is nose down, standby." The Lake Hood ATCT controller told the pilot that rescue personnel were being sent. At 1412:28, the first Piper reported, "Okay, that, that Cub has sank out of sight now. I'll stay here on the area." The pilot of the first Piper reported to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) that there was an area of fog over the inlet with a base about 400 feet agl, but about mid-channel, the fog layer was about 200 feet. He said that the fog was not as thick further to the west, but was thicker to the east of his position. He indicated he descended below the fog and then began to climb to about 300 feet as he passed mid-channel. As he approached the north shore of the inlet, he said he could see that a thick fog bank was obscuring his destination, and he radioed to TRACON north radar that he was returning to Anchorage. He then proceeded southbound toward Anchorage, and about mid-channel, observed something on the surface of the water. He said that he recognized the tail of the accident Piper protruding vertically from the water. He made a northerly turn near the south shore of the inlet, and proceeded to land on the surface of the inlet and taxied to the accident Piper. He informed the air traffic controllers of the situation and looked for any occupants of the accident Piper. None were visible. The first Piper pilot said that within about 2 minutes of his landing, the accident Piper sank. The first Piper was not equipped with global positioning system (GPS) equipment. The location, described by the pilot utilizing visually referenced geographic points, was mid-channel, about 2.6 nautical miles north of the Lake Hood Seaplane Base. The first Piper pilot provided the NTSB IIC with a map of the inlet, indicating his estimate of the accident location. A witness was parked at Airport Park, a small parking lot adjacent to the south shoreline bluff of the inlet, near the intersection of Northern Lights Boulevard and Post Mark Drive. He indicated that he was facing north when he saw a PA-18 airplane appear from a fog bank that was over the inlet. He said the airplane appeared from the base of the fog, southbound, about 100 feet above the water, and it appeared to be in a left bank of about 45 degrees left wing down, and about 20 degrees nose down. The airplane descended in a left bank until it collided with the surface of the water about mid-channel. The airplane impacted the water with the left wing first, and immediately began to sink. He used his cell phone to call 911, to notify emergency personnel. About 1 minute later, he observed N40463 appear from the fog further to the west of the impact site. It made a left bank toward the accident site, and then land on the water. A second witness, sitting at the intersection of Northern Lights Boulevard and Post Mark Drive, located about 200 yards south of the south shoreline of the inlet, reported that he observed a PA-18 airplane fly in an arc from west to east, near the south shoreline of the inlet. He described the arc as ascending into his view from below the south shoreline bluff of the inlet, and then descending out of his view as it passed from left to right. He said the upper surface of the airplane was visible to him, with the right wing oriented 90 degrees wing down from a wings-level attitude. He said he felt this was not a usual attitude for an airplane to fly, and it indicated to him that airplane was in trouble. He drove about 1/4 mile east of the sighting and walked to the south edge of the bluff, but he could not see any aircraft because fog was obscuring his view of the inlet. He later noticed N40463 taxiing on the surface of the inlet. The first Piper remained on the surface of the Cook Inlet while rescue personnel responded to the area. He reported that he had trouble keeping visual contact with the shoreline due to low fog. In addition, the outgoing tide in the inlet was moving his airplane. At 1425:13, the Lake Hood ATCT controller alerted the first Piper that a hovercraft was on its way to the scene. The pilot reaffirmed the accident position as, "...when it sank out of sight (the accident airplane), it was, best I could make out, directly between the boat hull, and I could see the FedEx hangar, right about in a straight line there; midway in between." At 1437:48, the pilot asked the Lake Hood ATCT controller if the responding hovercraft had a radio frequency, but the controller did not have that information. At 1439:17, a new ATCT controller took over the local control position at Lake Hood tower. The pilot of the first Piper expressed some concern about the low visibility, the possibility of stranding his airplane, and the status of his passengers (his daughters). At 1443:42, the Lake Hood ATCT controller contacted the first Piper and stated, "Piper 463, the, the boat did said that they don't need you anymore. Whatever you need to do to be safe is, is what you need to do now." At 1446:18, the first Piper reported, "Believe I have the hovercraft in sight now," and he indicated that he was going to shut down his engine and talk to the hovercraft crew. At 1507:42, the pilot of the first Piper inquired about getting his passengers off the airplane and headed to their home, and at 1510:38, the pilot was informed that, "AFD rescue boat is coming back, and they'll assist in getting the kids off." The first Piper remained on the inlet until the visibility improved, and then departed for Lake Hood. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, and airplane single-engine sea ratings. His most recent third-class medical certificate was issued on August 20, 2004, and contained the limitation that he must wear lenses for distant vision, and possess glasses for near vision. According to the pilot's logbook, his total aeronautical experience consisted of about 774 hours. In the preceding 90 and 30 days prior to the accident, the logbook lists a total of 20.17, and 8.64 hours, respectively. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane's maintenance records revealed that the most recent annual inspection of the airframe and engine, was accomplished on July 28, 2004. At the time of the annual inspection, the airplane and engine had accumulated a total time in service of 1,172.3 hours. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1353, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) at Lake Hood was reporting, in part: Wind, 030 degrees (true) at 3 knots; visibility, 2 statute miles in mist; clouds and sky condition, 400 feet overcast; temperature, 39 degrees F; dew point, 39 degrees F; altimeter, 30.07 inHg; remarks, surface visibility, 5 statute miles. At 1353, a METAR at the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport was reporting, in part: Wind, 060 degrees (true) at 4 knots; visibility, 2 statute miles in mist; clouds and sky condition, few clouds at 100 feet, 500 feet broken, 3,000 feet overcast; temperature, 41 degrees F; dew point, 37 degrees F; altimeter, 30.06 inHg; remarks, surface visibility, 3 statute miles, ceiling 300 feet, variable to 700 feet in mist, few clouds at ground level. COMMUNICATIONS A transcript of the air to ground communications between the accident Piper, and the first Piper, and the Anchorage ATCT and TRACON facilities, are included in the public docket of this accident. Continuous data recording (CDR) radar data recorded at the Anchorage TRACON facility, was reviewed in an effort to document position data of the two involved Piper airplanes. During the review, only one or two momentary radar returns were noted. Radar identification of the two airplanes was never established. AERODROME AND GROUND FACILITIES The Lake Hood Seaplane Base is adjacent to the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport. The seaplane base has two north/south waterlanes, an east/west waterlane, and one northwest/southeast waterlane. The seaplane base is served by an air traffic control position, located within the Anchorage Air Traffic Control Tower cab. Arrivals and departures are served by the Anchorage Terminal Radar Approach Control facility. The seaplane base is within Class D airspace. The Anchorage airspace is subject to Federal Aviation Regulation Part 93 (FAR 93). FAR 93 outlines geographic segments and special rules for operating at airports within the Anchorage area. SEARCH AND RESCUE NOTE: All of the time references utilized in this portion of the report about the emergency response is based on each individual responding agencies records. There is no common or consistent time reference contained in the following discussion. A review of emergency responder's agency records revealed that the initial call about the accident was made via cell phone to the Anchorage Police Department's 911 dispatcher at 1406:40. The 911 dispatcher connected the caller with an Anchorage Fire Department dispatcher who coordinated the fire department's response. The caller who described his location as "Earthquake Park, reported observing the accident airplane crash in the water of the inlet. When asked by the dispatcher, "How far out," the caller replied, "approximately, I would say, 1/2 mile; out in the center of the Inlet." The dispatcher replied by stating, "1/2 mile from Earthquake Park out in the Inlet." The caller then informed the dispatcher that a second airplane was landing next to the crashed airplane. The caller also explained that due to the mud, access to the accident airplane would have to be via boat from the downtown docks. The caller then confirmed his location as the parking lot at the end of the runway, near the FedEx building. FAA Anchorage Air Traffic Control Tower According to the FAA's ATCT records, emergency notification of the accident was reported to the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport fire department, and the Kulis Air National Guard Base, via the direct-dial "crash" phone, at 1409. The U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) was notified at 1419. The Federal Aviation Administration's Regional Operations Center was notified at 1420, and the Anchorage Airport police department at 1427. Anch
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and collision with water during maneuvering flight. Factors contributing to the accident were fog and low ceilings.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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