Pine Bluff, AR, USA
N82TN
Dassault-Breguet Falcon 20
While landing on a 5,998-foot long wet asphalt runway, the 12,886-hour captain stated that "hydroplaning seemed to be occurring" with "no cycling of the anti-skid" system during the landing roll. Subsequently, the airplane exited the departure end of the runway into the overrun area. The FAA inspector that responded to the accident site reported that the first evidence of ground contact by the airplane was observed at a point 2,450 feet from the approach end of the runway, or roughly 3,548 feet from the departure end of the ungrooved runway. No evidence of braking action was found on the runway. The pilot reported that the weather at the time of the accident was wind from 090 at 5 knots, visibility 1.5 miles, overcast cloud layer at 500 feet, moderate rain, and pooling of water on the runway. Examination of the airplane's braking and anti-skid systems, did not revealed any anomalies. The aircraft was not equipped with thrust reversers; however, it was equipped with an emergency drag chute. The emergency drag chute was not deployed during the landing overrun.
On December 5, 2004, at 1145 central standard time, a Dassault-Bregeut Falcon 20 twin-turbo fan airplane, N82TN, was substantially damaged when it overran the departure end of Runway 18 at the Grider Field Airport (PBF), near Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The airplane was registered to and operated by Inland Paperboard and Packaging Inc., of Austin, Texas. The airline transport rated captain, airline transport rated pilot acting as first officer (FO), and two passengers were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The 376-nautical mile cross-country flight originated from the Austin Bergstrom Airport (AUS), near Austin, Texas, at 1045, and was destined for PBF. The 12,886-hour captain reported in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2) that they were vectored and cleared for the ILS Runway 18 instrument approach. When approximately 100 feet above the approach descent minimums, the first officer (FO) informed the captain that he had Runway 18 (a 5,998-foot long and 150-foot wide asphalt runway) in sight. The captain continued the approach and noted that the landing touchdown was "firm." During the initial landing roll, the captain applied both brakes, extended the airbrakes, and noted that that "nothing appeared abnormal." Subsequently, the captain noticed that while applying brakes, there was no braking action, and that "hydroplaning seemed to be occurring" with no "cycling of the anti-skid" system. The airplane overran the departure end of the runway into the overrun area. The airplane came to rest approximately 200 feet beyond the departure end of the runway. The captain added that during the stabilized approach, the glide slope and localizer courses were maintained. The captain added that moderate rain prevailed the vicinity of the airport at the time of the approach, and he noticed standing water on the runway during the landing roll. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers; however, it was equipped with an emergency drag chute. The airplane also was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The recorder was transported to the NTSB Laboratories in Washington, DC., for readout. The transcripts of the CVR readout is included in this report. Examination of the airplane by an Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, who responded to the site of the accident, revealed that the forward pressure bulkhead was compromised. The nose landing gear was folded aft into the fuselage structure. Examination of the runway revealed that there was pooled water in various areas of the runway the day after the accident. First evidence of touchdown by the airplane was observed 2,450 feet from the approach end of the runway. No evidence of braking action was observed throughout the remaining portion of the runway. The drag chute was also found in the stowed position. At 1153, the automated weather observing system at PBF reported wind from 110 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 1.5 statute miles, overcast cloud layer at 500 feet, rain, mist, temperature 52 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 50 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 29.94 inches of Mercury. The pilot reported that the weather at the time of the accident was wind from 090 at 5 knots, visibility 1.5 miles, overcast cloud layer at 500 feet, and moderate rain. Examination of the nose wheel landing gear by a maintenance technician was conducted under supervision of an FAA inspector at the facilities of Aero Precision Repair and Overhaul, of Deerfield Beech, Florida. During the examination, the shock absorber was actuated and would not return to center. The shock absorber was disassembled and the seals were intact with signs of little wear. A gap was found on the sliding rod assembly between the piston and nut. Disassembly of the sliding rod assembly revealed that a portion of the rod end was stretched and bent. The cylinder and pistons were found within limits. The sliding rod assembly was partially re-assembled and was found to bind at the stretched and bent section of the rod. Examination of the selector switch revealed that the switch did not actuate when the shock absorber was compressed due to the shock absorber not fully extending. Once the shock absorber was fully extended, the selector switch actuated. Examination of the anti-skid control box by a representative of Aircraft Braking Systems, of Akron, Ohio, under the supervision of an FAA inspector was conducted on July 28, 2005, at the facilities of Aircraft Braking Systems. The examination revealed no anomalies.
The pilot's misjudgment of speed/distance which resulted in a runway overrun. Contributing factors were the moderate rain and the reported encounter with hydroplaning conditions.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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