Atlantic, IA, USA
N7803Y
Piper PA-30
The rental/instructional airplane received substantial damage on impact with terrain during a forced landing. Dark night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Inspection of the airplane revealed that the fuel selector(s) were positioned to the main fuel tanks and that the right auxiliary fuel tank contained an estimated 5-10 gallons of fuel. All remaining fuel tanks did not contain any usable fuel. The pilot stated that at the time of total engine power loss, it was decided to enter a left downwind for runway 12 since a straight-in approach to runway 30 at that time would leave "us a little high." The airplane impacted terrain while on final for runway 12. The operator stated that he mentioned to both pilots that there was no fuel in the auxiliary tanks and if the main fuel tanks were full, there was only 3 hours of fuel on board. He stated that both pilots used the accident airplane in their training towards their multiengine land airplane certificates and that they knew what the fuel consumption rate of the airplane was. The pilot and pilot rated passenger held multiengine airplane certificates. The pilot also held a certified flight instructor (CFI) certificate with a single-engine airplane rating, and the pilot-rated passenger held a CFI certificate with single-engine and multiengine land ratings. According to the operator, both pilots had used the accident airplane in their training towards their multiengine airplane certificates and that the purpose of the accident flight was for both pilots to accumulate flight time. The airplane was certified under Civil Air Regulations as a normal category airplane not equipped with shoulder harnesses.
On December 4, 2004, at 1815 central standard time, a Piper PA-30, N7803Y, operated by Hangar One, Inc., as a rental/instructional airplane, received substantial damage on impact with terrain during a forced landing while on approach to Atlantic Municipal Airport (AIO), near Atlantic, Iowa. The pilot stated the he diverted to AIO after the airplane experience engine roughness during cruise flight. Dark night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and a second passenger reported no injuries. The flight departed from Dubuque Regional Airport (DBQ), Dubuque, Iowa, at 1700 and was returning to Millard Airport, Millard, Nebraska. The president of Hanger One, Inc., stated that he asked where the pilot and pilot-rated passenger were going to which they said, Chicago. He stated that he was sure that the airplane was coming due for a 100-hour inspection and that there would not be enough time remaining for them to complete the proposed trip to Chicago. He checked the board where they track aircraft inspections and confirmed that the airplane was due for a 100-hour inspection in 2.9 hours. He stated that he advised "them" the airplane was due for a 100-hour inspection in about 3 hours. He stated the purpose of the accident flight was for both pilots to accumulate flight time. The president stated that the airplane was used as a multiengine trainer and consequently did not carry fuel in the auxiliary fuel tanks. He stated that as a habit, he mentioned to both pilots that there was no fuel in the auxiliary tanks and if the main fuel tanks were full, there was only 3 hours of fuel on board. He stated that both pilots used the accident airplane in their training towards their multiengine land airplane certificates and that they knew what the fuel consumption rate of the airplane was. The pilot stated that during cruise flight 5 miles from AIO and at 6,000 feet mean sea level, the engine ran rough for a brief moment. They diverted to ALO and during the descent both engines experienced a total loss of engine power; "low fuel levels were suspected." As they turned back to ALO, it was decided to enter a left downwind for runway 12 since a straight-in approach to runway 30 at that time would leave "us a little high" on final. Upon turning onto final for runway 12, "the aircraft was slightly low." The airplane impacted terrain during a forced landing short of runway 12. The pilot stated, "There were several failures and poor judgments on my part in the events leading up to the incident at AIO. My first failure in the chain of events up to the accident at AIO was my inability to properly determine how many gallons of fuel remained within the fuel tanks after having landing in DBQ. At which point I should have been able to determine that I was in need of extra fuel if I intended to fly back to MLE under the existing conditions. As we continued to MLE, I exercised poor judgment as I passed airports along the route where fuel could have been purchased such as Des Moines, Ankeny, and quite possibly Atlantic. The fuel quantity indicators at the point where engine roughness first occurred did show fuel remaining in the tanks, however the fuel quantity indicators, much like those found in many other general aviation aircraft are not always the most accurate instruments." The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a certified flight instructor (CFI) certificate with a single-engine airplane rating. The pilot reported a total flight time of 1,397 hours, of which 63 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The pilot-rated passenger, who was seated in the right pilot seat, held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a CFI certificate with single-engine land and multiengine land airplane ratings. He reported a total flight time of 1,500 hours, of which 60 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The 1965 Piper PA-30, serial number 30-882, airplane was powered by two Lycoming IO-320-B1A, serial number L-1805-55A and L-1878-55A, engines. The airplane was certified under Civil Air Regulations as a normal category airplane not equipped with shoulder harnesses. The airplane was inspected by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector following the accident, which revealed that the fuel selector were positioned to the main fuel tanks and an estimated 5-10 gallons of fuel was present in the right auxiliary fuel tank. The remaining fuel tanks did not contain any usable fuel. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) publication "Time in Your Tanks," FAA-P-8740-03, states: e. Multiply the usable fuel on board by 75% and divide the result by your previously confirmed consumption rate. This will be your SAFE FLIGHT TIME limit for the aircraft at that specific operating condition. Resolve never to exceed it. h. Do not assume your fuel quantity and quality to be correct. Visually check it. j. Fuel gauges are subject to malfunctions and errors. Fuel gauges must only be calibrated to accurately indicate an empty tank. They do not have to be accurate at any other fuel level. Therefore, unless restricted by the gross weight of center of gravity limits of your aircraft, it is considered good judgment to "top off" the tanks at all fuel stops. If fuel load must be limited, an accurate measurement can be made by use of a dipstick calibrated for you specific aircraft. FAA Advisory Circular Number 91-65, Use of Shoulder Harness In Passenger Seats, states, "...The safety board found that 20 percent of the fatally-injured occupants in these accident could have survived with should harnesses (assuming the seat belt was fastened) and 88 percent of the seriously injured could have had significantly less severe injuries with the use of should harnesses..."
The pilot's inadequate in-flight planning/decision which resulted in fuel exhaustion. The dark night light conditions was a contributing factor.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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