Lakeland, FL, USA
N42WA
Cessna T337G
According to a witness, the airplane was in a steep nose-up attitude after becoming airborne, then rolled left and impacted the ground while in a slight nose-up and left wing low attitude. An individual who owns a Cessna 337 heard both engines operating at what he thought was full power. The airplane impacted on the runway surface and was destroyed by impact and the postcrash fire. According to a witness, the pilot started the engines and taxied to utilize all available runway. The flight was cleared to takeoff, and according to a controller in the tower cab, he did not observe the point of rotation, but reported the airplane was in a normal climb attitude when the flight was airborne approximately 1,000 feet down the runway, when it was approximately 500 feet more down the length of the runway, he observed the airplane pitch up to between an estimated 30-45 degrees, then level off at an estimated altitude of between 150-200 feet above ground level. Approximately 5 seconds later, the wings were noted to rock up and down and the airplane drifted north of the runway. The airplane rolled nose and left wing low, then appeared to level off before impacting the ground while in a slight nose up and left wing low attitude. He did not hear any unusual engine sounds during the flight and could not determine if the engines were run-up before departure. Both engines' rpm sounded to be synchronized during the flight. There was no distress call made by the pilot. The owner recently purchased the airplane and had a pre-buy inspection of it; no discrepancies were noted related to the flight controls. The airplane was flown from the place where purchased (California), to Florida, and was delivered 2 days before the accident. The pilot who flew the airplane to Florida reported it was a "fairly flawless trip." He did report that the autopilot was inoperative, and the digital fuel flow meter was inoperative. No repairs were performed to correct the inoperative autopilot before the accident flight. The accident pilot flew the airplane on 3 separate flights earlier on the day of the accident, and during the takeoff of all 3 flights, a pilot rated passenger later reported that the airplane pitched up aggressively during rotation. The passenger looked at the elevator trim setting and noted it was in the correct range for takeoff. During the landing of the third leg, the accident pilot reportedly performed a full stall landing from a height of 10 feet. The airplane was then taxied to the ramp and both fuel tanks were topped off for the accident flight. No maintenance was performed to the elevator primary or secondary flight control systems as a result of the reported excessive pitch-up events. Examination of the primary and secondary flight control system of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the cables. The elevator trim was found set to 4 to 5 degrees aircraft nose-down. The flaps were extended 10 degrees, and the landing gear was extended at impact. Examination of the front and rear engines propeller and propeller governors revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the pilot's seat tracks revealed both exhibited evidence of lock pin engagement at the time of impact in the 9th hole from the front. The airplane was calculated to be within weight and balance limits at the time of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 14, 2005, about 1537 eastern standard time, a Cessna T337G, N42WA, registered to Aerolease of America, Inc., and operated by a private individual, crashed shortly after takeoff at Lakeland Linder Regional Airport, Lakeland, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight from Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (KLAL), Lakeland, Florida, to Tallahassee Regional Airport, Tallahassee, Florida. Impact forces and a postcrash fire destroyed the airplane, and the airline transport-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. According to the local controller of the Lakeland Linder Regional Airport Air Traffic Control Tower, the flight was cleared to takeoff from runway 27 and to climb on runway heading. He did not observe the point of rotation, but reported the airplane was in a normal climb attitude when the flight was airborne approximately 1,000 feet down the runway. The flight continued and when it was approximately 500 feet more down the length of the runway, he observed the airplane pitch up to between an estimated 30-45 degrees, then leveled off at an estimated altitude of between 150-200 feet above ground level. At that time the flight was abeam runway 27 and taxiway "B." Approximately 5 seconds later, the wings were noted to rock up and down and the airplane drifted north of the north edge of the runway. The airplane rolled nose and left wing low, then appeared to level off before impacting the ground while in a slight nose up and left wing low attitude; the airplane caught fire 20 seconds later. He did not hear any unusual engine sounds during the flight and could not determine if the engines were run-up before departure. Both engines' rpm sounded to be synchronized during the short duration flight. There was no distress call made by the pilot of the airplane. Another witness reported seeing the airplane in a steep nose-up attitude after becoming airborne. The witness reported the airplane then rolled left and impacted the ground while in a slight nose-up and left wing low attitude. An individual who owns a Cessna 337 airplane and only heard the accident flight reported hearing both engines operating at what he thought was full power. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot was the holder of an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings airplane single and multi-engine land. He also was the holder of a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine sea rating, and was a certified flight instructor with airplane single and multi-engine, and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a second-class medical certificate on November 16, 2004, with the restriction, "Must wear corrective lenses." He listed a total flight time of 14,600 hours on the application for the last medical certificate. In reference to the passenger, a search of FAA airmen records by name, date of birth, and social security number revealed no records. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane, model T337G, was manufactured by Cessna Aircraft Company and designated serial number P3370205. It was certificated in the normal category, and the type certificate data sheet indicates the front and rear engines are required to be Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-360-C or -CB, rated at 225 horsepower when operated at 2,800 rpm. The front and rear engines installed at the time of the accident were Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-360-CB5B and Rolls-Royce TSIO-360-DCC, respectively. The rear engine was originally manufactured by Rolls-Royce as a model TSIO-360-D engine, but on November 16, 1992, it was converted to a "C model Spec 5" engine. As a result of the conversion, the engine dataplate was reportedly remarked to read "TSIO-360-DCC." The front propeller rotates clockwise when viewed from behind the engine looking forward, while the rear propeller rotates counter-clockwise when viewed from behind the engine looking forward. The airplane was reportedly purchased by the current owner in California in December 2004, and was flown to Florida by a pilot other than the accident pilot. The flight to Florida commenced on January 11th, and arrived in the afternoon of January 12th, in Lakeland, Florida. The individual who flew the airplane to Florida reported the flight was a "fairly flawless trip" which took approximately 16 to 17 flight hours and numerous fuel stops. He reported he did not have any noticeable problems with the engines or propellers, and that the autopilot and digital fuel flow meter were inoperative. He also reported that when flying the airplane at an altitude greater than 10,000 feet, the rear engine manifold pressure reading would decrease 4 inches then return to the normal setting. After landing in Lakeland, the pilot who flew the airplane from California offered the accident pilot a chance to fly together; he reportedly declined. The current owner of the airplane provided to NTSB a list of discrepancies found during a pre-buy inspection of the airplane; none of the discrepancies relate to flight controls. Records provided by the facility that performed the pre-buy inspection revealed some, but not all of the discrepancies were repaired. The owner of the facility that performed the pre-buy inspection and some of the repairs reported they repaired only the items they were asked to repair. The owner also reported at the time of the repairs his company did not have access to the permanent maintenance records; therefore, the work performed was not entered in the maintenance records. A review of the permanent maintenance records confirmed there were no entries in either the airframe or either engine logbooks indicating maintenance was performed related to the pre-buy discrepancies. The maintenance records further indicate the airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on April 24, 2004. The airplane total time at that time was 6,091.8 hours. The front engine was last rebuilt/zero timed by the engine manufacturer on September 10, 1993, and was installed in the airplane on June 20, 1999. The front engine had accumulated approximately 1,043 hours since overhaul at the time of the last annual inspection. The rear engine was last overhauled on August 25, 1992, and was installed in the airplane on October 1, 1992. The rear engine had accumulated approximately 1,386 hours since overhaul at the time of the last annual inspection. No determination was made as to the elapsed time since the last annual inspection. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A surface observation weather report taken at the accident airport on the day of the accident at 1541, or approximately 4 minutes after the accident indicates the wind was from 330 degrees at 5 knots, the visibility was 10 statute miles, scattered clouds existed at 700 feet, and 8,000 feet, overcast clouds existed at 12,000 feet, the temperature and dewpoint were 18 and 16 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.10 inHg. COMMUNICATIONS The pilot was last in contact with the Lakeland Linder Regional Airport Air Traffic Control Tower at the time of the accident. There were no reported communication difficulties. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane crashed on airport property and came to rest upright located at 27 degrees 59.324 North latitude and 082 degrees, 01.087 minutes West longitude, or approximately .56 nautical mile and 271 degrees magnetic from the approach end of runway 27. Examination of the accident site revealed the airplane first impacted on runway 9/27 approximately 3,000 feet from the approach end of runway 27 (the departure runway), and 44 feet south of the runway centerline. The energy path was oriented on a magnetic heading of 220 degrees. Numerous ground scars on the runway surface were noted, while two separate ground scar locations consistent with propeller to runway contact were also noted. The first ground scars on the runway associated with propeller contact consisted of three marks with a deeper gouge on the left side of each scar when viewed looking towards the main wreckage, or consistent with a counter-clockwise rotation. The distance from the center of the first to the center of the second scar measured 16 inches. The second ground scars on the runway associated with propeller contact occurred down the energy path and consisted of two marks with a deeper gouge on the right side of each scar when viewed looking towards the main wreckage, or consistent with a clockwise rotation. The distance from the center of the first to the center of the second scar measured 19 inches. A faint outline of the full span of the left wing was noted on the runway surface near the initial contact location. Additionally, a mark on the runway associated with the right wingtip was noted. A combination flexible and aluminum line measuring approximately 3 feet in length later associated with the left brake line was noted near the initial runway contact location. Further examination of the accident site revealed the ground scar on the runway continued off the south edge of the runway onto grass where the ground scar continues to the point where the airplane came to rest, which was approximately 146 feet from the south edge of runway 9/27. The airplane came to rest upright on a magnetic heading of 260 degrees. The energy path in the grass was oriented on a magnetic heading of 215 degrees. Debris consisting of the left and right main landing gear struts, a cell phone clip, pieces of the nose landing gear fork, a piece from an engine crankcase, and a fuel sump drain tube were located in the grass along the energy path. Fire damage to the grass was noted south of the main wreckage. The majority of the burn area was located forward of the left wing and south of the left wingtip, with some burning aft of the left wing. Examination of the wreckage revealed all components necessary to sustain flight were attached to the airplane or were in close proximity to the main wreckage. The postcrash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, and left wing. Compression wrinkles were noted on the upper skin of the right wing, which remained secured only by the aileron flight control cables. The elevator was noted in the full trailing edge up position; binding prevented movement of the elevator from neutral to the trailing edge down position. Both vertical stabilizers were displaced from their normal positions; the upper portion of both were displaced away from each other. Flight control continuity was confirmed for roll, yaw, and pitch trim. Both main landing gear wheels were separated from each strut; each rim exhibited a flat spot on the outer diameter. The flap actuator measured 3.6 inches extended which equates to approximately 10 degrees extended. The right flap cable was connected at the actuator but was fractured near the right wing root area. The left flap cable was also connected at the flap actuator but was fractured in 2 locations. The first fracture point was located approximately 19.5 inches from the actuator attach point and the second fracture was located near the actuator. The aft propeller was separated from the engine but found in close proximity to the main wreckage. The forward fuel selector valve was found positioned near the "off" detent, and the aft fuel selector valve was found positioned between the "off" and "right" tank detents. Segments of each fractured flap cable, the pitch trim sensor, pitch actuator, and pitch trim actuator were retained for further examination. Examination of flight control system for pitch revealed flight control cable continuity was confirmed for pitch from the bellcrank near the control surface to the cockpit, except where cut to facilitate recovery of the airplane. The elevator cables were noted to be properly routed over all pulleys. The elevator rod assembly (P/N 1560136-1), which connects to the bellcrank near the control surface and the control surface, was bent and fractured at the threaded portion near the bellcrank. No evidence of preexisting cracks was noted on the fracture surface. The elevator flight control surface remained connected to the horizontal stabilizer at the four hinges, and the elevator trim tab remained secured to the elevator. The elevator trim tab actuator measured 1.375 inches extended, which equates to approximately 4-5 degrees trailing edge tab up, or aircraft nose down trim. Several rivets that secure the right elevator counterweight attach arm to the elevator were fractured. The leading edge of the elevator at the right side was displaced aft, and the inboard lower edge of the skin of the right side of the elevator was pushed up in the area of the counterweight attach point. The outboard section of the right side of the elevator, and the right elevator counterweight were retained for further examination. Examination of the interior of the right vertical stabilizer which houses the right elevator counterweight revealed arc shaped scraping/score marks on the interior surface of the inboard skin, and also on a section of the forward spar of the vertical stabilizer. The total length of the arc measured approximately 12.125 inches. A dent measuring approximately 2 inches wide is located along the arc; the counterweight measured approximately 5 inches wide. The tail end of three consecutive rivets were noted to have paint/material transfer on a side of the rivet, and the inboard top side of the right elevator counterweight was gouged. The tail end of the rivets with material adhering to one side measured .16 inch in diameter, while the gouge in the counterweight measured .12 inch in diameter. The location of the paint/material on one side of the three rivets was consistent with the elevator counterweight moving in the down, or elevator up direction. A sharp edge impact mark was noted on the bottom side of the counterweight. The counterweight stop bolt and bracket did not appear to be deformed. Three distinct indentations were noted on the aft spar lighting hole in the area where the counterweight beam goes through. The damage is consistent with the shape of the counterweight beam. Examination of the interior of the left vertical stabilizer which houses the left elevator counterweight revealed a mark on the interior surface of the inboard skin, and several dents measuring approximately 4.25 inches in length. The dents are located at the juncture of the forward spar and skin line. The counterweight was gouged on the top, forward, and inboard edges. Light scuffing in the primer aft and above the dented area was noted. The dented area was noted to start at the top of the lighting hole and extended to the top of the adjacent lighting hole. No abnormalities were noted to the counterweight stop. Examination of the cockpit revealed heat damage precluded reading of flight and engine instruments. The throttle quadrant was displaced from its normal position; therefore, throttle, propeller, and mixture control positions could not be accurately determined. Examination of the pilot's seat tracks revealed the inboard seat track rail was displaced down 17 inches aft of the forward end; a gouge in the inboard edge and top side of the rail was noted in that area. The inboard seat track rail also exhibited a gouge in the aft and outboard directions on the top of the seat track rail at about the 8 o'clock position of the 9th hole from the front. The outboard seat track also exhibited hole elongation of the seat track rail in the aft and outboard directions of the 9th hole from the front. Both seat tracks were bent up beginning approximately 6.5 inches aft of the forward end. Examination of the outboard seat track revealed the forward foot was off the track. Heat damage to the outboard seat track was noted in the first forward 7 inches of the track. A stop made of steel was noted in the aft portion of the outboard seat track. Examination of the pilot's seat revealed one of the two seat pins was fractured approximately 1.375 inch up from the bottom of the pin. Examination of the co-pilot's seat tracks revealed a roller was located
The pilot's operation of the airplane with known deficiencies in equipment related to pitch, an abrupt pitch-up during the initial climb after takeoff for undetermined reasons and the failure of the pilot to maintain airspeed (Vs) resulting in inadvertent stall, uncontrolled descent, and in-flight collision with terrain.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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