Scottsdale, AZ, USA
N7512G
Robinson R22
The certificated helicopter flight instructor was conducting an introductory flight instruction lesson under Title 14, CFR part 91 with a prospective student. A witness, about 1 mile south of the accident site, estimated that the helicopter was about 1,000 feet above the ground as it passed over him. Shortly afterwards, he heard a "pop", and the helicopter started a shallow, controlled turn to the left, followed by two or three more popping sounds. The helicopter then began to descend rapidly, and started spinning counter-clockwise. As the helicopter's descent rate increased, the main rotor blades stopped turning, and the helicopter entered a vertical descent. The witness said he could no longer hear any engine sounds during the accident helicopter's vertical descent. The helicopter crashed in a residential area, and came to rest between two houses. The helicopter sustained damage consistent with a high speed, fuselage level, vertical impact. Postaccident inspection of the engine core and airframe disclosed no evidence of any preimpact anomalies. Impact damage prevented testing of the engine's carburetor and ignition wiring harness assemblies. A review of the accident pilot's historical training records revealed a series of failed check rides and overall substandard performance. The NTSB IIC interviewed both previous and prospective employers, which disclosed that the accident pilot had either been dismissed or not hired due to his lack of academic and/or flight skills. The FAA approved flight manual for the accident helicopter, emergency procedures section, states that at the first indication of an engine failure, the pilot's required emergency action is, in part: 1) Lower collective immediately to maintain rotor rpm, and enter a normal autorotation. 2) Establish a steady glide at approximately 65 knots. The helicopter manufacturer published a safety notice, which addressed the dangers of a low rotor rpm conditions, stating in part: "A primary cause of fatal accidents in light helicopters is the [pilots] failure to maintain rotor rpm. To avoid this, every pilot must have his reflexes conditioned so he will instantly add throttle and lower the collective to maintain rpm in any emergency." Additionally, the safety notice states, in part: "If the pilot not only fails to lower the collective, but instead pulls up on the collective to keep the ship [helicopter] from going down, the rotor will stall almost immediately. When it stalls, the blades will either "blow back" and cut off the tail cone or it will just stop flying, allowing the helicopter to fall at an extreme rate. In either case, the resulting crash is likely to be fatal. No matter what causes the low rotor rpm, the pilot must first roll on the throttle and lower the collective simultaneously to recover rpm BEFORE investigating the problem. It must be a conditioned reflex. In forward flight, applying aft cyclic to bleed off airspeed will also help recover lost [rotor] rpm."
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On February 22, 2006 about 1135 mountain standard time, a skid-equipped Robinson R22 helicopter, N7512G, was destroyed during an uncontrolled descent and subsequent collision with desert terrain, about 8 miles north of Scottsdale, Arizona. The helicopter was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) local area instructional flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The certificated flight instructor, seated in the left seat, and the passenger, seated in the right seat, sustained fatal injuries. All Out Aerial of Scottsdale operated the accident helicopter. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated at the Scottsdale Airport, Scottsdale, about 1129. During an on scene conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on February 23, the operator's president reported that the accident flight was an introductory flight instruction lesson for a prospective student. She said that a friend of the passenger had previously purchased a gift certificate for the 45-minute introductory flight. According to the Scottsdale air traffic control tower (ATCT) specialist on duty at the time of the accident, the accident helicopter flew northbound after departure from the Scottsdale Airport. About 5 minutes after departure, the specialist received a brief mayday call, which he thought was from the accident helicopter. No further radio communications were received from the accident helicopter. A witness located north of the Scottsdale Airport, about 1 mile south of the accident site, reported to the NTSB IIC that he saw the accident helicopter fly over him while he was working outside. He estimated that the helicopter was about 1,000 feet above the ground as it passed over him. He reported that helicopter traffic to the north of the Scottsdale Airport is a very common occurrence, and he is accustomed to hearing and seeing the same type of helicopter that was involved in the accident. He said that when the helicopter flew over him, the engine sounded normal. As the helicopter continued northbound, he heard what he thought was a "pop." He said the helicopter then started a shallow, controlled turn to the left, followed by two or three more popping sounds. He said that the helicopter then began to descend rapidly, and eventually started spinning counter-clockwise. As the helicopter's descent rate increased, the main rotor blades slowed, and the helicopter entered a near vertical descent. The witness noted that as the helicopter descended vertically, the main rotor blades had stopped turning, and appeared to be bent upwards, and were in a trail position. The witness said he could not hear any engine sounds during the helicopter's descent, and watched it until it descended behind a row of houses. CREW INFORMATION The pilot held commercial helicopter and helicopter flight instructor certificates, and a helicopter instrument rating. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on February 8, 2006, and contained no limitations or waivers. On his application for a medical certificate, dated February 8, he indicated that his total aeronautical experience consisted of about 1,200 hours, of which 150 were accrued in the previous 6 months. According to the pilot's personal logbook that was provided to the NTSB IIC by family members, the pilot's total aeronautical experience consisted of about 1,191.3 helicopter flight hours. The last entry in the logbook was dated February 16, 2006. The president of All Out Aerial stated the accident pilot was a part-time/contract helicopter flight instructor for the company, and that the accident occurred while the pilot was off-duty from his full time employer, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., based in Lafayette, Louisiana. Training / Employment background A review of the accident pilot's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) historical records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed that on January 7, 2004, the accident pilot obtained a student pilot certificate, and soon enrolled full time in a local helicopter flight school in Scottsdale. The flight school also operates additional helicopter flight training facilities in Long Beach, California, and Provo, Utah. On February 4, 2004, the accident pilot failed his initial private helicopter certificate check ride. The flight school's president and designated pilot examiner (DPE) performed the check ride. According to the FAA records, the accident pilot then obtained an additional 9.8 hours of helicopter flight instruction, and subsequently passed a second check ride with the same DPE on February 10, 2004. According to the president of the flight school, the accident pilot continued his enrollment at the flight school, working to obtain a commercial helicopter certificate, a helicopter instrument rating, a helicopter flight instructor certificate (CFI), and a helicopter flight instructor certificate for instruments (CFII). However, the president reported that the accident pilot's overall performance was poor, and that he had a series of failed phase checks, which slowed his advancement. He noted that the accident pilot struggled academically, requiring an exceptional amount of ground instruction, and still displayed an overall knowledge shortfall. On May 29, 2004, the accident pilot successfully completed a check ride for a commercial helicopter certificate, as well as a helicopter instrument rating. The two check rides were conducted concurrently, and were performed at the flight school's Long Beach location. The flight school's DPE assigned to that location performed the check rides. On September 25, 2004, the accident pilot failed his initial CFI check ride. The check ride was conducted at the flight school's Long Beach training facility. The flight school's DPE assigned to that location performed the check ride. According to FAA records, the accident pilot obtained an additional 2.0 hours of helicopter flight instruction, and passed a second check ride with the same DPE on September 27, 2004. During an interview with the NTSB IIC on February 24, the president of the flight school reported that after the accident pilot obtained his commercial helicopter certificate, helicopter instrument rating, and certified flight instructor's (CFI) certificate, he continued working towards obtaining a certified flight instructor-instrument (CFII) certificate. The flight school's president reported that historically, students that successfully complete the CFI and CFII programs are offered employment with the flight school as helicopter flight instructors. He said that the accident pilot expressed an open interest in working for the flight school once he obtained the required certificates, and he continued to work towards completion of a CFII certificate. The flight school president said that after reviewing the pilot's past performance, and while closely monitoring his recent progress, he, along with other senior flight school management personnel, collectively decided not to offer the pilot a position. Additionally, the group elected to discontinue any further flight-training activities with the accident pilot citing serious safety issues and concerns. In an interoffice memo dated October 4, 2004, the president summarized comments about the accident pilot that were provided by flight school personnel. The memo states, in part: "Over confident. Thinks he is much better than he is. RED FLAG. Gets overloaded and freezes. Unable to recover from overload. Dangerous in this situation because he isn't able to collect himself and figure out what to do next. Lack of reality about own performance." In an undated, hand written notation in the upper right hand corner of the memo, it states: "Post CFI check ride, 9/27 and retest on 9/28, was not recommended for CFII check ride - Unable to meet PTS [practical training standards] - consistently." The flight school's president said he, along with a group of senior flight school managers, met with the accident pilot and informed him of their decision. The accident pilot then left the flight school, without completing his CFII certificate. Previous Work Experience On October 26, 2004, the accident pilot was hired as a helicopter flight instructor for a large helicopter flight instruction school, with multiple locations in Arizona, and other states. The flight school operated a large fleet of Robinson R22 and R44 helicopters, which were used for primary helicopter flight instruction. During a telephone interview with the NTSB IIC on March 8, 2006, the manager and chief flight instructor for the flight school's Mesa, Arizona, facility reported that the accident pilot worked for his school until his termination on July 7, 2005. He said that while the accident pilot was employed with the flight school, he accumulated about 800 hours of flight time while flight instructing in Robinson R22 and R44 helicopters. The manager stated that he was forced to terminate the accident pilot's employment due to a series of unheeded warnings concerning safety related standards, as well as his overall lack of performance. In a memo from the accident pilot's employment records dated July 7, 2005, the same day the accident pilot was terminated, the manager wrote, in part: "[The pilot] had a hard landing this morning. Said that it was the student's fault. Said that student got low rotor on go around from autorotation, and he did not catch it in time. They did a run on [landing] at 70 knots, went sideways, and ended up in the dirt. Very close call." On July 25, 2005, the accident pilot applied for a job as a flight instructor with an operator of Robinson R22 and R44 helicopters located in Augusta, Kansas. During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on November 30, 2006, the operator's president and owner reported that his preemployment interview for any prospective flight instructor includes an in depth oral interview, a written aptitude test, and flight examinations in both a Robinson R22 and R44 helicopters. The operator's president and owner flew with the accident pilot in an R44 helicopter, and had the flight school's DPE fly with him in an R22 helicopter. Each flight lasted about 1 hour. The operator's president and owner reported that the accident pilot performed well below acceptable standards, in all three categories, and the pilot was not offered a position. On August 11, 2005, the accident pilot traveled to Sevierville, Tennessee to interview with a helicopter tour operator that operated Robinson R44 helicopters. During a telephone conversation with the operator's operations manager on November 29, 2006, he stated that the accident pilot attended a 3-day interview session that included 17.7 hours of flight time in a Robinson R44 helicopter. The operations manager reported that at the conclusion of the interview, the pilot was not hired. On August 18, 2005, All Out Aerial hired the accident pilot as a primary helicopter flight instructor in a Robinson R22 helicopter, and to conduct local area flightseeing tours in a Robinson R44 helicopter, under Part 91 flight operations. The president of All Out Aerial reported that the accident pilot was hired as a contract pilot, and was scheduled for flights on an as needed basis. The president said that she had not flown with the accident pilot before he was hired, nor was she required to under Title 14, CFR Part 91 flight operations. She said that prior to hiring the accident pilot, she relied on a verbal recommendation from another flight instructor in the area concerning the accident pilot. On October 3, 2005, the accident pilot interviewed with a large offshore helicopter operator based in Lake Charles, Louisiana, which subsequently hired the accident pilot. According to the operator, he completed his initial Part 135 ground school training course on October 13. He then began his initial flight training in an American Eurocopter EC-120 helicopter on October 22. According to the operator's chief pilot, the accident pilot accumulated about 10 hours of dual instruction in an EC-120 helicopter, but was unable to achieve the minimum standards required to pass a Part 135 check ride. The accident pilot was released from the operator's employment on November 18, 2005, and he returned to Scottsdale, and continued to occasionally fly for All Out Aerial. According to the pilot's logbook, another large offshore helicopter operator, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. hired him, and he began flight training in Bell 206 series helicopters on December 4, 2005. After completing his initial ground and flight training, he satisfactorily completed his initial 14 CFR Part 135 check ride on January 7, 2006. At the completion of his training and check ride, he had accumulated about 17.0 hours of flight time. He was then assigned as a pilot of Bell 206 series helicopters, operating offshore, in the Gulf of Mexico. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The helicopter was a Robinson R22 Beta II, equipped with a Lycoming O-360-J2A engine. The helicopter and engine had accumulated a total time of 563.8 flight hours. The most recent annual /100 hour inspection of the engine and airframe was accomplished on January 3, 2006, 18.4 flight hours before the accident. On August 23, 2005, 97.0 flight hours before the accident, a certificated airframe and power plant mechanic replaced both engine magnetos with two that had been recently inspected in accordance with a required 500-hour inspection. The mechanic made a notation in the engine logbook concerning his work on the helicopter's engine, stating, in part: "Engine not producing power, removed and replaced spark plugs with new ones. Adjusted mixture screw 1 1/2 turns out. Replaced mags with ones inspected IAW [in accordance with] 500-hour inspection." According to the operator, as well as other pilots that had recently flown the accident helicopter, there were no outstanding mechanical discrepancies or anomalies. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The closest official weather observation station is located at the Scottsdale Airport, which is 8 miles south of the accident site. On February 22, 2006, at 1053, an automated weather observation system was reporting, in part: Wind, 210 degrees at 2 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and ceilings, clear; temperature, 55 degrees F; dew point, 19 degrees F; altimeter, 30.09 inHg. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The National Transportation Safety Board IIC, along with representatives from Robinson Helicopter, Textron Lycoming, and inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office, traveled to the accident site on February 23, 2006. The helicopter crashed in a residential area and came to rest between two houses. There were no injuries to personnel on the ground, and there was no damage to the homes. All of the helicopters major components were found at the accident site. The helicopter's fuselage was found in an upright position, with the nose of the helicopter orientated on a 210-degree magnetic heading. Both of the helicopter's skid tubes were crushed and broken, and the helicopter's fuselage was lying atop the dry, hard packed desert soil. The underside portion of the helicopter's engine sustained extensive impact damage. The carburetor assembly was shattered, and the mechanical linkages that link the cockpit controls to the carburetor were destroyed. Both of the engine's magnetos were torn from the mounting plates. The engine's ignition system wiring harness was cut through in numerous locations. The cockpit/cabin compartment area was extensively crushed upward. The cabin compartment floor area, forward of the front landing gear cross tube assembly, was displaced in an inward direction. The front windshield bow, dividing the left and right sides of the forward windshield, was separated at its upper attach point with the cabin. The windshield Plexiglas was broken out of the frame, an
A loss of engine power during cruise flight for an undetermined reason, and the pilot's failure to maintain rotor rpm, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and collision with terrain.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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