Hickory, NC, USA
N86FS
Canadair F86
Witnesses observed the F86 airplane on takeoff. A decrease in engine power was heard after the airplane crossed an intersecting runway and a few puffs of smoke were observed in the vicinity of the main landing gear. The airplane continued off the runway onto the overrun, collided with fixed objects, and came to a complete stop on an airport perimeter highway engulfed in flames. Initial performance documentation provided to the FAA by the project manager for the F86 revealed the maximum takeoff gross weight of the airplane was 17,300 pounds. The initial takeoff weight computed by the project manager for the F86 was 17,705 pounds. The FAA computed the initial takeoff weight at 17,693 pounds. A subsequent weight and balance was submitted to the FAA by the project manager with undocumented figures indicating the takeoff weight was 16,983 pounds. The departure runway is 6,400 feet long, and the takeoff distance required was 2,600 feet. Examination of the runway revealed evidence of braking action beginning 2,175 feet before the end of the runway. The project manager stated the pilot had observed the assembly and installation of the F86 brake assemblies on four different occasions The pilot assembled and installed the brakes on the F86 by himself four or five days before the accident. Examination and disassembly of the brakes revealed the clearance nuts on the adjuster pins were not rotated the proper amount on the left and right brake assemblies as required by the F86 Restricted Executive Order.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 24, 2006, at 1140 eastern daylight time, a Canadair F86, N86FS, registered to Flying Fossils LLC, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight collided with fixed objects during an aborted takeoff from runway 24 at Hickory Regional Airport, Hickory, North Carolina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. A post crash fire destroyed the airplane. The airline transport rated pilot was fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident, enroute to Oshkosh, Wisconsin. The Line Manager for a local fixed base operator (FBO) stated the accident pilot requested the airplane be moved from the FBO hangar so the airplane could be serviced with oxygen before the pilot departed to Oshkosh. The Line Manager observed the airplane being serviced. The pilot requested fuel and he refueled the airplane and ensured all fuel caps were secured. The Line manager departed the airplane to meet a vendor. Witnesses stated that the pilot started the engine, performed a control check, started his taxi, stopped 75 feet later, completed an engine shutdown, and made a few phone calls. A close friend and project manager for Flying Fossils stated, he received a phone call from the pilot before departing informing him that he thought he had a hydraulic problem. The pilot did not have the phone number for their airframe and power plant mechanic with him and asked if he would have the mechanic call him. The mechanic called the pilot and had a conversation about a stiff stick movement, which was resolved. The Line Manager and the vendor went outside to observe the airplane as it taxied to runway 24 for take off. The airplane was out of their direct view when the airplane reached runway 24; however they both heard the engine spool up. The airplane came back in view as it came by the commercial ramp and the fire station on its takeoff roll. The Line Manager stated, "the airplane seemed ok, but it appeared to be slow." The airplane was observed as it crossed the intersection of runway 19, and the nose wheel was still on the ground. The Line manager stated he heard a decrease in engine power followed by a few puffs of smoke in the vicinity of the main landing gear tires. The airplane continued off the end of the runway into the overrun. The airplane was observed to turn to the right and the left wing tip collided with a localizer antenna on the approach end of runway 06. The airplane continued down an embankment and disappeared from view followed by a fireball. The Line Manager notified the FBO on a hand held radio to call the fire departed and immediately departed to the crash site in a courtesy car. Upon arrival he observed the airplane had gone through a perimeter fence, and was on the highway engulfed in flames. Other witnesses located at the Hickory Terminal ramp confirmed the Line Managers statement and stated it was very unusual because the airplane normally rotates before reaching the terminal ramp. The speed of the jet was much slower than normal. When the airplane approached the mid-field intersection, it appeared it attempted to slow down, from that point the pilot was unable to stop the airplane before reaching the end of runway 6 and entered the over run. The airplane seemed to speed up, ran through the localizer antenna, and went through the security fence, followed by a huge fireball. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Review of information on file with the FAA Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the pilot was issued an airline transport pilot certificate on November 15, 2004, with ratings for airplane multiengine land, commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, and airplane instrument rating. The pilot held a second-class medical issued on April 12, 2006, with the restriction, "must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." The pilot reported on his application for the second-class medical certificate that he had accumulated 15,000 total flight hours. The pilot's logbook was not located and the pilot's last flight review could not be determined. The pilot received ground instruction utilizing an FAA approved Pilot Transition Training Program of Flight Systems Inc., from September 10, 2004, through September 16, 2004. No flight evaluation was conducted. A close friend of the deceased pilot and project manager for the restoration of N86FS stated the pilot had 64 total flight hours in the F86. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Review of the airplane logbooks revealed the last 100-hour inspection was conducted February 16, 2006, and the airplane has flown 13.1 hours since the 100-hour inspection. The engine was overhauled by Mohave Air on April 24, 1995, and had 398.9 hours. The engine was reinstalled on the airplane on May 11, 1996, and the airplane was placed in storage until February 16, 2006. The airplane has flown 26 hours since overhaul and the total time on the engine is 436.5 hours. The total time on the airframe is 3,954 hours. The airplane was topped off with 702 gallons of Jet A fuel on July 24, 2006, before departing on the accident flight. The Flying Fossil Project Manger stated the deceased pilot had observed the assembly of the F86 brake assemblies on four different occasions. The pilot assembled the brakes that were in use at the time of the accident on July 19, 2006, or July 20, 2006. In addition, the project manager stated the brakes are not manufactured by any company today and Flying Fossils had purchased a warehouse full of spare F86 parts, including the brake parts when the airplane was purchased. The Flying Fossil Project Manager submitted his initial copy of the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report to the FAA Accident Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) on August 26, 2006. Performance documentation given to the FAA by the project manager indicated the maximum gross weight of the airplane for takeoff was 17,300 pounds. Weight and balance computations also showed that the weight of the airplane at the time of the accident was 17,705 pounds. These computations were based on weight and balance figures submitted to the FAA by the project manager on a spreadsheet dated August 22, 2004. The FAA was informed by the project manager that the computations on this document were based on the 120 gallon drop tanks configuration, not the 200 gallon drop tanks configuration which was on the aircraft at the time of the accident. The FAA computed the takeoff weight to be 17,693 pounds. The FAA weight and balance computations were based on data extracted from the document provided by the project manager on July 26, 2006. Examination of the weight and balance spread sheet data by the FAA revealed the fuel was not added back to the net empty weight in order to compute the take off weight by the project manager. The FAA pointed out this error to the project manager on August 4, 2006. The project manager submitted an e-mail with a second weight and balance-spread sheet to the FAA on August 4, 2006, which included 2 additional weight and balance computations. The first computation in the far left column indicated a takeoff weight of 16,863 pounds. The second column indicated a takeoff weight of 16,963 pounds. Review of the computations by the FAA revealed the Pilot and parachute weight of 230 pounds and the ballast weight of 400 pounds were included in the full weight center of gravity computation on the left column computation. The FAA compared this figure to the document received on July 27, 2006, and noted the pilot and parachute weight of 230 pounds and the ballast weight of 400 pounds were not included in the full weight center of gravity that was added afterwards by the project manager. The second column computation used a net weight of 10,396. pounds. The project manager did not use this computation on the previous computations. The FAA asked the project manager where the 10,396 pounds came from. The project manager informed the FAA the airplane was reweighed at Mojave due to several modifications over a seven-month period. The FAA requested the project manager to send them the source document from this reweighing. The project manager provided a hand written document without a letterhead, signature, and address of the person who completed the work. When the FAA questioned the project manager about this, the project manager stated an airframe and power plant mechanic (A&P) who was responsible for weighing the airplane was unable to find any paper work to support his computations. The project manager stated the A&P mechanic faxed a copy of the weight and balance data and that he was going to provide the FAA with an affidavit. The FAA has not received an affidavit from the project manager or the A&P mechanic. The FAA calculated the take off weight with the second undocumented figures provided by the project manner to be 16,963 pounds. The project manager and the FAA computed the take off distance of the accident airplane to be 2,600 feet based on a take off weight of 17,300 pounds on July 27, 2006. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The 1153 surface weather observation at Hickory Regional Airport was: wind 100 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 8 miles, broken clouds at 8,000 feet, temperature 75 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point temperature 64 degrees Fahrenheit, and altimeter 30.09. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The wreckage of the airplane was located on its left side on Hickory Road adjacent to the approach end of runway 06 at Hickory Regional Airport, Hickory, North Carolina, on a heading of 040 degrees, and a post crash fire ensued. Examination of the runway revealed evidence of braking action (tire marks) beginning 2,175 feet before the end of runway 24. Broken brake rotors parts were found a few hundred feet from the end of runway 24 by an employee of the City of Hickory Airport. The rotors were collected in a 5-gallon bucket and turned over to the line manager for Profile Aviation. The Line Manager placed the bucket in hanger 5 on the north ramp with the other remains of the aircraft. The tire marks continued off the runway onto the 1,000-foot over run. The FAA, Hickory Airport Manager, and a Hickory Airport Maintenance employee conducted a check of runway 24 for debris. The maintenance employee collected metallic pieces that were mostly on the right side of the runway centerline near the edge of the departure end of runway 24. In addition, additional debris was found next to burned grass about 40 feet off the edge of the runway and about 200 feet from the edge of the runway. Three-grass fire burn marks were located by the FAA in the over run 35 feet, 214 feet, and 474 feet from the beginning of the overrun. The tire marks were observed on the ground turning to the right 25 feet before the left wing drop tank impacted the localizer 06 antenna, 1,007 feet from the beginning of the runway 24 over run. A fourth grass burn fire mark was located 28 feet after the left wing drop tank collided with the localizer antenna. The tire marks were observed on the ground turning to the left heading towards a berm located 72 feet from the left wing drop tanks impact with the localizer antenna. No tire marks were observed after the airplane collided with the berm. The airplane collided with the airport perimeter fence 91 feet from the berm. The airplane went off a 30-foot drop off in a nose down attitude and came to a complete stop on Hickory Road. Examination of the aircraft revealed that the cockpit area was destroyed by fire to include the canopy. The Hobbs & tachometer meter were not found in the wreckage. The throttle was not found in the wreckage. The fuel selector valve was not located. The speed brake switch could not be located. The airplane was equipped with seatbelts and shoulder harness. The seatbelt and shoulder harness was in use and had not been cut by emergency responders. The pilot had not activated the ejection seat, and the airplane was not equipped with a drag chute. Continuity of the flight controls was confirmed from the cockpit aft to all flight control surfaces. The nose wheel separated and was found in the wreckage. The nose wheel tire was not located. The aircraft registration and airworthiness certificate was not found in the airplane. The right wing separated from the fuselage with the center fuel tank attached and was located 20 feet from the fuselage. The right wing leading edge was damaged. The right wing tip was dented and bent down. The right wing drop tank was ruptured and main fuel tanks were ruptured. The right aileron was attached to its attachment point. The flaps were extended 50-degrees. The airplane was equipped with speed brakes and according to witnesses were activated by the pilot. The right main landing gear was fire damaged and remained attached to the right wing. The right tire was still on the wheel and most of the rubber was burned off. Elliptical marks were not found on the tire. The brake line, hydraulic quick disconnect, 6-brake drive keys were removed from the brake assembly, and the brake assembly was removed from the wheel. The inboard rotor was missing. The second rotor appeared intact and the third and fourth rotors were broken. The backing plate, lining assembly, and compensating shim were removed. The outboard rotor assembly was disintegrated. The rotor measured .325 of an inch. An original rotor was measured at .440 of an inch. The stators were worn. The fourth stage compensating shim and fourth stage rotors were removed. The stator was measured .506 of an inch. A new stator was measured at .570 of an inch. The third stage rotors were disintegrated, and the rotors were measured at .320 of an inch. The third stage stators were worn and measured at .530 of an inch. The second stage rotors were worn and broken except for one segment. The rotors were measured at .411 of an inch. The second stage stators were worn and measured at .555 of an inch. The pressure plate and assembly received fire damage and were melted in two spots. The stators were worn and measured at .511 of an inch. An original stator was measured at .560 of an inch. The clearance nuts on five adjuster pins were rotated clockwise to check for clearance. The clearance nut rotated 1 full turn and one eighth of a turn on three adjuster nuts and would not rotate on the fourth and fifth adjuster nuts. The remaining five adjuster pins could not be checked due to heat damage. The F86 Restricted Executive Order EO-05-5E-2, figure 2-53, item 6, on page 192 states, "Install return springs with washers, sleeves and nuts on adjuster pins over the pressure plate. Tighten nut on adjuster pins until they bottom on threads, and then turn off two and half turns. Ten pins on the adjuster clamp were removed and the tension was measured at 124, 360, 111, 130, 320, 260, 310, and 164 pounds with a calibrated spring scale. Two pins could not be measured due to damage. All ten pins were measured again for tension. They measured 140, 104, 110, 106, 320, 222, 110, 126, and 104 pounds psi with the calibrated spring scale. The Executive Order states in a NOTE in Figure 2-53, "Check that all adjuster units require 65 to 85 pounds to move pins through friction blocks in the area of the pins where the blocks are normally situated when installed." The pressure plate was fire damaged. The dust cover was removed and was fire damaged. The annular piston remained in the piston groove. The annular piston was removed and the seal was fire damaged. The empennage, vertical fin, left and right horizontal stabilizers, left and right elevators and rudder were damaged to include fire damaged. The left Elevator was bent up 90 degrees and the left elevator was broken off at one of the attachment points. The left wing separated from the fuselage with the center fuel tank attached and was located 20 feet from the fuselage. The left wing leading edge was damaged from the wing root extending outboard to the mid section of the wing. The left wing tip was dented and bent down at tip. The left wing drop tank was consumed by fire. The left main fuel tank was ruptured. The left main fuel cap had a tight seal and fuel was not present in the fuel tank. The aileron was attached to its attachment point. The flaps were exte
The pilot's improper assembly of the airplanes brakes, exceeding the authorized gross weight of the airplane at takeoff, and the pilot's failure to abort the takeoff in sufficient time to avoid an on-ground collision with fixed objects. A factor in the accident was the pilot's lack of experience in assembling the airplanes brakes.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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