Crystal Springs, FL, USA
UNREG
Mike Smilee CGS Hawk II Arrow
The unqualified pilot-in-command initiated the flight in the unregistered airplane, and approximately 32-47 minutes after takeoff, a witnesses reported hearing a sputtering sound, followed by a cracking sound then an impact. The airplane descended nearly vertical, and impacted trees then the ground. Examination of the airframe revealed no evidence of pre-impact failure or malfunction, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, or yaw. Impact damage to the engine precluded operational testing of it. Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the power section. Examination of the fuel system components including both carburetors, the fuel pump, and in-line fuel filter revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of both ignition coils revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the ignition switch revealed a malfunction with the switch when positioned to the "both start" position; the left magneto did not operate when the switch was in the "both start" position. The airplane flight manual indicates that there may not be any prestall buffet.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 21, 2006, about 0902 eastern daylight time, an unregistered homebuilt two-seat CGS Hawk II Arrow, operated by a private individual, crashed into a swamp near Crystal Springs, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal, local flight from Blackwater Creek Ultralight Flightpark, Plant City, Florida. The airplane was substantially damaged and the private-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated between 0815 and 0830, from Blackwater Creek Ultralight Flightpark. A witness located at the Blackwater Creek Ultralight Flightpark reported that the accident flight departed the airport to the south, turned an unspecified direction, then proceeded north towards Zephyrhills. The witness reported that during the time he saw the airplane flying, he did not notice anything unusual. A witness who was located approximately .75 nautical mile southwest of the crash site reported that fog existed, and he observed an airplane fly over his property. The airplane was flying in a northeasterly direction at an estimated 400 to 500 feet above ground level. He initially heard the engine but reported a short time later hearing a sputtering sound followed by a crackling sound. He compared the crackling sound to that heard by a parachute falling through the air. He then heard a loud sound, waited a couple minutes then called 911. The airplane crashed into a marsh/swamp located at 28 degrees 12.058 minutes North latitude and 082 degrees 07.473 minutes West longitude, or approximately 3.8 nautical miles north-northeast of the departure airport. The airplane came to rest upright with the empennage elevated. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot was the holder of a private pilot certificate with glider rating, issued on November 23, 2005. He did not hold an FAA issued medical certificate. The NTSB was provided copies of 3 different pilot logbooks. The first pilot logbook began with an entry for a familiarization flight dated August 6, 1986, and the last entry was dated January 14, 1987. He logged a total time of 34.0 hours, of which 16.2 hours were as pilot-in-command. The 34.0 hours were accrued during 24 flights in a Cessna 150 airplane. The second logbook titled "Soaring Society of America" began with an entry dated February 23, 2005, and the last entry was dated October 14, 2006. He logged a total time of 73 hours 42 minutes, of which 10 hours 20 minutes were as pilot-in-command. All logged flights were in glider type aircraft. The third logbook titled "Ultralight Pilot Logbook" began with an entry dated September 10, 2005, and the last entry was dated October 8, 2006. He logged a total time of 17.7 hours; the last entry dated October 8th did not have the flight duration or make and model completed. He logged a total of 17 flights, of which, 15 were in the accident make and model airplane. Of the 17.7 hours, 7.8 hours were as pilot-in-command during a total of 7 flights, and 9.9 hours were accrued during 10 dual instruction flights. A remark captioned "[propeller] cavitation/right wing dipping" and "First Flight" was associated with a solo flight on September 17, 2006; the flight duration was 1.0 hour. A remark captioned "new [propeller]" was associated with a solo flight on September 29, 2006. The flight duration was 2.0 hours, of which 1.0 hour was associated with cross-country flying. The pilot did not have any exemption to operate a two-place unregistered airplane for the purpose of giving flight instruction by either United States Ultralight Association (USUA), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), or Aero Sports Connection (ASC). AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The unregistered airplane was manufactured by CGS Aviation, Inc., in 1994, as a model Hawk II Arrow in kit form, and was assigned serial number H-II-103-R503. It was equipped with a Rotax 503 two-cycle, two-cylinder reciprocating, dual-carburetor equipped 50-horsepower engine which operates on oil in fuel lubrication. The airplane was also equipped with a 15-gallon fuel tank, and tandem oriented seats. The original design occurred in 1982, and the airplane's design empty weight was 420 pounds, and the design gross weight was 950 pounds. No maintenance records were located. According to the FAA inspector-in-charge, the airplane did not meet requirements for classification as an ultralight aircraft in accordance with 14 CFR Part 103; therefore, the airplane was required to be registered. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A surface observation weather report (METAR) taken at the Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (KLAL), Lakeland, Florida, on the day of the accident at 0850, or approximately 12 minutes before the accident, indicates clear skies existed, the wind was calm and the visibility was 7 statute miles. The temperature and dew point were 25 and 23 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.95 inHg. The accident site was located approximately 337 degrees magnetic and 13.8 nautical miles from the center of KLAL. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane crashed in a wooded area; the main wreckage was located at 28 degrees 12.058 minutes North latitude and 082 degrees 07.473 minutes West longitude, or approximately 22 degrees magnetic and approximately 3.8 nautical miles from the departure airport (9FD2). Examination of the accident site by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed the airplane descended nearly vertical. All components necessary to sustain flight remained attached or partially attached to the airframe. Examination of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The fuel tank was breached, and a strong odor of fuel was noted at the crash site; however, there was no preimpact or postcrash fire. The airplane was recovered for further examination. Examination of the engine by a representative of the engine manufacturer with FAA oversight revealed crankshaft continuity. No scuffing or scoring of the pistons was noted. Impact damage to the engine precluded operational testing on a test stand. Ignition and fuel system components consisting of an ignition switch, ignition coil units (2), in-line fuel filter, fuel pump, and both carburetors were retained for further examination. Examination of the propeller revealed one blade was fractured completely through the chord section of the blade; the separated portion of propeller blade was located in close proximity to the main wreckage. Examination of the separated section of blade revealed damage to the leading edge located beginning approximately 7 inches inboard from the blade tip. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION Postmortem examinations of the pilot and passenger were performed by the District Six Medical Examiner's Office. The cause of death for both was listed as blunt trauma. Toxicological testing of specimens of the pilot and passenger was performed by the FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory (CAMI), located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and also by Pinellas County Forensic Laboratory (Pinellas Laboratory), located in Largo, Florida. The results of testing of pilot specimens by CAMI was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles. Citalopram was detected in blood (0.689 ug/ml), and an unquantified amount of Citalopram was detected in the submitted liver and gastric specimens. An unquantified amount of N-Desmethylcitalopram was detected in the submitted liver and gastric specimens, and 0.387 ug/mL N-Desmethylcitalopram was detected in the submitted blood specimen. An unquantified amount of DI-N-Desmethylcitalopram was detected in the submitted liver and gastric specimens, and 0.053 ug/mL DI-N-Desmethylcitalopram was detected in the submitted blood specimen. The results of testing of pilot specimens by Pinellas Laboratory were negative for the presumptive drug screen. The vitreous fluid was negative for ethanol, while the chest blood sample tested positive for ethanol 0.013 g/dL. The results of testing of passenger specimens by CAMI was negative for carbon monoxide and cyanide. The results of testing of passenger specimens by Pinellas Laboratory were negative for the presumptive drug screen. The confirmation screen for 11 nor-Delta-9-Carboxy-THC and ethanol were negative. TESTS AND RESEARCH According to a fuel receipt, the pilot purchased 21.916 gallons of 87 octane unleaded fuel on the day of the accident. The pilot's wife reported her husband's pick-up truck has a fuel capacity of 14 to 15 gallons; the fuel truck was found at the departure airport. The Pasco County Sheriff's Office report indicates that two 5-gallon gas tanks that appeared to be full were noted under the area where the truck was parked. As previously reported in the "Wreckage and Impact" section of this report, a strong odor of fuel was noted at the crash site. Postaccident examination of the retained fuel and ignition system components was performed with FAA oversight at a service center of the engine manufacturer. Examination of the fuel pump revealed "...all parts and construction of fuel pump were in good condition." Resistance testing of the ignition coils revealed both exhibited readings which were consistent with new units. The in-line fuel filter was examined and was clean and free of foreign objects. Examination of both carburetors revealed impact damage to one of them precluded placement on an exemplar engine for a test run. Examination of the damaged carburetor revealed all parts were "...set to stock settings and were in fact stock to the carburetor...." The floats were correctly set, and both floats were clean and clear. Examination of the second carburetor also revealed all parts were "...set to stock settings and were in fact stock to the carburetor...." The second carburetor was installed on an exemplar engine which was started and found to operate normally. Examination of the 4-position ignition switch revealed the key was broken but the switch worked through its range. Testing of the switch in the left and right positions revealed the switch worked normally. Testing of the switch in the both position revealed the left magneto "did not work" but the right magneto "did work with no resistance through switch." According to the airplane designer, a checklist was provided to the original purchaser. NTSB review of a copy of the checklist provided by the airplane designer revealed that the normal procedures section indicates a caution pertaining to stalls. The note indicates "THE AIRCRAFT GIVES LITTLE WARNING OF AN IMPENDING STALL. DEPENDING ON THE CONFIGURATION (LOAD, POWER SETTING, FLAP SETTING, FABRIC TIGHTNESS) THE AIRCRAFT MAY OR MAY NOT EXHIBIT ANY PRESTALL BUFFETT." Further information indicates that the "...onset of the stall is evidenced by a drop in the nose attitude together with a loss of altitude. If the aircraft is unbalanced there may be a tendency for a wing to drop. You may also hear a sound buffet through the [propeller]." The "Normal Takeoff" section of the checklist indicates that to check for proper operation of both magnetos while operating the engine at 4,000 rpm. The checklist indicates that the magnetos should then be switched to both, open the throttle slowly, and the rpm should be above 6,000, with full power at 6,500 rpm. As previously reported, the pilot was the holder of a private pilot certificate with glider rating. Review of 14 CFR Part 61.31(d)(1) revealed a person may not serve as pilot-in-command of an aircraft unless the person holds, "...the appropriate category, class, and type rating (if a class rating and type rating are required) for the aircraft to be flown." ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The NTSB did not retain any components.
The failure of the non-rated pilot to maintain airspeed. A finding in the accident was a malfunction of the ignition switch.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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