Alliance, NE, USA
N1116Y
Cessna 208B
The pilot was dispatched on a nonscheduled cargo flight to an airport other than his usual destination because it had a precision instrument approach, while his usual destination airport did not. The pilot elected to fly to his usual airport, and attempted a nonprecision instrument approach. The airport had both a VOR and an NDB approach. The NDB approach was noted as being out of service, although there was still a radio signal coming from the navigation aid. The pilot was cleared for the VOR approach, although instrumentation inside the cockpit was found set for the NDB approach, and radar track data disclosed that the flight path was consistent with the NDB approach path, not the VOR's. The airport's reported weather was 1.25 miles visibility, with a 200-foot overcast in mist. The airport's minimum NDB approach altitude is 652 feet above touchdown height. The airplane did not reach the runway, and collided with a pole and a building. Inspection of the airplane disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On February 8, 2007, about 0225 mountain standard time, a Cessna 208B, N1116Y, operated by Suburban Air Freight Inc., sustained substantial damage on impact with a building and terrain during a non-precision approach to runway 12 at the Alliance Municipal Airport (AIA), near Alliance, Nebraska. The non-scheduled domestic cargo flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 135. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was on file and was activated. The commercial pilot sustained serious injuries and was hospitalized. The flight originated from Eppley Airfield (OMA), near Omaha, Nebraska, about 2345, and was dispatched to the Western Nebraska Regional Airport/William B. Heilig Field (BFF), near Scottsbluff, Nebraska. The operator's accident report, in part, stated: Scheduled U.S. Mail route operating AIA - LBF [North Platte, Nebraska] - OMA, OMA - AIA. Due to low IFR conditions and preceding night's aircraft diverting to, and remaining at CDR, (Chardon, Nebraska), and being unable to position into AIA for the evening departure, decision was made to leave the first [airplane] at CDR overnight, and simply fly a [second airplane] from OMA - BFF where [weather] was suitable for ILS [instrument landing system] approach. Only non-precision approaches, with higher minimums, are available at AIA. Thus, the accident [airplane] was dispatched to take mail directly to BFF, which has precision approaches (ILS), and the U.S. Mail truck was to meet the aircraft at BFF. That is a normal procedure for occasions when AIA is below non-precision landing conditions. All scheduled flights operate on "canned" flight plans which are on file. ... The flight from OMA to either BFF or AIA proceeds along the identical route until west of North Platte, Nebraska. ... The change is typically only requested after handoff from [Minneapolis] Center to [Denver] Center, west of North Platte. ... Since the direct route from OMA - BFF passes literally over, or almost over, the procedure turn for the AIA approach procedures, there is always the option for a pilot to check weather at AIA, and if it has unexpectedly improved so as to allow landing at AIA, certainly, then he may land. However, in this case, the mission was not to go to AIA, land, and remain for the next evening's return, but rather to simply proceed to BFF, execute the precision approach, drop off the mail, and return to OMA empty immediately. An excerpt from a Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) transcript follows: Agencies Making Transmissions Abbreviations Denver ARTCC, Sector 35R Radar Controller ZDV35R Suburban Air Freight, INC. (Omaha, NE) SUB22 ... 0846:46 ZDV35R sub air two two denver center 0846:52 SUB22 denver center sub air two two level eight thousand 0846:55 ZDV35R sub air two two denver center roger the uh alliance altimeter is three zero one seven and do you have the uh alliance weather yet 0847:10 SUB22 three zero one seven sub air two two uh we are requesting the uh v o r runway one two 0847:18 ZDV35R sub air two two roger 0848:09 ZDV35R sub air two two do you have the uh weather and notam information for alliance 0849:17 SUB22 sub air two two i have the uh alliance awos and notams 0849:22 ZDV35R sub air two two roger 0854:15 SUB22 denver center sub two two request 0854:17 ZDV35R sub air two two go ahead 0854:20 SUB22 roger sub air two two would like to uh uh amend my uh request for the uh v o r runway three zero at alliance and uh in the event uh i have to go missed approach i'll be uh planning to uh head over to scottsbluff 0854:36 ZDV35R sub air two two roger maintain seven thousand until alliance v o r outbound cleared for v o r runway three zero approach to the alliance airport 0854:48 SUB22 sub air two two departing eight for seven thousand maintaining seven thousand until established cleared v o r runway three zero alliance thank you 0857:11 SUB22 sub air two two copies all switching to advisory and i'll close out my flight plan with columbus radio or i'll contact you later if i have to uh divert to Scottsbluff 0857:21 ZDV35R sub air two two roger 0857:57 ZDV35R sub air two two radar service terminated change to advisory frequency approved report your uh arrival with columbus radio or you can report back to me if you uh have to go missed approach there 0908:41 SUB22 denver center sub air two two request 0908:52 ZDV35R alpine or correction uh sub air two two go ahead 0908:56 SUB22 (unintelligible) sir sub air two two looks like i'm gonna have to uh flr the v o r runway one two after all request uh v o r runway one two at alliance 0909:08 ZDV35R sub air two two roger uh cleared for v o r runway one two approach to the alliance airport maintain seven thousand until established on a published segment of the approach 0909:20 SUB22 sub air two two maintaining seven thousand until established cleared v o r runway one to alliance thank you sir- - - and uh switching back to advisory 0909:29 ZDV35R sub air two two roger change to advisory frequency approved 0909:34 SUB22 sub air two two A witness, who was a train engineer in a standing locomotive about a quarter mile from the impact site, reported that he felt a shock wave against his locomotive and thought it was impacted by something. He went out to inspect the locomotive. The train had collected a coating of ice and the weather was foggy according to the engineer. He stated that he saw a leaning power pole across the roadway and saw steam rising from the ditch across the roadway. He went to investigate, saw the airplane, and called 911. FAA inspectors interviewed the pilot and he reported that he did not recall the accident. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to FAA records, the pilot was issued a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land limited to center thrust and instrument airplane ratings on October 25, 1977, based on military competence provisions allowed under 14 CFR Part 61.73 Military Pilots or Former Military Pilots: Special Rules. On December 14, 1977, he added an airplane single-engine land rating to his commercial certificate following a check ride in a Cessna 172. On August 25, 1978, he was reissued his commercial certificate without the center thrust limitation based on his military competence in the KC-135A airplane. On June 22, 1982, he was issued a type rating in the Boeing 707 and 720 airplanes based on his military competence in the KC-135A airplane. On August 22, 1982, he was issued an airplane single-engine certified flight instructor certificate following a check ride in a Piper PA-28R-200. On June 19, 1989, he was issued a type rating in the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 based on his military competence in a KC-10A airplane. The pilot's last medical examination was completed on July 10, 2006, and the pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate with a limitation to wear corrective lenses. According to the operator's report, the pilot reported a total flight time of 4,863 hours. The operator reported that the pilot had flown 523 hours in the Cessna 208. The operator reported that the pilot had flown 203 hours during the last 90 days and 64 hours during the last 30 days. On October 2, 2006, the pilot attended and completed the airplane manufacturer's winter operations training seminar. The pilot attended recurrent ground training for the Cessna 208 aircraft on January 17, 2007. The pilot's last FAA Airman Competency/Proficiency Check was completed on January 18, 2007, and he was approved for 14 CFR Part 135 pilot-in-command operations in the Cessna 208. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION N1116Y, a Cessna 208B, Caravan, serial number 208B0368, was a single-engine, turbo-prop, high-wing airplane, equipped with fixed tricycle landing gear. The fuselage and empennage are of an all-metal semimonocoque design. The wings are externally braced and have two integral fuel tanks. The accident airplane was configured for flight into known icing conditions and to carry cargo. The airplane was equipped with two cockpit seats. The Cessna 208B had its certified maximum takeoff weight increased by supplemental type certificate SA00188SE to 8,950 lbs. A 675-horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-114A, serial number PCE-19241, powered the airplane. The propeller was an electrically heated three-bladed McCauley 3GFR34C703-B model with hub serial number 952444. The airplane was equipped with distance measuring equipment (DME) and was not equipped with global positioning system (GPS) navigation equipment. A Radio Magnetic Indicator (RMI) was installed. The RMI display combined three navigation data points on one indicator. The data points were the current aircraft heading and the magnetic headings to VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR) and Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) stations, which were shown by the RMI's twin needles. Either needle could be switched to show VOR or NDB data in reference to the frequency that the pilot had selected in the navigation/communication radio or NDB receiver. The airplane was equipped with a panel mounted KI 525A Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) which showed standard Directional Gyro and Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) information, slaved heading, and VOR, Localizer, and Glideslope information in one display. The HSI indicator incorporated a Course Select Knob that rotated the course pointer to the desired course on the compass card. This knob corresponded to an Omni Bearing Selector (OBS) on standard VOR indicators. The HSI had a Heading Select Bug, which was a movable orange marker on the outer perimeter of the compass display, used primarily to select the desired heading you wished to fly. This desired heading can be coupled to the autopilot system. The airplane was being maintained under an approved aircraft inspection program for the Cessna 208B. Phase nine of the program was completed on January 11, 2007. The airplane had accumulated 7,248.3 hours of total flight time and it's Hobbs meter read 6,188.7 hours. The airplane was modified with a Cessna Service Bulletin (SB) titled, "FLIGHT INTO KNOWN ICING - LOW AIRSPEED AWARENESS SYSTEM INSTALLATION." The propeller anti-ice switch activated the awareness system. The SB, in part, stated: The new low speed awareness system is designed to alert the pilot with the illumination of an annunciator light on the instrument panel and the sound of an aural horn when the airspeed is less than approximately 110 [knots indicated airspeed]. ... Compliance with this Service Bulletin will assist the pilot in taking appropriate actions during icing operations. The dispatch record for the flight showed the airplane was carrying 2,126 pounds of cargo during the flight. The cargo was rechecked after the accident and its rechecked weight was 2,206 pounds. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A Senior Meteorologist for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) compiled a Meteorological Factual Report for the investigation. The report listed pilot reports (PIREP) near the airplane's route of flight. The PIREPs showed that airplanes were reporting light to moderate icing conditions. Airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) advisories were issued for IFR conditions. The AIRMET was valid from 1945 on February 7, 2007, through the time of the accident. At 0153, the recorded weather at AIA was: Wind 050 degrees at 4 knots; visibility 1 1/4 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast 200 feet; temperature -6 degrees Celsius (C); dew point -7 degrees C; altimeter 30.17 inches of mercury. At 0219, the recorded weather at AIA was: Wind 070 degrees at 4 knots; visibility 1 statute mile; present weather mist; sky condition overcast 200 feet; temperature -6 degrees C; dew point -7 degrees C; altimeter 30.17 inches of mercury AIDS TO NAVIGATION There were five non-precision instrument approaches and no precision approaches available at AIA. The non-precision approaches were the area navigation (RNAV) GPS RWY 12 approach, the RNAV GPS RWY 30 approach, the VOR RWY 12 approach, the VOR RWY 30 approach, and the (NDB) RWY 12 approach. The pilot was cleared for the VOR RWY 12 approach. The published inbound course was 111 degrees magnetic and the straight in minimum descent altitude for that approach was 4,560 feet above mean sea level (MSL), which was listed as 632 feet above the touchdown. The straight in minimum descent altitude, for DME equipped aircraft, once past the AIA 2.3 DME fix was 4,380 feet MSL, which was listed as 452 feet above the touchdown. The touchdown zone elevation for runway 12 was 3,928 feet MSL. The published weather minimums for the approach were a 700-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility for category A and B aircraft. The published weather minimums for the approach were a 500-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility for category A and B aircraft equipped with DME. The straight-in minimum descent altitude for the NDB RWY 12 approach was 4,580 feet MSL, which was listed as 652 feet above the touchdown. The published inbound course was 127 degrees magnetic. The published weather minimums for the approach were a 700-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility for category A and B aircraft. A NOTAM had been issued on February 1, 2007, stating that the AIA's NDB was out of service. Pilots reported that the signal associated with AIA's NDB frequency was still being transmitted while the out of service NOTAM was in effect. AIRPORT INFORMATION AIA was located about three miles southeast of the city at an elevation of 3,931 feet MSL. It was served by three runways 8-26, 17-35, and 12-30. Runway 12-30 was 9,202 feet long and 150 feet wide. The runway was made of asphalt. Medium intensity runway lighting for runway 12-30 and 8-26 was pilot-controlled. Pilot-controlled runway end identifier lights and a visual approach slope indicator serviced runway 12. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane was found resting upright impacting a power pole near the intersection of West 25th Street and Highway 385. The airplane fuselage had split open on its left side aft of the flaps. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage. The empennage remained attached to the fuselage. The inboard section of the left wing remained attached to the fuselage. A metal building northwest of the airplane was found with tears in its roof and side. The tears in the roof were in line with a ground scar that started about 60 feet southeast of the torn wall section. The ground scar continued on about a 105-degree magnetic heading and stopped at the airplane wreckage. The airplane wreckage was about 230 feet from the torn wall section. The outboard section of the left wing was found near the ground scar. A flap rail from the left wing was found in the building and the left navigation light cover was found on the roof by the first tear in the roof. Red media was observed on the roof by the navigation light cover. The propeller hub separated from the engine. Two propeller blades separated from the hub and were found resting near the ground scar. The third propeller blade separated from the hub and was found in a field about 150 yards south of the start of the ground scar and was about 200 yards southwest of the main wreckage. The left fuel tank was compromised. The smell of jet fuel was present around the left wing. The right wing fuel tank contained liquid consistent with jet fuel. The fuel line to the engine contained liquid consistent with jet fuel. The emergency locator transmitter was found activated. The Hobbs meter indicated 6,240 hours. The DME selector switch was positioned to the number one navigation radio. The Heading Select Bug was pointing to a desired course of 120 degrees. The Course Select Knob was selecting a course of about 106 degrees. Both of the RMI's indicator switches were set t
The pilot's descent below minimum descent altitude while on a nonprecision approach. A contributing factor was a low ceiling.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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