Livermore, CA, USA
N214KS
Hill Europa XS
Witnesses observed the airplane reach about 300 to 400 feet above ground level (agl) in the initial climb as it approached the departure end of the runway. The airplane then descended about 100 feet as one witness heard the engine begin to sputter, and then lost power. The airplane made a hard left turn and continued to descend while reversing course, consistent with the pilot attempting to return to the runway. As the airplane came close to completing a 180-degree turn, the airplane stalled and dove toward terrain. The airplane impacted in a near-vertical attitude and erupted into flames. The pilot, who was the airplane's builder, had amassed about 300 hours in the accident airplane. The terrain at the end of the departure runway was characteristically flat, stretching over 6,500 feet beyond the runway, and consisted of a golf course and open fields. Investigators found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures during the examination; however, the extremely impact damaged and thermally consumed wreckage precluded many components and systems from being inspected. An article in the EAA Sport Aviation newsletter detailed the flight characteristics of an Europa that was configured similar to the accident airplane. In pertinent part, it stated that stalls, both with level flight and idle power, are abrupt with a 5- to 10-degree nose drop accompanied by a 5-degree right wing drop. The article reported that there is virtually no traditional stall warning, such as airframe buffeting.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On June 16, 2007, about 0830 Pacific daylight time, an experimental Hill Europa XS, N214KS, made a 180-degree turn and collided with terrain during the initial climb from Livermore Municipal Airport, Livermore, California. The pilot, who was the owner and builder, was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The commercial pilot and pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed. The local personal flight was originating from Livermore, with a planned destination of the Yosemite, California, area. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed. Family members of the pilot reported that the leisure flight intended to terminate at an airport around Yosemite, where both occupants planned to spend the day. They planned to be back in Livermore about 1830. The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) gathered witness statements and conducted telephone interviews. One witness, who was a certificated flight instructor (CFI), stated that the morning of the accident he was planning to give instruction to a student. He was intending to perform an instrument flight rules (IFR) departure and recalled that, about 0830, he was holding short of runway 25R awaiting an IFR clearance. While sitting in the run-up area, he noticed a white low-wing experimental airplane being cleared for takeoff on runway 25R. The airplane departed and then air traffic control subsequently cleared the CFI to take position on the runway and hold. The CFI further stated that he aligned his airplane with the runway centerline and looked for the departed airplane ahead. He observed the airplane reach about 400 above ground level (agl) while approaching the end of the runway, passing the identifier marking 7L. The airplane then sunk about 100 feet in a level attitude. He noticed the airplane was to the north of the runway centerline (right side), and as it reached about 300 feet agl, it made a hard left turn. The airplane continued to descend and reverse course. As the airplane came close to completing a 180-degree turn, the nose dove toward terrain. The airplane impacted in a near-vertical attitude and erupted into flames. Additional witnesses recalled the accident airplane departing and reaching between 200 to 400 feet agl. They observed it make a left turn and dive toward terrain. Some pilot-witnesses stated that they thought the airplane had stalled through the turn. Another witness, who was also a CFI, stated that he regularly tows banners out of Livermore. Just prior to the accident he was setting up a banner on pad "A," which was located abeam the accident site about 100 yards away. He noted that a 13- to 15-knot headwind was continuous down the runway. He watched the airplane as it began the departure roll. As the airplane climbed to about 250 to 300 agl, the engine began to sputter and subsequently quit (which he determined by an audible change in rpm). The airplane's nose pitched down and the engine sounded as though it were going to start again. It sputtered again and then quit. He watched the airplane begin a left turn, consistent with the pilot trying to turn back to the airport. Shortly after starting the turn, the airplane stalled and spun into the ground, impacting in a near vertical attitude. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airman and Medical records files, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land and instrument flight. He additionally held a repairman experimental aircraft builder certificate. The pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate in June 2005, with no limitations. No personal flight records were recovered for the pilot. The family stated that pilot normally kept his logbooks in the airplane. The pilot's sons estimated that he had amassed about 300 hours in the accident airplane, noting that he flew around one time a week. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The Europa XS tri-gear, single engine kit airplane, serial number A214, was completed in 2005 by the accident pilot. The airworthiness certificate was issued June 01, 2005. According to the maintenance records, the pilot performed the last annual inspection on July 03, 2006, at which point the airplane had accumulated 87.5 hours. It is estimated from both the family and the pilot's online postings, that at the time of the accident, the airplane had about 300 hours total time in service. According to the pilot's postings on various websites, in addition to the 18-gallon internal fuel tank, the pilot had acquired two supplementary 6-gallon Evinrude Johnson "Duratanks" from the local boat dealer. He reported using quick disconnect fittings purchased from the kit manufacturer and a separate aircraft specific fuel pump. The tanks were strapped to the wing tie bar for restraint just aft of the seats. One of the pilot's sons reported helping his father assemble the airplane the day of the accident. Following the setup, the son immediately left the airport. The other son commented that his father normally purchased automotive unleaded gasoline from a local station. The airplane was assumed to be configured at the time of the accident with full fuel in the internal tank (18 gallons) and one external fuel tank (6 gallons in one of the Durantanks). WRECKAGE AND IMPACT Airport information for the Livermore Municipal Airport contained in the Airport Facility Directory, Southwest U.S., indicated that the airport was equipped with two runways. Runway 7L/25R was 5,253 feet in length and 100 feet wide; runway 7R/25L was 2,699 feet in length and 75 feet wide. The estimated airport elevation was 400 feet msl. The airplane came to rest in the dirt adjacent to the departure end of runway 25L, about 40 feet east of taxiway G. The terrain to the west of airport's runways was characteristically flat, stretching over 6,500 feet; the area consisted of a golf course and open fields. The wreckage was consumed by fire. The Livermore Police Department wreckage diagram is contained in the public docket for this accident. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL An Alameda County Sheriff's Office coroner performed autopsies on both the pilot and passenger. The FAA Toxicology Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on the pilot. The specimens tested negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and drugs; the examination revealed that 1.88 (ug/ml) of Cyanide was detected in the pilot's blood. TESTS AND RESEARCH A Safety Board investigator examined the wreckage on July 06, 2007, in Livermore. The wreckage had been recovered and placed into a secured storage hangar prior to the examination. Present to the examination was a FAA inspector and a technical representative from Rotax Engines. According to the data plate affixed to the crankcase, the powerplant of the accident airplane was a Rotax 914UL, serial number 4418336. An external examination was performed of the engine wreckage and accompanying accessories. The engine was consumed by fire and was no longer attached to any surrounding airframe. The ring mount, normally affixed to the firewall, had been folded forward and was wedged around the ignition housing. Investigators removed the mount from the engine, giving access to the cylinders. Ductile bending and crushing of the exhaust system components was observed on the bottom of the engine. The muffler was attached to the exhaust and a light dusting of a white residue was noted on the inside of the shroud. The visual examination of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact catastrophic mechanical malfunction. Investigators were unable to establish continuity within the ignition system due to the components being consumed by fire. The ignition coils melted within the stator. No leads from the ignition system remained. Rotation of the engine was not possible due to binding of various components, which was a result of impact damage; investigators were not able to obtain compression. Upon removal of the jammed parts, the complete valve train was confirmed to be undamaged and was observed to operate in proper order. The crankshaft was rotated by hand at a flywheel retaining bolt. It was free and easy to rotate in both directions, with the exception of an area where a molten bead of ignition wires near the flywheel interfered. Investigators removed the rockerbox covers, revealing a thin coat of oil within. The rocker arms and valve springs were intact in each cylinder. Mechanical continuity was established throughout the rotating group and valve train during hand rotation of the crankshaft. The cylinders' combustion chambers were examined upon removal of each cylinder. The combustion chambers remained mechanically undamaged, and there was no evidence of foreign object ingestion or detonation. The valves were intact and undamaged. There was no evidence of valve to piston face contact. The gas path and combustion signatures observed at the spark plugs, combustion chambers, and exhaust system components displayed coloration that the Rotax representative said was consistent with normal operation. The number 3 cylinder was lighter in coloration than the other cylinders, with the intake valve almost white. The piston rings moved freely with ample space between the ringlands. The oil pump was removed. The shaft did not rotate and appeared to be bent, with mounting screws bowed. The rotors moved freely when the pin was removed. There was no evidence of contamination. The main rotor housing contained a groove that was consistent in size and orientation with that of contact of a rotor. Removal of the main drive gear housing revealed that one side of the propeller shaft keeper had been displaced. The accessory drive within that housing remained affixed to the shaft. Additionally, grooves consistent with the size and orientation to that of the accessory gear teeth were located in the gearbox on the crankshaft mounting flange. The push-pull rod for the propeller shaft was intact, though the bolt at the forward rod end was sheared consistent with on overstress. The carburetors were not attached to the engine and were found within wire bundles adjacent to the engine. Investigators removed and disassembled the units for examination. The examination revealed that the composite floats were consumed by fire. The bowls were empty and partially consumed, and no trace of fuel was found. The throttle slide on the right carburetor was not aligned with the passage and appeared to be wedged in that position; it could not be determined if the position was a result of impact. The Rotax representative stated that even if the slide was positioned in such a manner during operation, the performance differentiation would be negligible. The jets installed in the right carburetor were 1.60 on the outer and 2.72 on the inner; the left carburetor had a 1.64 outer jet and 2.72 inner jet. The Rotax representative stated that those jets were consistent with the factory recommended sizes. The fuel system could not be examined for continuity and integrity, as it was mostly consumed by fire. The fuel selector was partially melted and no meaningful position could be ascertained. The turbocharger was removed from the engine. The compressor wheel within the center section of the turbocharger moved freely. The engine was equipped with an intercooler, which was designed to cool the inlet air and situated between the turbo and air inlet chamber. The propeller blades were detangled from the wreckage and labeled for identification purposes as "A", "B", and "C". All blades remained attached to the hub. One blade was separated from the others, and the two remaining blades remained affixed to one another on the aft section of the outer housing. The blades were free from major external damage with the exception of one blade, which had been partially burned. Each blade, measuring about 66 inches from tip to the hub center, appeared physically in an overextended position in relation to the hub. Two of the blades were stuck in that orientation. The composite blades revealed no bending or scoring along the leading edge. The Safety Board IIC contacted the propeller manufacturer, Rospeller, in an attempt to establish the propellers position at the time of impact. The extensive damage to the propeller precluded any meaningful information from being obtained. Investigators found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures during the examination; however, the extremely impact damaged and thermally consumed wreckage precluded many components and systems from being inspected or tested. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION An article in the EAA Sport Aviation newsletter detailed the flight characteristics of an Europa that was configured similar to the accident airplane. In pertinent part, it stated that stalls, both with level flight and idle power, have the same, somewhat abrupt, character. A 5- to 10-degree nose drop accompanied by a 5-degree right wing drop defines the wings-level stall. There's virtually no traditional stall warning such as airframe buffeting. Left pedal gives balanced flight during the idle-stall deceleration, but expect to use right pedal while decelerating with power on. Failing to apply the necessary right pedal can result in a fairly aggressive nose-left yaw rate with power on. The stall, which occurs at an indicated 35 knots, is again abrupt, with a nose drop in the 15-degree range, but this time the left wing drops about 5 degrees.
the loss of engine power for an undetermined reason during the initial climb, and the pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed while attempting a return to runway maneuver, which resulted in a stall/spin.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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