Nokomis, FL, USA
N261BH
BELL 206B
The helicopter pilot was performing the last of six photo shoots of a boat. The boat did not have a functioning GPS for an accurate speed indication and speed coordination between the boat and helicopter operator was made by hand signals. During the photo shoot, the helicopter maneuvered in front of the boat, to the left, in a slight right yaw, and about 10 feet above the water. The boat was traveling at an estimated speed of 85 mph at that time. Witnesses on the boat observed the helicopter gradually flying lower until the helicopter’s skid impacted the water. The recovered wreckage of the helicopter’s airframe and engine were examined. No evidence of preimpact abnormalities with the helicopter were found.
History of Flight On September 11, 2007, about 1000 eastern daylight time, a Bell 206B, N261BH, registered to Biscayne Helicopter Inc., and operated by Southland Helicopters, crashed into the waters offshore of Nokomis, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 91 aerial observation flight. The pilot received serious injuries and the two passengers were killed. The helicopter was destroyed. The flight originated from the Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida, earlier that day, about 0840. Information obtained from witnesses and the pilot revealed the planned use of the helicopter was as an aerial platform for photography of performance boats for a magazine. Traditionally, the helicopter photo shoots are done in the early morning when the light is best for the pictures and the seas and wind are at their most calm. For this evaluation session, the first flight was scheduled for the afternoon of Monday, September 10, 2007. Monday afternoon's flight was canceled because overcast conditions and intermittent rain did not present adequate photography conditions. The next scheduled flight was to be Tuesday morning, September 11, 2007. That Tuesday was the first day of a week long series of evaluations being conducted in the Sarasota, Florida area. At first light, there was significant cloud coverage and there was consideration to delay the helicopter shoots until later in the day. As the weather quickly improved, it was decided to go ahead and get the photography done. The helicopter pilot stated that this was the last photo shoot of the day of the scheduled six. He maneuvered the helicopter lower and nearer the boat so the photographer could give the boat captain hand signals as to what direction to go. The pilot then began maneuvering as required to photograph the boat from different angles in the same manner they had for the previous boats. The boat picked up speed and was traveling too fast for the helicopter. The pilot advised the photographer that he could not fly with the boat at those speeds and flew up and away from the boat. This resulted in the boat captain slowing sufficiently to allow the helicopter to re-join with the boat and for photographer to relay via hand signals to slow down. The boat captain related, via hand signals, that he did not have a speedometer. The pilot told the photographer that he understood the "no speedometer" signal but that the boat should be setting its speed based on the helicopter’s speed. The pilot set a speed of 65 knots (75 mph). The boat pulled into position as directed by the photographer, and he began photographing in the manner they had before. The pilot had the following memories, but was not sure of the proper sequence. Around the time of slowing the boat down the pilot looked at his watch; it was 0950 and he noted approximately 21 gallons of fuel indicated on the fuel gauge. He told the photographer that he had to finish this boat soon because they were nearing the point where he wanted to return to SRQ for fuel. After slowing the boat initially, he told the photographer that the boat was starting to go too fast and he would slow the helicopter to get the boat captain’s attention enough to adjust the boat’s speed. He also remembered telling the photographer that he could not see the boat, and the photographer advised him to "hold my line" so he could direct the boat to where he wanted it to be. The pilot advised the photographer that he had a building on shore that he was flying toward and that he was set on his line. The pilot’s next memory was of surfacing in the water with the boat captain aiding him. The boat captain stated that the helicopter was flying at about seven to ten feet off the water, about 100 yards in front of and to the left of the boat. They were traveling, at his estimate, about 85 mph as the helicopter was flying pretty much straight ahead, but maybe crabbing about 5 degrees so that the right door was a little more visible. The pilot was flying the helicopter from the right seat. One of the passengers, the videographer, was in the left front seat and the other passenger, the photographer, was taking pictures out the right rear door opening, sort of leaning out the door connected to a harness strap attached to the inside of the helicopter. They were traveling directly into a very mild head wind of 5 mph or less. The seas were calm and nearly flat, especially closer to shore. As the boat captain was following the helicopter with the boat, the helicopter seemed to get a little lower in altitude, which was lower than he had ever seen it. It rose back up slightly, and then immediately started descending until it hit the water. It seemed almost as if it glided in at consistent angle; it appeared that the first contact with the water was the front radius section of the right skid. Immediately, the helicopter tumbled vertically to where the bottom of the helicopter was seen for a split second. The helicopter then disintegrated violently with the water; parts and debris flew into the path of the boat, which was still traveling at a speed of about 85 mph. The boat captain instinctively turned the boat to the right and ducked down. The passenger, in the boat with him, also ducked as they passed through the flying debris and wreckage. He recalled the sound of pieces of the helicopter hitting the boat as they passed. At this point they were already turning in a clockwise direction. They continued in the circle 270 degrees back to where the helicopter had crashed. He pulled up just seaward of the debris field, put the boat in neutral and shut off the motors. The boat captain called 911 on his cell phone at 1000 according to the call log in his cell phone. The boat passenger, a model for the magazine, stated that while the boat was traveling to the photo shoot area, the boat captain discovered that the GPS was not working and they would not know at what speed they would be traveling. The helicopter was above them at this time, following them out to the bay. The boat captain was able to yell up to the photographer that he was unable to get the GPS to work and had no idea how fast they were going. Once in open waters they took off, she would guess traveling about 100 mph or so. During this time the helicopter was traveling around them at different angles and altitudes photographing every possible angle of the boat. They ran for what she would guess to be 5 or 10 minutes. She remembered the boat captain saying that the photographer had communicated with him that they were traveling too fast and needed to slow down for better shots. He was able to communicate this by hand signals, which consisted of a downward hand motion. They then took off (at a bit slower speed) and the helicopter continued to travel with the boat, constantly changing positions to get the best pictures. It was when they got directly in front of the boat, which they had several times prior, that she noticed the helicopter going surprisingly low to the water. She remembered thinking “Wow, these guys really know what they are doing and are serious about getting that perfect shot…” when all of a sudden the front leg went into the water and immediately “stuffed” the helicopter into the water sending a huge wall of water into the air. She then ducked down into her seat while covering her head, anticipating getting hit with the debris. But it never happened. She didn't’t even remember hearing anything hit the boat. Once the boat stopped and she realized they had survived, she looked at the boat captain in absolute shock and awe and told the boat captain to call 911, which he was already calling. She then looked out and observed one of the men from the helicopter among all the debris in the water. Personnel Information The pilot, age 44, held a commercial pilot certificate for rotorcraft helicopter and an instrument helicopter rating. He held a certified flight instructor certificate for helicopter. He was issued a second class medical on July 27, 2007, with no limitations. The pilot documented, at the time of the medical, a total of 7,500 civilian flight hours in all type. The pilot had document in his pilot’s flight logbook a total of 2,613 flight hours in the Bell 206 helicopter. Aircraft Information The Bell, 206B, Jet Ranger, helicopter, was built in 1979 with serial number 2817 and was certificated in the normal category. The helicopter was maintained with the manufacturer’s recommended maintenance program. A review of the helicopter’s maintenance records revealed the helicopter had a 100 / 300 hour inspection on the airframe and engine on July 12, 2007, at which time the helicopter had accumulated a total of 14,989.7 hours. The helicopter had maintenance performed on August 25, 2007, at which time the helicopter had accumulated a total of 15,039.8 hours. Meteorological Information The closest official weather observation was the SRQ, 18 miles from the accident site. On September 11, 2007, at 0953, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METER) recorded in part, winds at 170 degrees at 7 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; few clouds at 2,300 feet; temperature 30 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 23 degrees C; altimeter 30.05 inches of mercury. Wreckage and Impact Information The helicopter's top section, instrument panel, engine, transmission, drive shaft, tail boom, bottom section, skids, and rotor head with sections of the main rotor blades were recovered from under the water, relative to the helicopter water impact location. The entire airframe had sustained severe hydro dynamic damage. The recovery crew searched a large area of sea floor locating the major portion of the airframe over a period of several days. All damage was consistent with the high speed, low angle water impact. The cabin section sustained severe water impact damage. The flight controls, both fixed and rotating, were damaged and or destroyed. The instrument panel, center and overhead consoles, separated from the fuselage and all were distorted and damaged. The saddle mounts of all four cross tubes were fractured where they attach to the skids and both skids were fractured just forward of their aft saddle mounts. The observed damage to the airframe and recovered components were consistent with water impact at high speed. The main rotor system separated from the mast just beneath the yoke. Both blades of the main rotor spars were fractured at the end of the doublers. An outboard portion of one of the blades was not recovered. The other outboard section was still attached by the aft blade closure strip. The damage to both main rotor blades was consistent with rotation at water impact. The mast bent and separated; the fracture was a 45 degree overload type. Markings were observed with the main rotor yoke making contact with the mast, consistent with the main rotor blade to water contact. The mast to yoke contact was on the side of the blade whose outboard spar was not recovered. The main transmission remained attached to the cabin roof and separated from the remainder of the fuselage. The tail boom, which remained intact, and remnants of the aft fuselage separated just forward of the engine oil cooler assembly in the vicinity of the aft engine firewall. There was little damage observed to the tail rotor gearbox, tail rotor blades, or aft vertical fin. Continuity in the drive shaft and control tubes between the forward end of the tail boom and the tail rotor gearbox was established. No evidence of pre-impact abnormality was observed. The engine was recovered; it was located entangled in the engine deck and remnants of the aft fuselage. The exterior surfaces of the engine were observed with heavy impact forces. The left side of the compressor front support was crushed inward, the aft end of the horizontal fire shield was bent inward against the governor, and the outer combustion case was torn away from the aft flange of the gas producer turbine support. A teardown examination of the engine, with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight, revealed the engine sustained heavy damage as a result of the accident sequence and being submerged in salt water. There were dirt, rust and corrosion, deposits noted throughout the engine. The engine to main transmission drive shaft fractured just aft of the flex coupling at the forward end. The aft end remained attached to the power take-off gear in the engine accessory gearbox. The drive shaft exhibited circumferential scoring. Both the N1 and N2 drive trains were locked. No evidence of pre-impact abnormality was observed. Medical and Pathological Information A postmortem examination of the videographer (front passenger) and photographer (rear passenger) were conducted under the authority of the Florida State Medical Examiners, Sarasota, Florida, on September 12, 2007. The cause of death for the videographer was an acute Atlanta-Occuiptal dislocation, blunt head and neck trauma. The cause of death for the photographer was sequelae of multiple blunt force traumas with contributory of Valvular, Dysrhythmic, and Hypertensive disease. Test and Research
The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from the water.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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