N100UC
BEECH D55
The non-instrument rated pilot called a friend on St. Thomas and asked if he had a flight to St. Croix that day, and if he could he bring back a family member for him. The friend advised it would be no problem. Later, the pilot called again and stated, "I can see St. Croix from my house," so that he would fly to St. Croix and get the family member himself. The friend became concerned as the weather was "real bad" near St. Croix. The pilot departed St. Thomas and received VFR flight following. The controller asked if he was able to go through the weather. The pilot responded that he did not have any weather where he was, that there was some lightning around him, but that everything seemed "pretty good." The flight was handed off to St. Croix tower. The tower controller asked what his position was, and the pilot responded, "Roger we are level at (unintelligible) oh boy we're having some prob." This was the last transmission received. Analysis of the weather revealed level 5 thunderstorms were present in vicinity of St. Croix. The pilot probably encountered moderate-heavy rain in the minutes before the accident. However, the pilot was likely in light-moderate precipitation when the airplane was lost from radar. Multiple cloud layers existed at and below 3,000 feet. After the accident the weather observation showed winds with gusts to 17 knots. The sun had set, and twilight had ended prior to the accident. Considering the weather data, and lack of ambient light, there would have been no visible horizon, forcing the pilot to control the airplane solely by referencing the flight instruments The Airplane Flying Handbook states that "unless a pilot has many hours of training in instrument flight, flight in reduced visibility or at night when the horizon is not visible should be avoided.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 7, 2007, about 1834 Atlantic standard time, a Beech D55, N100UC, was destroyed when it impacted water, approximately 3 nautical miles north northwest of St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. The certificated private pilot was killed. Night instrument meteorological conditions were present in the area of the accident. The flight departed Cyril E. King Airport (TIST), Charlotte Amalie, United States Virgin Islands, and was destined for Henry E. Rohlsen Airport (TISX), St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. No flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to a friend of the pilot's, the pilot called him on St. Thomas and asked him if he had a flight to St. Croix that day, and if he could he bring back a family member for him. The friend advised him that he had a flight and it would be no problem. Later that day, the pilot called again and advised that, "I can see St. Croix from my house," so he would fly to St, Croix and get the family member himself. The friend became concerned later when he realized that the weather was "real bad" in the area of St. Croix. According to information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), an area of inclement weather existed between St. Thomas and St Croix on the day of the accident. The pilot departed TIST at approximately 1817 and was in communication with a controller at the FAA San Juan Combined Enroute and Approach Control (CERAP), receiving visual flight rules flight following. The approach controller queried the pilot regarding the weather and asked him if he was able to go through the weather. The pilot responded that he did not have any weather where he was, that there was some lightning around him, but that everything seemed to be "pretty good." The flight was then handed off to St. Croix tower. Once communications were established with the pilot, the St. Croix tower controller asked him what his position was, and at 1833:22 the pilot responded, "Roger we are level at (unintelligible) oh boy we're having some prob." No further transmissions were received from the pilot. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to FAA records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land. The pilot did not possess an instrument rating. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on October 3, 2007. He reported 970 total hours of flight experience on that date. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION According to FAA records and the airplane owner's maintenance provider, the accident airplane was manufactured in 1969. The most recent annual inspection was completed on March 30, 2007. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 2,899.6 total hours of operation. Both propellers had been overhauled 615.4 hours prior to the inspection and both engines had been overhauled 1,460 hours prior to the inspection. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION According to the National Weather Service, the weather for the accident area was forecast to be 6 miles visibility in the vicinity of thunderstorms, with a scattered cloud layer at 2,500 feet with cumulonimbus clouds present. Temporary changes were also expected, with visibility at times forecast to be 4 miles. Correlation of the accident airplane's radar track and San Juan Doppler Weather Radar by a National Transportation Safety Board meteorologist indicated that at 1833:08, the accident airplane was in an area of light-moderate precipitation. A weather observation taken at TISX about 19 minutes after the accident, included winds from 030 degrees at 13 knots, gusting to 17 knots, 6 miles visibility, few clouds at 1,200 feet, broken clouds at 2,800 feet, and an overcast layer at 3,700 feet. Seven minutes later, the wind shifted to 360 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 17 knots, the visibility dropped to 1 3/4 miles, with scattered clouds at 800 feet, broken clouds at 1,300 feet, and an overcast layer at 2,700 feet. According to the United States Naval Observatory sunset occurred at 1803, and the end of civil twilight occurred at 1825. Moonrise did not occur until 0401 on the following day. According to the FAA, there was no record of the pilot receiving a weather briefing. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION According to the FAA, the last radar contact with the accident airplane occurred at 1833, 1 mile west-southwest of Butler Bay, St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. According to the United States Coast Guard, at 2045, after a search by multiple vessels and aircraft, a debris field was discovered that consisted of small pieces of fiberglass, seat cushions, floor mats, and fuel. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FAA Guidance According to the FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A), crossing large bodies of water at night can be potentially hazardous, because with little or no lighting the horizon blends with the water, in which case, depth perception and orientation become difficult. During poor visibility conditions over water, the horizon could become obscured, which could result in a loss of orientation. Even on clear nights, the stars may be reflected on the water surface, which could appear as a continuous array of lights, thus making the horizon difficult to identify. The FAA's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25), also contained guidance which stated that under normal flight conditions, when there is a visual reference to the horizon and ground, the sensory system in the inner ear helps to identify the pitch, roll, and yaw movements of the airplane. When visual contact with the horizon is lost, the vestibular system becomes unreliable. Without visual references outside the airplane, there are many situations where combinations of normal motions and forces can create convincing illusions that are difficult to overcome. In a classic example, a pilot may believe the airplane is in level flight, when, in reality, it is in a gradual turn. If the airspeed increases, the pilot may experience a postural sensation of a level dive and pull back on the stick, which tightens the turn and creates increasing G-loads. If recovery is not initiated, a steep spiral will develop. This is sometimes called the graveyard spiral, because if the pilot fails to recognize that the airplane is in a spiral and fails to return the airplane to wings-level flight, the airplane will eventually strike the ground. If the horizon becomes visible again, the pilot will have an opportunity to return the airplane to straight-and-level flight, and continued visual contact with the horizon will allow the pilot to maintain straight-and-level flight. However, if contact with the horizon is lost again, the inner ear may fool the pilot into thinking the airplane has started a bank in the other direction, causing the graveyard spiral to begin all over again. The Handbook also advised, that prevention is usually the best remedy for spatial disorientation, and "Unless a pilot has many hours of training in instrument flight, flight in reduced visibility or at night when the horizon is not visible should be avoided." A pilot can reduce susceptibility to disorienting illusions through training and awareness, and learning to rely totally on flight instruments.
The non-instrument rated pilot's decision to continue VFR flight into IMC conditions subsequently leading to a loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of instrument experience, the weather conditions, and the night lighting conditions.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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