Teterboro, NJ, USA
N988PA
Learjet 45
The local air traffic controller was working alone and was aware that runways 1 and 19 were closed due to maintenance related work. He appropriately placed internal tower controls to indicate that the runways were closed, but failed to place that information on the recorded ATIS (automatic terminal information service) for arriving and departing air traffic. He also failed to advise the local approach controller when the approach controller called him to advise that he had an airplane inbound to land on runway 19. The tower controller subsequently cleared the approaching airplane to land on the closed runway. The airplane landed without incident, but passed within approximately 150 feet of two workers on the runway. The controller's written statement reads in its entirety, "While performing required non-control duties WDR 988 landed on runway 19."
WDR988, tail number N988PA, departed Westchester County Airport, White Plains, New York (HPN) at approximately 5:20 am on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 135 instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to TEB for passenger pickup. According to the pilot in command there were no notices to airman (NOTAM) in effect closing runway 19 at TEB prior to their departure from HPN. After departing HPN, WDR988 was assigned a northwesterly heading by New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (N90) for approximately 15 miles and then was cleared direct to TEB. N90 directed WDR988 to advise when they had TEB in sight, which occurred when the flight was about 10-12 miles from the airport. N90 then cleared WDR988 for a visual approach to runway 19 at TEB and directed them to contact the TEB tower. At approximately 5:30 am, WDR988 called TEB tower for landing and was cleared to land on runway 19. According to the pilot in command, it was dark and the runway lights for runway 19 were illuminated. About 400-500 feet above touchdown the flight crew of WDR988 noticed that there were men and equipment in the displaced threshold area for runway 19, but not on the runway itself. The men were located near a truck that had a yellow X either attached to it or in tow, and it appeared that the men were standing by in preparation to close the runway but that the runway had not yet been closed. The two vehicles in the displaced threshold had illuminated rotating beacons. The men and equipment were well clear of the actual runway and the flight crew of WDR988 briefly discussed the situation and verified with each other that they were in fact cleared to land on runway 19. After landing roll out and just prior to exiting the runway, the pilots of WDR988 stated that they saw an erected "X" at the approach end of runway 1. The pilots stated that the erected X at the approach end of runway 1 was not lighted and was not visible to the flight crew until they we were approaching the departure end of runway 19 which was the approach end of runway 1. WDR988 was directed to taxi to the Atlantic Aviation Fixed Base Operations. After receiving fuel and picking up passengers at Teterboro, WDR988 departed for Nashville International Airport (BNA) at approximately 6:52 am. ATC did not advise the flight crew of WDR988 that they had landed on a closed runway nor did the crew query the tower regarding the possibility that the runway had been closed. The incursion occurred during the midnight shift when there was one controller in the tower, as scheduled. The Federal Aviation Administration reported that runway 1/19 had been closed by Airport Operations and confirmed closed by the tower controller. The facility's record of daily operation (tower log) reflected runway 1/19 closed at 5:13 am. According to Teterboro Airport Operations, Flight Service Station Notice to Airman (FSS NOTAM) 06/105 was in effect reflecting runway 1/19 closed from 5:00 am to 2:00 pm, June 25, 2008. The local controller had placed two runway incursion devices (RID) at the local control position on the flight progress strip bays as a reminder the runway was closed. The local controller did not inform New York Terminal Radar Approach Controller (N90 TRACON) of the runway closure as required by FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-10-2, Forwarding Approach Control Information by Nonapproach Control Facilities. Additionally, the tower controller did not update the Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) to reflect the runway closure as required by FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 2-9-2, ATIS Operating Procedures. Airport operations personnel had placed a lighted X indicating the runway closure at the approach end of runway 1 and two employees were working north of the displaced threshold of runway 19, between taxiways L/A and B in the process of erecting an unlighted X at the approach end of runway 19 when WDR988 overflew them. The New York Terminal Radar Approach Controller (N90 TRACON) had called the tower controller approximately 7 minutes prior to the incident to request a visual approach to runway 19 for WDR988. The tower controller approved the request. On the initial communication with WDR988, the tower controller cleared WDR988 to land on runway 19. The controller had been working the local control position for 7 hours and 21 minutes when the incident occurred. At the time of the incident it was daylight, the wind was calm, sky clear, with 10 statute miles visibility. Official sunrise occurred at 5:26 am.
The local air traffic controller's failure to follow published procedures and directives, resulting in a landing airplane coming in close proximity to runway workers.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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