Wendover, UT, USA
N98FC
CESSNA 180G
The tailwheel-equipped airplane began veering to the right immediately after touchdown and the pilot's corrective rudder inputs could not bring it back in line with the runway. He therefore initiated a rejected landing, but did not correctly reconfigure the airplane for takeoff. The pilot ultimately aborted the rejected takeoff, but during his attempt to bring the airplane to a stop it nosed over in rough terrain off the side of the runway. The investigation revealed that there was a lack of free rotational movement (binding) in the right main gear brake assembly. The wheel was hard to turn by hand, with the resistance to free movement due to the pressure being applied to the brake rotor by the new brake pads that were installed about three to four flight hours prior to the accident. A postaccident interview with the mechanic who installed the pads determined that after the installation of the pads, the wheel was not jacked up off of the ground so that free movement of the rotor and wheel could be established. Instead, the determination of free movement was made based upon the fact that no resistance was noted when the airplane was pushed out of the hangar by hand. At the time the airplane was rolled out of the hangar the brake rotor was at ambient temperature. Shims are available to insert between the two halves of the brake caliper upon reassembly, and one should have been installed in this situation in order to reduce the amount of resistance present without pilot brake application.
On March 27, 2009, about 1645 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 180G, N98FC, nosed over after departing the side of the runway at Wendover Airport, Wendover, Utah. The private pilot and his passenger were not injured, but the airplane, which was owned and operated by the pilot, sustained substantial damage. The local 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal pleasure flight, which was initiated at the same airport about 15 minutes prior to the accident, was being operated in visual meteorological conditions. No flight plan had been filed. According to the pilot, his first landing was a stop-and-go, followed by a closed pattern to a second planned stop-and-go. On his second landing, immediately after touching down on the main landing gear, the airplane veered sharply to the right. The pilot therefore applied opposite rudder, but the airplane continued toward the right edge of the runway. Because the airplane was heading toward rough terrain off the right side of the runway, the pilot elected to execute a go-around. He therefore pushed the throttle full forward, and attempted to get the airplane to lift off, but he did not push the carburetor heat to the off position or reposition the flaps from their setting of 40 degrees. Although the airplane lifted off momentarily, as the pilot continued the go-around, the landing gear contacted several mounds of loose dirt and brush off the side of the runway. According to the pilot, this contact caused the airplane to decelerate, so he decided to abort the go-around attempt. He therefore pulled the power to idle and attempted to land on the rough terrain. During that sequence, the airplane impacted a mound of dirt and nosed over onto its back. Although the pilot reported that he had not applied any braking action while the airplane was on the runway, a post-accident inspection of the runway surface revealed a thin skid mark from near the point of touchdown to where the airplane departed the runway. Also, at the location where the airplane departed the side of the runway onto the loose dirt surface, there was a clear skid mark created by the right tire, but none from the left tire. An on-scene inspection of the right main landing gear wheel by a local law enforcement official determined that the wheel, which was no longer contacting the ground because the airplane was in the inverted position, could only be rotated with the application of considerable hand force. Three days after the accident, an Airworthiness Inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration's Salt Lake City Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) also inspected the right wheel assembly. During that inspection he confirmed that the wheel was hard to turn by hand, and that the resistance to free movement was the result of the pressure being applied to the brake rotor by the new brake pads that were installed about three to four flight hours prior to the accident. According to the FSDO Inspector, during his post-accident interview with the mechanic that installed the pads, it was determined that after the installation of the pads, the wheel was not jacked off the ground so that free movement of the rotor and wheel could be established. Instead, the determination of free movement was made based upon the fact that no resistance was noted when the airplane was pushed out of the hangar by hand. At the time the airplane was rolled out of the hangar the brake rotor was at ambient temperature. The inspector also noted that although there was no requirement for a shim to be placed between the two halves of the brake caliper upon initial reassembly, such shims are available, and one should have been installed in this situation in order to reduce the amount of resistance present without pilot brake application.
A loss of directional control during landing as a result of the binding in one main landing gear brake assembly due to incorrect maintenance procedures. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to correctly reconfigure the airplane during an attempted rejected landing.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
