North Captiva Island, FL, USA
N911LZ
EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH EC-145
The emergency medical services (EMS) helicopter was on a night, over-water flight in visual meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were en route to pick up a patient on a barrier island. The pilot flew over the water with the autopilot engaged (altitude acquisition mode), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. While en route, the pilot unsuccessfully attempted to contact the fire department on the island to obtain landing zone information. When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. Unable to contact the fire department, the pilot likely became preoccupied with the task as well as the visual acquisition of the landing. The descent-power setting, which was manually controlled by the pilot, was not adequate to capture the selected altitude, and maintain 60 knots. As designed, the helicopter likely continued its descent with the autopilot engaged until it impacted the water. The pilot observed an amber indication on the primary flight display just before impact, which indicated the autopilot was engaged, and confirmed this most likely scenario. A post-accident examination of the helicopter revealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies. After the impact, the dispatcher initiated a re-boot of her computer, rather than a search for the helicopter, when the helicopter's movement stopped on her screen. However, the fire department on scene initiated a search, and the crewmembers were rescued within a short timeframe. Had the crewmembers sustained serious injuries during the accident, the dispatcher's failure to initiate a search may have reduced the survivability of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 17, 2009, at 0031 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter EC-145, N911LZ, operated by the Lee County Division of Public Safety, as MedStar 1, was substantially damaged when it impacted water near North Captiva Island, Florida. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. The medical evacuation positioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the pilot, she received a call around midnight for a patient pickup on North Captiva Island. After departure from FMY, she flew west over the water, with the autopilot engaged (set on altitude hold), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The helicopter remained at 1,000 feet to assure obstruction clearance (towers on Pine Island). After passing over the towers, the pilot descended to 800 feet, using the autopilot. At the same time, she was attempting to contact the Captiva Fire Department (FD) on the radio. The pilot reported she tried to call the FD 4 or 5 times with no response, and then contacted Lee County Dispatch to confirm which frequency the FD was using. When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. She continued toward the airfield and made a final transmission to the FD that she was "one minute out." The pilot commented to the medical crew that she could see the FD moving fire trucks to the center of the landing zone (a grass airstrip). She stated she wasn't concerned that she could not reach the FD since she was landing on an airfield, and was familiar with the obstructions in the landing zone. The pilot could not remember the exact sequence of the final 500-foot descent; however, at some point she remembered the medical crew commenting they "couldn't see anything." She responded, that the flight to Captiva is usually very dark over the water and there's "never anything to see." She remembered turning on the search light and shortly after, impacting the water. She also stated she thought she "pulled power and cyclic" when she saw the water; but didn't have time to warn the crew. After the helicopter impacted the water, it flipped over and was submerged within seconds. The pilot had flown to North Captiva Island numerous times prior to the accident flight. She reported that the "sight picture was the same as previous flights;" however, the pilot did remember that during the accident just prior to impact, she saw an amber altitude alert on the primary flight display. The pilot did not remember ever disconnecting the autopilot during the flight, and knew she was "at the controls at impact." The pilot additionally reported no mechanical problems with the helicopter. Both paramedics reported the flight was routine (with the exception of being unable to contact the FD), until they were within a few minutes of landing at North Captiva Island. At that time, they commented that they "couldn't see anything" outside of the helicopter. They observed what appeared to be rain outside the helicopter; however, since they knew it was not raining at the time, they thought this was the rotorwash from the water below. The helicopter then immediately impacted the water, flipped over, and the cabin filled with water within 5 seconds. According to the Upper Captiva Fire Department, MEDSTAR transport was requested at 0000 EDT, for a head trauma patient. At 0015, the personnel on-scene could hear the helicopter, but were unable to reach the pilot on the radio. They attempted contact with the helicopter on VHF frequency 122.750 and the "air ops" 800 MHz frequency. They attempted to contact MEDSTAR until 0021, at which time a witness reported that he observed an aircraft impact the water. The Fire Department launched their rescue boat, while they continued to attempt to contact MEDSTAR on the radio. At 0044, personnel on the Fire Department rescue boat reported all three crewmembers had been rescued and were on the boat. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. She also held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on February 24, 2009. At that time, the pilot reported 5,800 hours of total flight experience. The pilot reported 21 years of EMS flying experience. She began her career in fixed-wing aircraft, and in 1982, completed U.S. Army Flight School. She flew helicopters for the National Guard and in 1988 began employment with another Part 135 EMS operator. The pilot was hired by Lee County in 1998. Since then, she flew the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm/Eurocopter BO-105 and then the EC-145 (beginning in 2003). According to records provided by Lee County, the pilot had accumulated 6,061 hours of total flight experience, 621 of which were in the accident helicopter. She had 4,810 hours of total rotorcraft flight experience, 28 of which were in the previous 90 days, and 11 were in the previous 30 days. The pilot had accumulated 1,975 hours of night experience, 14 of which were in the previous 90 days and 5 of which were in the previous 30 days. The pilot' most recent training was employer provided factory recurrent training in July 2009. The factory recurrent training included ground instruction and flight instruction in the accident aircraft. The pilot's also completed a Part 135 Airman Proficiency Check on April 9, 2009 in the accident helicopter. The check flight was completed in 1.5 flight hours, and the pilot received a "satisfactory" rating. In a post-accident interview, the pilot was asked about the possibility of fatigue during the accident flight. She stated she did not feel fatigued at all. Although this was her seventh night on duty, she had adapted to the night shift. She normally slept from about 1000-1500 when she worked nights. On the night prior to the accident, she did not receive any calls while on duty so she rested between 2200-0000, and 0400-0700. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The Eurocopter EC-145 helicopter was manufactured in 2003, and Lee County was the only owner. The helicopter was powered by two Turbomeca Arriel 1E2 turboshaft engines. The most recent inspection performed on the helicopter was a 100-hour inspection, completed on August 14, 2009. At that time, the helicopter had accumulated 2,979 hours of total time. Radar Altimeter (RA) The accident helicopter was equipped with a radar altimeter. According to the pilot, she could not remember to what altitude the radar altimeter was set for the accident flight. She additionally reported that a pilot must set the radar altimeter prior to every flight, as it defaults to 0 at shutdown. The accident pilot stated that the company procedure required setting the radar altimeter at 500 feet for night flights, and 300 feet during the day. According to an email sent from the chief pilot to all pilots on April 30, 2009, pilots were required to set the radar altimeter to at least 250 feet as a warning on all flights. According to the helicopter manufacturer, the decision height flag on the radar altimeter is displayed when the radio height is lower than the selected decision height. In addition to the decision height flag, an audio alarm is also given, as well as a brown colored symbol (radio height zero) displayed on the barometric altimeter. Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) The accident helicopter was equipped with TAWS, which would have given the pilot an aural and visual indication of the helicopter's proximity to terrain. The accident pilot reported the TAWS was selected to the terrain page during the approach to North Captiva Island. She stated she heard a terrain warning during her descent; however, that was not uncommon during a descent for landing (at altitudes below 1,000 feet). The Manager of Aircraft Operations reported if the system was set correctly, the pilot should have also observed a solid red screen to display the low altitude warning. Night Vision Goggles (NVG’s) According to the Manager of Aircraft Operations, at the time of the accident, pilots had not completed training in NVG’s yet, and the program had not been approved by the FAA. He estimated that NVG’s would be fully implemented by December 2009. MaxViz The accident helicopter was equipped with a Max Viz system, an operational infrared night vision imaging system. The enhanced vision system was designed to improve situational awareness in all phases of rotor-wing flight operations. Autopilot System Description The accident helicopter was equipped with an automatic flight control system (AFCS). The AFCS consisted, in part, of two dual electronic modules (autopilot modules - APMs) which acquire helicopter angles and rates, compute AFCS control laws (basic stabilization and upper modes functions) and transmit them to the actuators. Another component of the AFCS is the self-monitored duplex series actuators of the smart electro-mechanical (SEMA) type for pitch and roll axes. Simplex SEMA is used for the directional axis. The autopilot mode selector (APMS) for AFCS engagement and mode selection is located in the center console. Additional controls are located on cyclic sticks and collective levers. The push buttons on the APMS are of the momentary push-type, whereas the push buttons for heading (HDG) and altitude acquisition (ALT.A) modes are rotary knobs. The APMS also features illumination for mode status indication. The APMS enables the pilot to perform the following: Preflight test Engagement/disengagement of both APMs Engagement/disengagement of autotrim Engagement/disengagement of the following upper modes: • VOR/LOC approach (APP) • Heading acquisition and hold (HDG) • Navigation in combination with an NMS (NAV) • Altitude acquisition (ALT.A) • Glide slope (GS) • Vertical speed hold (VS) • Indicated airspeed hold (IAS) • Altitude hold (ALT) The cyclic stick also contains controls for the AFCS. The SAS/AP CUT button disengages the SAS (3-axis backup SAS) and disengages the AFCS. The BEEP TRIM control modifies the attitude reference in ATT mode and modifies IAS, ALT, ALT.A, HDG, GA or VS reference when the respective mode is engaged. The AP MD DCPL button cancels all upper modes and reverts to ATT mode. For upper mode engagement of the AFCS, the airspeed has to be above 60 knots. At airspeeds below 26 knots, any previously engaged upper mode will be automatically disengaged. To engage the AP1/AP2 control a pilot must press the respective AP push button. The illumination "OFF" would then extinguish (the default mode after powering up the helicopter is AP off). To disengage the AP, a pilot must press the respective AP push button which then becomes illuminated "OFF." Additionally, pressing the SAS/AP CUT push button on the cyclic stick results in disengagement of all stabilization systems, and the pilot must fly "hands-on" at that point. The ALT function of the AFCS maintains the current barometric altitude. To activate this function the pilot must press the ALT push button which then becomes illuminated "ON." The reference will be synchronized to the barometric altitude at the time of engagement. To disengage the ALT function, a pilot has three options. He/she can press the ALT push button on the APMS, and the illumination "ON" will then extinguish. The pilot can also press the AP MD DCPL push button on the cyclic stick. The autopilot will then revert to ATT mode. Or, the pilot can engage the GA, IAS, ALT.A, VS, or GS mode. To temporarily override the ALT function, the pilot can apply fore or aft motion of the cyclic. Additionally, if the pilot applies fore or aft motion of the BEEP TRIM switch on the cyclic stick, the altitude reference will slow at 1500 ft/min. The reference is indicated by a green bug on the PFD ALT scale, and on the AFCS strip of PFD, a green ALT label is displayed in the area of engaged mode axis. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The weather reported at FMY, at 0053, included winds from 060 degrees at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 25 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.07 inches mercury. All three crewmembers reported the weather was "clear" at the time of the accident, and the visibility was "good." WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The helicopter impacted the Intercoastal waterway, about 1/2 mile east of North Captiva Island, off of Pine Island. It was recovered from 6-8 feet of water about midnight on August 17, 2009, and transported to a secure facility. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the helicopter after it was recovered. According to the inspector, flight control continuity was established and no anomalies were noted with the helicopter's engines. The tailboom separated from the helicopter fuselage during the accident. Additionally, substantial damage was noted to the fuselage and main rotor blades. SURVIVAL ASPECTS After the helicopter impacted the water, it flipped over, and crewmembers estimated it filled with water within 5 seconds. They estimated the helicopter was in about 6-7 feet of water, about 200 yards off shore when it came to rest. The first flight paramedic was seated in the rear of the helicopter, on the left side, facing aft. After the impact, he reached for the door handle and was able to open it and egress from the helicopter. The second flight paramedic was seated on the right side of the helicopter, facing forward. After the impact, he reached for the door handle on his side of the helicopter. He was able to slide the door about 5 inches before it became stuck. He then egressed through a 12-inch gap between his door and the pilot's door. The pilot was seated in the front, right seat of the helicopter. After the impact, she was also able to open her door and exit from it. All three crewmembers were wearing their seat belts and shoulder harnesses, as well as helmets. Additionally, they had completed water survival (egress) training about three months prior to the accident flight. The crewmembers estimated they surfaced within 10 seconds of impact. They climbed onto the belly of the helicopter and used whistles and flashlights to attract the attention of the fire department. The three crewmembers were not wearing life preservers during the accident flight; however, they were carried on the helicopter. After the impact, the crewmembers discussed going back into the helicopter to retrieve the life preservers; however, they agreed the helicopter was relatively stable and they were rescued after a short time. As a result of the accident, the company now requires pilots and flight paramedics to wear a life preserver from takeoff to landing on every flight. TESTS AND RESEARCH The following components from the accident helicopter were sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for further examination: L-3 Targa Data Recorder with PCMCIA Data card installed, Garmin model GNS-430 GPS/NAV/Com, Garmin model GNS-530 GPS/NAV/Com, Technisonic TDFM-6158 Com Unit, ECT Industries Boitier Helicopter Monitoring Type 704 unit. According to the Specialist's Factual Report, all of the components contained significant corrosion due to their immersion in salt water during the accident. The L-3 Targa Data Recorder was capable of recording several hours of flight and engine data to the removable PCMCIA memory card. The Garmin units were capable of recording the last two (primary/standby) radio and navigation frequencies in battery backed up volatile memory. They did not store any GPS track data. The Technisonic Comm Unit did not store any useful data in internal memory. The ECT Industries Boitier Helicopter Monitoring unit did not contain any internal memory. No data was recovered from either of the Garmin units. The internal batteries that held the memory alive were completely depleted
The pilot's failure to arrest the helicopter's descent, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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