Moab, UT, USA
N520NE
CESSNA 402C
The pilot noted that there were no Notice to Airman (NOTAMs) indicating an airport closure when he decided to depart on the cargo flight. He said that the runway surface had a thin snow covering and that light snow was falling. During the takeoff roll, about 1/4 of the way down the runway, the airplane encountered deeper snow and began to veer to the left of the runway centerline. The pilot attempted to correct to no avail and opted to abort the takeoff. The airplane exited the left side of the runway, coming to rest beside the runway with its nose pointed about 90 degrees from the runway heading and with a collapsed nose gear. The airport manager and other witnesses on the airport stated that the runway had a 4- to 5-inch snow layer and that heavy snow was falling. The airport manager said that at the time of the accident, he was in the process of closing the airport for snow removal operations since the runway snow cover was in excess of 2 inches. The 14 CFR Part 139 Airport Certification Manual stated that snow removal operations are to be initiated when accumulations reach 2 inches of dry snow (maximum allowed), and the airport manager is responsible for using one of four pieces of airport-owned snow removal equipment or notifying the appropriate county department to begin snow removal. There was no indication that the airport manager attempted to get the county's snow removal equipment to the airport prior to the accident. The ACM further says that the runway will be closed for aircraft use if it has more than 1/2 inch of slush or 2 inches of dry snow. The airport manager did not attempt to close the runway until the snow was 4 to 5 inches deep, in contrast to the ACM guidelines. He commented that there is limited amount of snow removal resources at the airport and he was "waiting for the snow to let up" before he began snow removal operations.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 22, 2009, about 1700 mountain standard time, a Cessna 402C, N520NE, veered off the runway surface and collapsed the nose landing gear at Canyonlands Field Airport, Moab, Utah. AeroLynx was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The cargo flight was originating in Moab with a planned destination of Price, Utah. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed. In a written statement, the pilot reported that prior to departure he received the latest weather report and checked for Notice to Airman (NOTAMs) via Aviation Digital Data Service and FltPlan.com. He taxied to runway 21 and performed the appropriate pre takeoff procedures, which included obtaining the latest weather information. He noted that the runway surface had a thin snow covering and light snow continued to fall. During the takeoff roll the airplane encountered a "snow bank," resulting in a loss of forward momentum and veering tendency to the left of the runway centerline. The pilot attempted to correct to no avail; he opted to abort the takeoff. The left main landing gear veered off the runway surface and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest on the snow covered ground left of the runway, with its nose pointed about 90 degrees from the runway heading. The pilot egressed the airplane and observed that a snow bank was across the runway about 1/4 of the way down the runway, where the snow was deeper than it had been at the departure end. The bank appeared to be the point where airport personnel had discontinued the snow removal from the surface. He noted that snow removal at the airport had been continuous throughout the day and that there were no NOTAMs indicating an airport closure. A sherriff's deputy who responded to the accident spoke with the pilot shortly after the accident. According to the deputy's report, when the airport manager told the pilot that the deputy needed to query the pilot as to what had happened, the pilot responded "what I lost direction control." At the time the pilot was speaking on the telephone with someone from his company, who apparently relayed that the pilot should not speak to the deputy. The deputy asked the pilot why his company did not want him to speak with him, to which the pilot replied that he guessed that they were afraid he might "say something dumb." The airport manager responded to the accident immediately after it occurred. He stated that the airplane began the takeoff roll left of the centerline for runway 21. It continued to veer to the left and eventually the left main gear departed the runway surface into deep snow. It appeared that as the airplane's main landing gear made contact with the snow, the airplane rotated sideways and slid about 300 feet into the safety area. The airport manager further stated that at the time of the accident, there was "heavy" snow falling with winds from the northwest at 5 to 15 miles per hour, and he estimated that the runway surface had a snow cover about 4 to 5 inches deep. He commented that there is limited amount of snow removal resources at the airport and he was "waiting for the snow to let up" before he began snow removal operations. He additionally reported that while the pilot was attempting to depart, he was in the process of closing the airport since the runway snow cover was in excess of 2 inches, which is the maximum amount allowed as dictated by the Airport Certification Manual. Although he was not on the airport property at the time of the accident, he had contacted the Cedar City Flight Service Station (FSS) to issue a NOTAM for the airport closure, which was in effect from approximately 1700 the day of the accident to 0130 the following day. He acquired a large plow to assist with clearing the airport about 2245 the evening of the accident. A pilot employed at a fixed based operator (FBO) on the airport stated the he regularly flies a Cessna 207 on the same route AeroLynx does, transporting cargo roundtrip from Moab to Price. He reported that the day of the accident he chose not to fly, as the weather did not permit safe operations, due to low visibility and heavy snow. Instead the cargo was driven via automobile that day. He added that when he heard about the accident he was surprised that someone had attempted to depart in such inclement weather conditions. A mechanic employed with the aforementioned FBO stated the pilot indicated he wanted to depart around 1700 to 1730. The mechanic pulled the airplane out of the hangar and the pilot asked him if the airport manager was "out on the runway plowing." The mechanic responded by saying that he did not know, but recommended the pilot call the airport manager over the local frequency, since the plows were all equipped with radios. The mechanic further stated that he watched as the airplane began the departure roll, gradually increasing power until about 500 feet down the runway, where it appeared to be at full power. The snow was kicking up from the landing gear and he lost sight of the airplane, which he thought was because of the reduced visibility. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A routine aviation weather report (METAR) for Canyonlands Field Airport was issued at 1653, or 7 minutes prior to the accident. It stated: visibility 3/4 mile; 1,500 foot overcast cloud layer, with few clouds at 800 feet; light snow and mist; temperature 23 degrees Fahrenheit; dew point 20 degrees Fahrenheit; and altimeter 29.62 inHg. At 1723, the report was updated to reflect visibility had increased to 1.5 miles with the overcast layer at 2,200 feet and broken clouds at 1,500 feet. AERODROME INFORMATION Canyonlands Field is a public airport operating under FAR Part 139; it is comprised of asphalt runway 03/21, which stretches 7,100 feet long and is 75 feet wide. The airport is equipped with an on-site Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS), providing 24-hour service on frequency 118.525 MHZ. The snow removal operations in effect at the time of the accident were to be conducted as outlined in the Airport Certification Manual (ACM). In section 313, Snow and Ice Control 139.313, the manual dictates that in the event that the airport receives an accumulation of snow or ice, 4 different vehicles are assigned to the airport for snow removal. With regards to snow removal, it states that "Snow removal operations will be initiated when accumulations reach 0.5 inches or more of slush or 2 inches of dry snow." It continued that, "The Canyonlands Field Airport Manager or Airport Technicians are responsible for notifying Grand County Road Department to begin snow removal," and that "The Grand County Road Department hours of operation are 7:00 AM to 5:30 PM [1700], Monday through Thursday." The accident occurred about 1700 on a Tuesday evening. The ACM further states that the "Runway will be closed for aircraft use if it has more than 1/2-inch of slush or 2 inches of dry snow." Additionally, "The Airport Manager or Airport Technicians will check snow depth accumulation during stormy weather," and "Upon determination that snow removal is required, Operations will post a Notice To Airmen (NOTAM) through the Cedar City Flight Service Station." The manual added that "During after hour’s snow events, Airport Technicians will report to the airport early to verify conditions and notify the County Road Maintenance Department of needed snow removal." The airport manager stated that snow removal equipment at the airport is limited, not to availability, but in its size and capacity. Auxiliary snow removal equipment to be used is the property of the Grand County Road Department, and the supply is not always immediately available because of other higher priority areas and their limited amount of equipment. He further stated that the airport does not frequently receive snow cover with the current winter being the exception. There was no record of him contacting the Grand County Road Department. The airport manager reported that the record for snow removal operations or any other airfield condition would be noted by two methods: the Self Inspection form and/or in the NOTAM log. He does not have friction measuring equipment. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION According to FltPlan.com the pilot last received a weather briefing at 1516 on the day of the accident. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reviewed the damaged and determined that damage incurred to the forward bulkhead, just aft of the radar would require a major repair.
The pilot's decision to depart on a snow covered runway, which resulted in a loss of control and encounter with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the airport manager's failure to adhere to the Airport Certification Manual and close the runway due to unsafe snow accumulation.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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