Humacao, PR, USA
N764EL
LUCIANO EDISON HA-2 SPORTSTER
Witnesses reported hearing the engine operate at a reduced power setting as the flight was taking off, remaining constant from the point of takeoff to the moment of impact. The gyrocraft was observed climbing to approximately 100 feet and banking hard to the left before it began to descend. A witness noted that the gyrocraft was in a 45-degree nose-low attitude, which he perceived was the pilot's attempt to gain airspeed. Postaccident inspection of the engine revealed that the right magneto was inoperative and several out-of-specification discrepancies were noted with both magnetos, consistent with a lack of maintenance.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 3, 2010, about 1730 Atlantic standard time, an experimental amateur-built Edison HA-2 Sportster gyrocraft, N764EL, registered to a private individual, crashed into an open field approximately .4 nautical mile southwest from Humacao Airport (X63), Humacao, Puerto Rico. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal, local flight from X63. The gyrocraft sustained substantial damage. The student pilot, the sole occupant was killed. The flight originated about 1 minute earlier. A witness reported that the pilot arrived at X63 about 1530 with the gyrocraft on a trailer, and inspected the gyrocraft before installing the main rotor blades. The witness then observed the pilot perform a preflight inspection. The pilot put on a helmet, started the engine and taxied to runway 28. The witness reported the gyrocraft crow hopped, or became airborne momentarily, and then landed and returned to the ramp. The pilot secured the engine and informed the witness that he had a problem with the main rotor blade. The witness observed the pilot remove the main rotor blades, adjust them, then reinstall them with the assistance of two individuals. The pilot restarted the engine and taxied to runway 28, and began the takeoff roll. The witness thought the pilot was going to do a crow hop again, but the flight continued climbing to between 50 and 100 feet, flying past his position. About 15 seconds later, the witness observed the gyrocraft bank to the left and began losing altitude. After turning 180 degrees the gyrocraft continued losing altitude and impacted the ground. A witness with 500-hour as a gyrocraft pilot reported that after the first short duration flight, the pilot adjusted the lead-lag of the main rotor blades. Following the adjustment he observed the pilot taxi to runway 28, and begin the takeoff roll. The gyrocraft became airborne at about the runway midpoint and climbed to an estimated altitude of 50 feet, then leveled off. The gyrocraft continued flying over the runway and was at an estimated altitude of 100 feet when the flight was over the departure end of the runway. The witness reported that the engine was running smooth but he perceived by the sound level that the engine was not at full power; he perceived it was operating at 50 percent power. The gyrocraft banked "hard left" and began sinking. The witness noted the gyrocraft was in a 45 degree nose low attitude which he perceived was the pilot's attempt to gain airspeed. He lost sight of the gyrocraft and was informed of the accident. He further stated that the engine sound remained the same from takeoff to the impact; he did not perceive a change in sound. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 43, was issued a third class student pilot medical certificate on February 4, 2010, with a limitation to have available glasses for near vision. He reported on the application for the certificate having 40 hours flight time. GYROCRAFT INFORMATION According to FAA records, the gyrocraft was manufactured in 1999, as model HA-2 Sportster, and was designated serial number 91966. It was powered by a 160 horsepower Lycoming O-320-2B engine and equipped with a fixed pitch Sensenich wood propeller. The permanent maintenance records were not located. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A surface observation weather report taken at Luis Munoz Marin International Airport (SJU), San Juan, Puerto Rico, at 1756, or approximately 26 minutes after the accident, indicates the wind was from 010 degrees at 7 knots, and the visibility was 10 statute miles. Broken clouds existed at 4,800 feet, the temperature and dew point were 26 and 17 degrees Celsius respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.90 inches of Mercury. The accident site was located approximately 21 nautical miles and 148 degrees from SJU. A pilot-rated witness who was at X63 at the time of the accident reported the wind was from the northwest at less than 5 knots. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The gyrocraft crashed into an open field and the wreckage was recovered before FAA arrival the following morning. The crash site was located at 18 degrees 08.0166 minutes North latitude and 065 degrees 48.3346 minutes West longitude, or approximately .4 nautical mile and 226 degrees from the center of the departure airport. Examination of the wreckage following recovery by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed the cockpit enclosure was separated. The left seat restraints (lapbelt and shoulder harness) remained connected consistent with the seat being unoccupied, while the right seat restraint exhibited evidence of use. The engine with attached wood propeller remained attached to the structure, though the upper engine mounts were fractured. The throttle and mixture controls were continuous from the cockpit to the carburetor. The rotor head was separated; one main rotor blade remained secured to the hub bar while the other main rotor blade was separated from the hub bar. The main rotor blade that remained secured to the hub bar exhibited an upward bend near the hub bar and also a smooth radius downward and aft bent about midspan. The blade also exhibited dirt adhering to the upper surface from the blade tip inward about midspan. The main rotor blade that was separated from the hub bar exhibited a large smooth radius down bend beginning about 2/3 span of the blade. Examination of the engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Both magnetos were properly timed to the engine. Rotation of the engine by hand produced spark at the spark plugs for the ignition leads connected to the left magneto, while the right magneto did not produce spark at any ignition lead. Further inspection of the right magneto revealed the "P-lead" was not connected to the magneto. Both magnetos were retained for further examination. Examination of the air induction system revealed the airbox was dirty internally. Examination of the carburetor revealed the floats were intact and moved freely; no holes were visible. The throttle movement was good with no binding noted. The fuel filters were clean with no obstructions. Examination of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed debris in the housing; the diaphragm was intact. Examination of the propeller revealed one blade was splintered spanwise, while the remaining blade exhibited slight nicks/dents on the leading edge. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by the Institute of Forensic Sciences, San Juan, Puerto Rico. The cause of death was listed as “severo trauma corporal”, or severe body trauma. Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Toxicology testing was also performed by the Institute of Forensic Sciences, San Juan, Puerto Rico. The toxicology report by FAA stated the results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and tested drugs. The toxicology report by the Institute of Forensic Sciences was negative for volatiles, cocaine, opiates, and cannabinoides. TESTS AND RESEARCH Examination of both magnetos was performed with FAA oversight at a certified repair station. The left magneto was placed on a test bench as received and no spark was produced. The P-lead was momentarily placed to ground and the magneto was then noted to produce spark at all leads throughout the rpm test range. Following bench testing, the magneto was disassembled which revealed oil contamination and internal corrosion. The coil primary and secondary resistance measured .5 and 16,700 ohms respectively. The specified coil primary and secondary resistance readings are .2 to .6 and 12,000 to 16,000 ohms. The point e-gap was 12 degrees (specification is 6 degrees to 14 degrees), and the contact point gap measured 0.008 inch (specification is 0.012 to 0.024 inch). No cracks were noted on the distributor block or gear. The capacitor measured 0.75 microfarad (new capacitors test at 0.50 microfarads). Inspection of the impulse coupling revealed it was a riveted style with loose rivets. The right magneto was placed on a test bench as received and no spark was produced. Following the attempted bench testing, the magneto was disassembled which revealed oil contamination and internal corrosion. The coil primary and secondary resistance measured .5 and 17,300 ohms respectively. The specified primary and secondary resistance readings are .2 to .6 and 12,000 to 16,000 ohms. The point e-gap was grounded; no reading was obtained (specification is 6 degrees to 14 degrees), and the contact point gap measured 0.010 inch (specification is 0.012 to 0.024 inch). No cracks were noted on the distributor block or gear. The capacitor measured 0.70 microfarad (new capacitors test at 0.50 microfarads). No grease was noted in the bearings, the oil seal was noted to be “worn out”, and the oil deflector was “loose.”
The failure of the pilot to maintain control of the gyrocraft while maneuvering after takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s operation of the gyrocraft with an inoperative right magneto.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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