San Diego, CA, USA
N444YP
Advertising MGMT & Consulting Velocity Super XLRG5
In a postaccident interview, the pilot reported that he did not remember taxiing out for takeoff with the right passenger door open but that he did remember that the right door was open after takeoff and that he advised the control tower operator of his intention to return to the airport. The pilot recalled that, during the return maneuver, there was a vibration, as if the door had come off and struck the rear-mounted propeller, which prompted him to make an emergency landing on a nearby golf course. A witness at the airport reported seeing the right passenger door open during taxi and takeoff. The right passenger door was located about 1 mile west-southwest of the accident site. A postaccident examination revealed that the door’s locking mechanism was intact and that the lower forward section of the door showed black rubber signature marks that were consistent with contact with the engine drive belt, which was found separated from the engine. Additionally, the cambered surfaces of each of the three propeller blades exhibited rubber impact marks. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preaccident anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A flight instructor reported that, during a postaccident conversation, the pilot told him that he simply missed locking the copilot door and that this resulted in the separation of the door from the airframe.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 2, 2010, about 1300 Pacific daylight time, an experimental Advertising MGMT & Consulting Velocity Super XLRG5, N444YP, was substantially damaged following an emergency landing while maneuvering near San Diego, California. The private pilot and two passengers sustained serious injuries, and two passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and a flight plan was not filed. The planned cross-country flight, which was being operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, had departed Montgomery Field (MYF), San Diego, California, about 1245. The flight’s destination was reported to be the Fullerton Municipal Airport (FUL), Fullerton, California. In a telephone interview with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC), which took place about two and one-half months after the accident due to the pilot's injuries, the pilot reported that after starting the engine and taxiing to the runway for a west departure, he did not remember the right cockpit/cabin door being open. The pilot stated that after takeoff he remembered turning to the south and then the right door being open, at which time he contacted the airport control tower to advise them of the opened door and that he would be coming back around to land. The pilot further stated that he thought he remembered a vibration, as if the door had come off and hit the propeller, which is why he elected to land on the golf course instead of trying to make it back to land at the departure airport. The pilot added that he did not remember making the approach to the landing, the landing, or the impact. In a report submitted to the IIC about 5 months after the accident, the pilot stated that the passenger door came open right after takeoff and that he advised the airport control tower that he was declaring an emergency and would be coming back around to land. The pilot added that the door then separated from the airplane and went through the rear propeller, which he said forced him to land on a golf course. The pilot stated that he did not remember anything after informing the control tower that he was going to land on a golf course. In a statement submitted to the IIC, a witness who was at MYF on the day of the accident reported that he observed the pilot preflight the airplane. The witness stated that the pilot was attending to the rear of the airplane and continued to attend [to] the engine, which he thought was for a rather long time. The witness reported that after the pilot boarded the airplane he closed his door, started the engine and taxied to the departure runway. The witness added that he noticed that while the airplane was taxiing the passenger door was still open. The witness stated that he then watched the airplane depart runway 27R and make a left crosswind turn, then another left turn to downwind. The witness reported that as the airplane departed the passenger door was open, as it was sticking up over the fuselage. The witness further stated that the pilot appeared to be having difficulty maintaining a straight and level attitude, but was able to maintain altitude downwind. A second witness, who resides on the approach pattern to MYF, reported in a statement submitted to the IIC that on the day of the accident he heard an aircraft very low over head, less than 100 feet above ground level, whose engine sounded different. The witness reported that the engine sound was varying from full open to almost stalling and back again, and all settings in between. The witness stated that it did not make a popping sound, and that he did not go outside to visually sight the airplane. In a statement provided by the accident pilot’s flight instructor, who conducted the initial test flight of the airplane as well as numerous maintenance and training flights with the accident pilot, the instructor pilot reported that at no time did he detect any anomalies with either the pilot or copilot doors or their associated locking mechanisms. The instructor pilot also revealed that during a post accident conversation with the accident pilot, [the pilot] indicated that he simply missed locking the copilot door (item on the Before Take-off Check List) prior to departure, which subsequently resulted in the separation of the door from the airframe and resulting in the accident. PERSONNEL INFORMATION A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the 46-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land. The pilot was issued a third-class medical certificate on April 22, 2009. No limitations or waivers were noted. An examination of the pilot’s logbook indicated that the last entry was on July 6, 2010, about a month prior to the accident. As of that date, the pilot had accumulated a total flight time of 196.3 hours, with 83.9 hours in make and model, all of which were in the accident airplane. In the 90 days, 60 days, and 30 days prior to the accident, the pilot logged 28.5 hours, 7 hours, and 3.6 hours respectively, all in the accident airplane. The pilot’s most recent flight review was conducted in the accident airplane on April 16, 2010. On April 17, 2009, while practicing takeoffs and landings, the pilot reported having landed gear up in the accident airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The Velocity Super XLRG5, serial number 3RX124, is a 5-passenger, experimental/amateur built fixed wing, retractable gear, single-engine airplane. It was issued an FAA airworthiness certificate on October 29, 2007. The airplane was powered by an aft-mounted, rear-facing Continental Motors IO-550-N reciprocating engine, rated at 310 horsepower. According to maintenance records provided by the pilot, the airframe and engine were most recently inspected in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation Part 43, Appendix D, on February 6, 2010, at a tachometer time of 137.0 hours. Both the airframe and engine were found to be in a condition for safe operations on this date. Engine logbook entries revealed that due to a propeller strike as a result of a gear up landing, the engine was removed from the airframe on June 26, 2009, at a tach time of 137.0 hours; the engine was reinstalled on February 6, 2010. It was also revealed that the engine was equipped with a supercharger assembly. According to the Continental Motors representative who was a party to the investigation, this would increase the rated 310 horsepower to an unknown number. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1253, the MYF weather reporting system reported wind 280 degrees at 7 knots, sky clear, temperature 23 degrees Celsius, dew point 14 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter reading of 29.95 inches of Mercury. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspector who examined the accident site, the airplane impacted a golf course fairway and then skipped over a green and into a cart path before coming to rest inverted in ice plant adjacent to a tee box. The location of the accident site was about 2.3 nautical miles (nm) east of the departure runway. According to the inspector, an examination of the wreckage revealed that all components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. However, the right passenger door was not located with the wreckage; the door was subsequently located about 1 mile west-southwest of the accident site. TESTS AND RESEARCH An NTSB investigator inspected the airframe at the facilities of Aircraft Recovery Services, Pearblossom, California. The investigator reported that an examination of the right passenger door, which had separated in flight, revealed that the window was fractured and partially absent and void of any strike/transfer marks. It was also noted that the window’s top inner frame was separated and missing. Additionally, the door locking mechanism was intact, which consisted of 1 actuator driving 4 lock pins, and also a locking mechanism for the actuator/linkage. The upper segment of outer door skin was separated from the door and its hinges. The lower forward corner of the door exhibited an impact gash and rubber impact marks. Under the supervision of the NTSB investigator, the airplane’s engine was examined at the facilities of Aircraft Recovery Services, Pearblossom, California, by a representative from Continental Motors Inc. The examination revealed that the top side of the number 5 cylinder cooling fins had damage, and that the 1, 3 and 5 upper deck reference line from the supercharger had separated from a fitting. The supercharger to throttle body coupling band clamps overlapped each other and both forward and aft drive belts separated from the engine. It was also noted during the examination that the cambered surfaces of each of the 3 propeller blades exhibited rubber impact marks. The technician concluded that the inspection of the engine did not reveal any other anomalies that would have prevented normal operation and production of rated horsepower.
The pilot did not close and secure the right passenger door, which resulted in an in-flight separation of the door and subsequent loss of engine power due to the door’s collision with the rear-mounted engine assembly.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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