Fort Worth, TX, USA
N6018U
HAWKER BEECHCRAFT 76
On a training flight, the flight instructor reduced the right engine power to simulate an engine failure. During simulated shutdown and feathering, the right engine was inadvertently shut down and the propeller feathered. After several unsuccessful attempts to restart the right engine, the pilot receiving instruction maneuvered the airplane to land. The airplane was on final approach about 1,000 feet above ground level (agl) and flying about 120 knots; the pilot receiving instruction lowered the landing gear, and the airplane began to slow and descend for a straight-in landing on the runway. The instructor stated that they would have a difficult time turning the airplane left onto the taxiway, so he suggested landing on a different runway, which would require a right turn onto the taxiway. The instructor then took control of the airplane and began a go-around with the landing gear still extended, despite published procedures to raise the landing gear during a go-around. However, the airplane continued to descend, and the airspeed continued to slow below the published one-engine-inoperative go-around procedure to maintain 85 knots minimum airspeed. The airplane was about 100 feet agl and slowing through 65 knots when the airplane suddenly banked to the right, which is indicative of a roll and loss of control at air minimum control airspeed (Vmca) of 65 knots. The airplane impacted terrain in a right-wing-down and nose-down attitude. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 26, 2011, about 0905 central daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation, model 76 multi-engine airplane, N6018U, impacted terrain while maneuvering in the vicinity of Hicks Airfield (T67) Fort Worth, Texas. The certified flight instructor (CFI), the pilot receiving instruction, and the passenger were seriously injured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Magnum Assets, Inc., and operated by Pro Aircraft under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a pilot training flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The local flight originated from T67 about 0850. The airplane was on a training flight and the CFI reported that he had intended to concentrate on one engine inoperative procedures. The pilot receiving instruction was in the left seat, the CFI was in the right seat, and the passenger was seated in the right rear. After takeoff, and while on a right crosswind leg, the certified flight instructor (CFI) pulled back on the power to simulate an engine failure on the right engine. During simulated shut-down and simulated feathering procedures the right engine was inadvertently shut down and the propeller feathered. With only the left engine operating the pilot receiving instruction continued a climb out to more than 1,000 feet above ground level (agl). After several unsuccessful attempts to unfeather the propeller and restart the right engine the pilot receiving instruction maneuvered the airplane to return to land at T67. The airplane was on final approach to runway 14 at about 1,000 feet agl and flying about 120 knots with the left engine operating and the right engine still shut down. The pilot receiving instruction lowered the landing gear and the airplane began slowing and descending for a straight-in landing on runway 14. The CFI then told the pilot receiving instruction that if they landed on runway 14 with the right engine shut down that they would have difficulty making a left turn to exit the runway and they should instead land on runway 32 in order to make a right turn to exit the runway. While entering a left downwind for runway 32 the CFI took over control of the airplane with the landing gear still down and the flaps up. The airplane continued to descend and the airspeed continued to slow. The pilot receiving instruction reported that he called out airspeeds to the CFI until the airplane was about 100 feet agl and slowing through 65 knots. The airplane then suddenly banked to the right and impacted terrain in a right wing down and nose down attitude. On impact the right wing separated, the nose of the airplane rotated to the right, and the fuselage slid around tail first before coming to rest upright. A postimpact fire ensued. The pilot receiving instruction reported that he was then seriously injured and could not walk or stand. He exited through the already open left cockpit door and rolled and crawled away from the airplane to clear the fire. The seriously injured passenger in the right rear seat exited the already open right door, unfastened the CFI's seat belt and shoulder harness and dragged the conscious, but seriously injured CFI out of the cockpit and about 15 feet from the airplane, which was then fully involved in flames. Several persons had witnessed the accident and they quickly responded and assisted the three victims, helping to move them further away from the flames. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Certified Flight Instructor The CFI, age 73, held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single and multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. In addition, he held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single and multiengine, and instrument airplane privileges. He was issued a second class airman medical certificate, with limitations, on August 25, 2011. The CFI reported that he had logged 11,532 hours of total flight experience; with about 2,163 hours in multi-engine airplanes, about 500 hours of which were logged in the same make and model as the accident airplane. Pilot The pilot receiving instruction, age 41, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single land, and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a second class airman medical certificate, with limitations, on January 5, 2011. The pilot receiving instruction estimated that he had logged about 199 hours of total flight experience. He also estimated that he had logged a total of 8 hours of experience in the accident airplane within the previous 30 days, all of which had been flight instruction from the CFI. Passenger The passenger, age 59, held a student pilot certificate. She was issued a third class airman medical certificate, with limitations, on May 11, 2011. The passenger reported that she had logged about 4 hours of flight instruction from the CFI, in a Cessna 152, single engine airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The four-seat, low-wing, retractable gear multi-engine airplane, serial number (s/n) ME-161, was manufactured in 1979. The left engine was a 180-hp Lycoming model O-360-A1G6D engine, serial number L-25958-36A, which drove a Hartzell model HC-M2YR-2CFUF 2-blade propeller. The right engine was a 180-hp Lycoming model O-360-A1G6D engine, serial number L-492-71A, which drove a Hartzell model HC-M2YR-20LBUF 2-blade propeller. A review of the airframe logbook showed that the most recent entry was made on April 7, 2011, which showed that an annual inspection had been completed at a tach time of 7,863.9 hours, or 15,725.8 total aircraft hours. The operator estimated that since the annual inspection the airplane had flown a total of 70.8 hours. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The closest official weather observation station was Fort Worth Alliance Airport (AFW), Fort Worth, Texas, located 6 nautical miles northeast from the accident site. The elevation of the weather observation station was 722 feet msl. The routine aviation weather report (METAR) for AFW, issued at 0853, reported wind from 180 degrees at 10 knots with gusts to 17 knots, visibility of 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 21 degrees C, dew point temperature 17 degrees C, with an altimeter setting of 29.88 inches of Mercury. COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR No record of any communications or radar contact with the accident airplane were found for the day of the accident. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The investigator-in-charge (IIC) performed an examination of the wreckage at the accident scene. The airplane impacted in open ranch lands on an impact path of 201 degrees about one mile west of T67. The cabin came to rest upright about 73 feet from the initial impact crater with the fuselage at rest oriented on a heading of about 60 degrees. A postimpact fire had spread around the wreckage path and the airplane. A large portion of the right wing, left wing, fuselage, cabin, instrument panel and portions of the aft fuselage were consumed by fire. The outboard portion of the right wing and the empennage revealed moderate to no fire damage. The left wing and left engine remained attached to the fuselage. The outboard section of the right wing and the right aileron was separated. The remainder of the right wing, with the right engine still attached, was separated from the main fuselage and came to rest upright. Flight control continuity for all three primary flight controls was mostly confirmed except for several areas where examination was not possible because of thermal or impact damage. The flap actuator was observed in an approximate flaps retracted position. The position of the hydraulically actuated landing gear could not be determined due to the separation of the right wing and the fire damage to both wings and to the cockpit area. The left and right wing fuel selector valves were observed to be in the main tank ON position. No preimpact position of the fuel selector handles in the cockpit could be determined. The left engine propeller remained attached to the mounting flange and was observed in an approximately fine pitch position. The left engine propeller blades displayed minor leading edge scratches and leading edge polishing, and did not show any noticeable bending or twisting. The left engine propeller spinner did not show any notable signatures of rotation at impact. The right engine propeller remained attached to the mounting flange and was observed in an approximately feathered position. The right engine propeller blades did not show any signatures of rotation at impact. The postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Maintenance Records The operator's main downstairs office lobby at T67 had separate discrepancy logbooks in loose leaf three-ring binders for each of the operator's airplanes. Each page of the discrepancy log had a place for the pilot to log the date and time of a problem. In the space below the pilot's entry there was a place for the mechanic to log the maintenance action taken and the date and time of that action. The IIC reviewed all pages of the discrepancy log for N6018V which covered the period beginning on May 21, 2008. The last complete discrepancy log entry for N6018U was on August 3, 2009 at a tach time of 7636.7. A review of discrepancy logbooks for all of the operator's other airplanes showed that they seemed to have more recent entries than the discrepancy logbook for N6018V. The discrepancy logbook for N6018V had no entries relating to any problems with unfeathering and no entries relating to any problems with an inflight engine restart. However, an entry on August 7, 2008, noted "right engine would not start. it sounds like the starter is stuck in the engaged position but engine will not turn". The discrepancy logbook maintenance action on August 8, 2008 was listed by the mechanic as "replaced starter w/ new starter". The IIC then reviewed the original aircraft maintenance logbooks which were provided by the operator. The maintenance logbooks for the airframe, both engines, and both propellers were reviewed for the period from 2008 thru April 7, 2011. The review did not show any logbook entries that correlated to any of the maintenance actions listed in the discrepancy logbook from May 21, 2008 to August 3, 2009. OPERATOR INFORMATION Magnum Assets, Inc., was listed as the registered owner of N6018U, and had a verbal lease agreement with Pro Aircraft for them to operate the accident airplane. Pro Aircraft held certificate number ZYFS200K, issued by the FAA, which authorized Pro Aircraft to operate as an FAA Part 141 pilot training school based at T67. Pro Aircraft was also authorized by the FAA to do business using the name Pro Aircraft Flight Training. The CFI was designated as the chief instructor for Pro Aircraft's Part 141 pilot training school. At the time of the accident Pro Aircraft was operating the accident airplane and nine single engine airplanes for their Part 141 pilot training. Pro Aircraft also used the same airplanes for pilot training under Part 61. According to the owner of Pro Aircraft the accident flight was an instructional flight with the instruction being given under the authority of Part 61. The pilot receiving instruction was not enrolled in a pilot training course under Part 141. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION According to the Beechcraft Duchess 76 Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual: the Limitations in section II state that the Air Minimum Control (Vmca) speed is 65 knots. The notes on Emergency Procedures in section III state that the speed for One-Engine-Inoperative Best Angle-of-Climb Vx) is 85 knots; the speed for One-Engine-Inoperative Best Rate-of-Climb Vy) is 85 knots; and the speed for One-Engine-Inoperative Landing, Final Approach (Flaps Down) is 85 knots. The notes on Emergency Procedures in section III state that the procedures for a One-Engine-Inoperative Go-Around are: 1. Power – MAXIMUM AVAILABLE 2. Landing Gear – UP 3. Wing Flaps – UP 4. Airspeed – MAINTAIN 85 KTS MINIMUM
The flight instructor's failure to maintain airspeed above the air minimum control airspeed (Vmca), which resulted in a loss of control and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the instructor's failure to follow published procedures to retract the landing gear and maintain 85 knots minimum airspeed during the one-engine-inoperative go-around maneuver.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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