Mulberry, FL, USA
N99168
ERCOUPE 415-C
The medically unqualified pilot filled the airplane’s fuel tanks and flew about 45 minutes to another airport, where the airplane remained on the ground about 2 hours and no fuel or maintenance services were performed. The pilot agreed to fly a passenger, who was a student pilot, to another airport. The passenger reported that, after boarding the airplane, he was not briefed on how to use the lapbelt, which the pilot secured for him. The passenger also reported that the pilot did not ask him his weight for the purpose of weight and balance calculations. The pilot did not perform a preflight inspection per the passenger’s account. Based on all available data from the pilot, maintenance records, and airplane documents located in the wreckage, the airplane was near or at its maximum gross weight at the time of engine start. After taxiing to the departure runway, the pilot did not perform an engine runup. He then taxied onto the grass runway, applied the brakes, and applied full power. The pilot reported that the airplane accelerated but not as fast as he thought it should have. The pilot reported that it took a long time to accelerate to 60 mph, and, about the point when he was considering aborting the takeoff, the airplane became airborne. After becoming airborne, the pilot stated that the airplane climbed to 400 feet, cleared power lines, then began descending. He maneuvered the airplane toward a clearing, and, while descending, the right wing collided with trees. The airplane then impacted the ground in a right-wing-low attitude and a fire ensued. The pilot and passenger exited the airplane. The passenger later reported having difficulty unlatching his restraint because he was not familiar with it. The delay in releasing his restraint most likely resulted in greater burn injury to the passenger than had it been immediately released. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no compression in three of the four cylinders, but this was most likely due to the postcrash fire. Further examination of the thermally damaged engine revealed that the left magneto produced spark when rotated by hand, but the right magneto did not produce spark. Postaccident inspection of the right magneto revealed extensive heat damage, which precluded operational testing; therefore, no determination could be made as to whether there was preimpact failure or malfunction of the right magneto. Based on available evidence, the airplane’s poor acceleration during takeoff was most likely due to being near or at its maximum gross weight and operating from a grass runway. The pilot should have aborted the takeoff once he recognized the airplane’s poor acceleration performance.
On November 19, 2011, about 1135 eastern standard time, an Ercoupe 415-C, N99168, registered to a private individual, was substantially damaged during a forced landing shortly after takeoff from South Lakeland Airport (X49), Mulberry, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from X49, to Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida. The sport pilot sustained minor injuries and the passenger sustained serious injuries due to burns. The flight originated about 5 minutes earlier from X49. The pilot stated that earlier that day he flew uneventfully from Punta Gorda, Florida, to X49, and after landing secured the engine and remained on the ground about 2 hours; no fuel or maintenance was performed while at X49. While on the ground at X49, he received a call, and based on that call, wanted to return to PGD rather than fly to SPG Airport as planned for lunch. While proceeding to his airplane he was asked if he could take the passenger to SPG for lunch. He agreed to do so, and both got into the airplane to depart. He (pilot) was seated in the left seat and the passenger was seated in the right seat. The pilot further stated that because the airplane was parked on grass which was soft, he needed a little bit of power to get out of the ruts created by the landing gear. He taxied to runway 14 and other airplanes departed ahead of him. The wind was from the east at 8 to 10 knots. Because of the short duration on the ground, the fact that the flight to X49 was uneventful, and the power application to get out of the parking spot, he did not perform an engine run-up. He estimated that the airplane had 16 gallons total fuel on-board at the time of engine start. He rolled onto the runway with all available runway ahead, applied the brakes, and added full power. The airplane accelerated but not as fast as he thought it should which he attributed to being on a grass runway. He also reported that it, “took a long time to get to 60 [mph]”, and when asked reported the grass was mowed and in good shape. About the point when he was considering aborting the takeoff, the airplane became airborne. The pilot estimated the takeoff roll was 1,000 feet (typical is 500 to 600 feet), with about 2,000 feet of runway remaining. At the point the airplane became airborne it was traveling at 60 miles-per-hour (mph). He also reported that the rotation point was farther down the runway than usual. He climbed to about 400 feet, cleared power lines, then the airplane began descending. He noticed trees ahead that he thought were not too far beneath the airplane. He maneuvered the airplane towards a clearing but while descending close to the ground, the right wing of the airplane collided with a tree spinning the airplane to the right. The airplane hit the ground right wing low which caused a postcrash fire that started on the right side of the airplane. He and the passenger undid their lapbelts and exited the airplane out each respective side. By the time he ran around to the right side of the airplane the passenger was already out of the airplane and on a road. The passenger stated that he had planned to fly to SPG as a passenger in another airplane; however, the pilot of that airplane declined to take him due to weight and balance considerations. He looked for another airplane to ride as a passenger to SPG, and the accident pilot advised he would fly him there. He did not notice any type of preflight inspection, and asked the pilot about the need to perform a preflight inspection to which he replied that he knew the airplane better than anybody else. He and the pilot boarded the airplane at the same time and he (passenger) was in the right front seat. After being seated the pilot buckled his lapbelt for him; the airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses. He was not briefed on the usage of the lapbelt, which he reported was fastened but loose. The pilot did not ask him his weight for weight and balance purposes, and he did not notice the pilot perform any weight and balance calculations. He donned his headset, and noted the pilot grab a card with handwriting. The pilot threw the card in the back of the airplane before starting the engine. After the engine was started, the passenger reported that the pilot applied ¾ throttle to get out of the parking spot, which did not seem right to him based on his flight experience in a Breezer airplane. The pilot taxied to runway 14, and when near the approach end of the runway there were 2 other airplanes there performing engine run-ups. He questioned the pilot about the need to perform an engine run-up, and the pilot replied that a run-up was not necessary because he had just landed about 2 hours earlier and the fact that he knew the airplane better than anybody else. The passenger further reported that the pilot taxied onto runway 14, applied full power and performed a rolling takeoff. About 1//2 way down the runway, the airplane was not airborne. Based on his aviation experience, he thought the pilot should have aborted the flight at that point. The pilot continued the takeoff roll and about ¾ down the runway with the nose landing gear still on the runway, the airplane felt light to him. At that point the pilot quickly pulled the control yoke then pushed it forward, followed by “very quickly” pulling it. The airplane became airborne and he described the wings as slowly rocking. The airplane began to slowly climb but it, “almost felt like it wasn’t supposed to be flying.” The pilot was pulling aft on the control yoke to climb but visually the airplane did not appear to be climbing even though the airplane was in a nose-high angle of attack. When the flight was over Highway 60, the pilot said, “woops” and the first and only time, He (passenger) glanced at the airspeed indicator noting it was at 70, but quickly decreased very quickly to 40; that was the last time he glanced at the airspeed indicator. The airplane impacted a tree on the right side causing the airplane to yaw to the right. The airplane then impacted the ground in a nose-low attitude, and he reported a slight gap in his memory. He reported gaining consciousness with fire all around him. Because he was not briefed on the lapbelt usage and he was unfamiliar with the kind of lapbelt he described as being a buckle type with a hinged clasp, he struggled to release his restraint. He pulled on the lapbelt and believed he became free of the lapbelt because fire destroyed the webbing. He exited the wreckage and ran away from the airplane walking on a road asking a nearby bystander for help. The individual provided him a blanket to rest his head as he laid on the ground. The passenger was airlifted by helicopter to the Tampa General Hospital where he was treated for his burns. While hospitalized the pilot visited the passenger and during the visit the passenger asked the pilot why he had not performed an engine run-up before takeoff and he replied that he was trained of the need to only perform an engine run-up 1 time a day regardless of the number of flights performed. During the visit the passenger’s mother who was in the room reported the pilot say he, “should have aborted the takeoff and doesn’t know why he didn’t.” The passenger was asked if he perceived any change in engine sound from the moment the pilot applied takeoff power to the point of the accident and he reported he could not recall; however, he added that he did not perceive any increase in engine sound between the point when the pilot applied takeoff power and the moment of impact. He was also asked at any point during the takeoff did he perceive any sputtering from the engine and he reported the only time he heard sputtering was when the pilot first attempted to start the engine. He was also asked how high the airplane climbed and he reported that a witness said the airplane climbed no higher than nearby powerlines. The passenger was asked if his lack of knowledge with the lapbelt contributed to his burn injuries and he reported in his estimation that he would have been burned to some extent, but he was not sure how much his knowledge on how to release his restraint could have mitigated his burn injuries. A witness who is an airframe and powerplant mechanic and was located about 100 yards from the departure end of runway 14 reported hearing the engine when the pilot taxied to the runway. Because of the distance between his position and the run-up area for runway 14 he was unable to hear clearly an engine run-up. He reported that when the airplane was at the departure end of runway 14, it was in a slight climb attitude, which was not too steep and about the height of power lines. He did not hear any sputtering sound from the engine but believed it was not developing full power only because he thought the airplane should have been higher based on the location. The witness further reported that, "...he didn’t hear any engine malfunction", but reported that the engine did not sound like the engine sound from other Ercoupe airplanes (3) he had heard in the past. The airplane did not appear to him to climb much between the departure end of the runway and the location of the power lines, and it appeared to be flat with respect to a climb attitude. The airplane then disappeared from his sight and he then diverted his attention to other duties. He did not see any smoke trailing the airplane. He then heard on a radio about the accident and grabbed a fire extinguisher and proceeded to the site. Following recovery of the airplane, the thermally damaged engine was examined by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness inspector. Hand rotation of the propeller which was still attached to the crankshaft flange revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Cold differential compression testing of all cylinders using 80 psi revealed the Nos. 1, 3, and 4 cylinders tested 0, while the No. 2 cylinder held 70 psi. The oil filter was cut open and no contaminants were reported. Both magnetos were determined to be properly timed to the engine; however, only the left magneto was noted to produce spark at all ignition leads during rotation of the magneto. The right magneto did not produce spark from any ignition leads during hand rotation of the magneto. Inspection of the interior of the right magneto revealed it had “corrosion throughout.” Further examination of the right magneto revealed the insulation of a wire was burned and the wire was fractured. The right magneto was retained for further examination. Examination of the right magneto was performed at a FAA certified repair station with FAA oversight. The magneto was determined to be manufactured by Eisemann, and was model LA-4, indicating it was for a four cylinder “light aircraft”, and the serial number was 46-40767. The magneto as first received was placed on a test bench and did not produce spark. The magneto was disassembled which revealed extensive internal corrosion and the FAA inspector noted it was “…excessively dirty”. The FAA inspector also reported that the points were excessively corroded and the electrical wire to the points had all the insulation cover burned exposing the conductor wire. Maintenance records and documents associated with the airplane located in the wreckage were recovered and noted to be heavily fire damaged. The examination of the documents revealed the airplane empty weight was 839.1 pounds, and the empty weight arm was 25.8 inches aft of datum. The gross weight was listed as 1,320 pounds, and the center of gravity (CG) range was listed to be 26.4 to 30.3 inches aft of datum. Weight and balance calculations were performed using the airplane empty weight (839.1), empty weight moment (21,648.78), the weight of the pilot per his NTSB interview (200 pounds), the weight of the passenger per his interview (155 pounds), the amount of fuel on-board per his NTSB interview (16 gallons or 96 pounds 100 low lead fuel), and the weight of oil (8.0 pounds). Based on those numbers, the airplane gross weight at the time of engine start was calculated to be approximately 1,298 pounds and the center of gravity was calculated to be 28.55 inches aft of datum. Weight calculations were also performed using the weight of the pilot reported by the FAA inspector-in-charge (approximately 230 pounds). Changing the pilot weight to 230 pounds resulted in a gross weight at engine start of approximately 1,328 pounds. The last annual inspection was signed off as being completed on December 14, 2010. The airplane total time at that time and recording tachometer time at that time were recorded to be approximately 1,963 hours and 1,025 hours, respectively. During an interview of the pilot 4 days after the accident, he was asked if the FAA had ever denied his medical application; he replied no. According to information from personnel from the FAA Aeromedical Certification Division, the pilot’s last special issuance medical certificate was dated June 14, 2006. The special issuance medical certificate was not valid for any class after June 30, 2007. In November 2006, he was issued a third class under a Special Issuance Authorization, which expired June 30, 2012. The authorization was contingent upon him sending medical reports at 12 month intervals. No new medical information was received by the Aeromedical Certification Division since the 2006 authorization; therefore, in August 2006, he was given a final agency denial by the FAA Administrator because he did not meet specified medical standards. According to 14 CFR Part 61.23, a pilot must have in his or her possession a medical certificate issued by FAA, or a U.S. driver’s license when exercising the privileges of a sport pilot certificate in a light sport aircraft other than glider or balloon. The regulation also indicates that a person using a U.S. driver’s license to meet the requirements must not have had his or her most recent Authorization for a Special Issuance of a medical certificate withdrawn. The pilot submitted an affidavit to the insurance adjuster indicating that at the time of the accident his pilot logbook was in the airplane and the logbook was “lost and./or destroyed” in the fire. He reported that his flight review was current, but was not able to contact the certified flight instructor who gave him his last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56.
The pilot’s failure to abort the takeoff after recognizing the airplane’s poor performance during the takeoff roll. Contributing to the passenger’s injuries was the pilot’s failure to provide a briefing on the use of the lapbelt, which delayed the passenger’s exit from the wreckage.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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