Newcomerstown, OH, USA
N110EB
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
About 5 minutes before the accident, when the airplane was in cruise flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), at 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl), and at 156 knots ground speed, an air traffic controller updated the altimeter setting via the radio. The pilot acknowledged the call, and his voice sounded normal. No other radio transmissions were received from the pilot, and he made no distress calls. Radar data showed that the airplane then began a descending right turn, that the airspeed increased slightly through the turn, and that the airspeed then suddenly decreased to 61 knots as the turn radius decreased. The airplane had turned about 270 degrees and descended to an altitude of 4,900 ft msl before radar contact was lost. A witness reported seeing the airplane coming out of the low clouds (the cloud ceiling was about 700 to 800 ft above ground level) in a nose-down descent with the wings about level before it disappeared behind a tree line. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies. Data from the on-board recoverable data module (RDM) showed an anomaly in the electrical bus voltages, autopilot mode changes, and a momentary dropout of the pilot transmission frequency. Specifically, the RDM data showed that the airplane was flying at 8,000 ft pressure altitude at an airspeed of 148 knots with the autopilot on when alternator 1 dropped offline followed by alternator 2 dropping offline; the airplane is equipped with a two-alternator, two-battery, 28-volt direct current electrical system. About 3 seconds later, the autopilot disengaged. The RDM data confirmed that the airplane then entered a descending right turn with the airspeed increasing slightly and then suddenly decreasing. The data further showed that the airplane then rolled right and that the pitch attitude sharply decreased. The airspeed then increased, and both the roll and pitch reversed back toward wings level before the data ended. The bolster switches for alternator 1, alternator 2, battery 1, battery 2, and the avionics were cycled "on" and "off" on an exemplar airplane to determine what may occur in the cockpit when the bolster switches are manually moved. Seven sets of various electrical bolster switch activations and deactivations were documented. During the tests, bolster switch operation on the exemplar airplane yielded recorded data similar to the accident flight data; however, the reason for the recorded electrical anomalies could not be determined because the RDM does not record the physical position of either the bolster switches or circuit breakers. The data did reveal that the airplane began its deviation off course and its subsequent descending right turn in IMC conditions a few seconds after the alternators went offline and that the pilot was likely attempting to troubleshoot the electrical anomaly with bolster switch activations and deactivations as the airplane descended and turned through the clouds. The electrical anomalies likely distracted the pilot and led to his subsequent loss of airplane control. The witness's statement that the airplane came out of the low clouds with the wings about level and the RDM data indicate that the pilot may have been able to recover from the turn and rapid descent to some degree but that there was insufficient altitude for a full recovery.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 21, 2012, approximately 1220 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp SR22, N110EB, registered to Photopheresis INC., of Morristown, New Jersey, was substantially damaged when it impacted heavily wooded terrain in the vicinity of Newcomerstown, Ohio. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal cross country flight. The flight originated at 1013 from the Somerset Airport (SMQ), and its intended destination was Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio. According to radar data and recorded radio communications provided to the NTSB by the FAA, approximately 5 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was in cruise flight at 8,000 feet msl at 156 knots ground speed, when Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) updated the altimeter setting via radio. The pilot acknowledged the call and his voice sounded normal. No other radio transmissions or distress calls were from received from the pilot after the altimeter setting acknowledgment. Radar data showed the airplane begin a descending right turn with airspeed increasing slightly through the turn and then suddenly decreasing to 61 knots as the radius of the turn decreased. The airplane had turned approximately 270 degrees of heading and descended to an altitude of 4,900 feet msl before radar contact was lost. There were no eye-witnesses to the accident, however, a boy who was a passenger of a car reported that he thought that he saw the airplane coming out of the low clouds in a descent, about wings level before it disappeared out of sight behind a tree line. The boy stated that he then saw black smoke. Recovered data from the on-board data module (RDM) showed an anomaly in the electrical bus voltages, autopilot mode changes, a momentary drop out of the pilot transmit frequency, and a descending right turn with a decreasing radius until impact. Detailed information is provided in the TESTS AND RESEARCH section of this report. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to FAA records, the pilot held a valid private pilot certificate with Airplane Single Engine Land (ASEL) and Instrument Airplane ratings. He held a valid third class medical certificate, issued April 28, 2010. At the time of his most recent medical exam, the pilot reported about 1,200 hours total flight time, of which 100 hours were within the preceding 6 months. The pilot attended and completed the Cirrus Standard Perspective Differences and Cirrus Turbo Differences Course on April 14, 2009. Additionally, he completed the Cirrus Icing Awareness Course on October 5, 2009. According to information provided by a flight instructor who had flown about once a month with the pilot in recent years, the pilot completed a successful bi-annual flight review in the SR22 on February 17, 2012. Remnants of the pilot's logbook were found at the accident site, but the contents were damaged from impact and could not be documented. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Cirrus SR22-3423, registration number, N110EB, received its standard airworthiness certificate on April 13, 2009. Cirrus records indicate that the pilot purchased the airplane new and took delivery on April 13, 2009. According to the records on file at Cirrus Aircraft, the airplane was equipped with: Garmin Perspective avionics with dual AHRRS and a single air data computer, Chartview, a GFC 700 autopilot with yaw dampener, Enhanced Vision System (EVS), Synthetic Vision, air conditioning, a Tornado Alley turbo-charging system, supplemental oxygen, engine monitoring, traffic alerting system, terrain awareness system (TAWS-B), XM weather/radio, FIKI, a Tanis heater, and a recoverable data module (RDM). The cover for the airframe, engine, and propeller logbooks were found at the accident site, but the pages were not located. The airplane was equipped with a two-alternator, two battery, 28-volt direct current (VDC) electrical system designed to reduce the risk of electrical system faults. The system provides uninterrupted power for avionics, flight instrumentation, lighting and other electrically operated and controlled systems during normal operation. The electrical system also provides automatic switching from either battery or alternator to the Essential Bus in the event of an electrical system failure by the opposing alternator or battery. The bolster panel contains the pilot switches for operating ALT 1, ALT 2, BAT 1, and BAT 2. The switches are mounted adjoining so that a pilot can control all four switches with a single hand. Power generated from the alternators is fed into the Master Control Unit (MCU). The MCU regulates and distributes the power to the batteries and the system loads. Each alternator provides constant charging current for the corresponding battery and primary power to the aircraft electrical system during normal system operation. The flight instructor who had given the pilot his most recent bi-annual flight review reported that there had been one instance whereby the autopilot had disengaged during a flight sometime in the fall of 2011. He recalled that the problem may have been associated with a battery issue, but could not recall all of the details. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was from Zanesville Municipal Airport (ZZV), Zanesville, Ohio, located approximately 24 miles southwest of the accident site at an elevation of 900 feet. The airport had an un-augmented ASOS and reported the following conditions at the approximate time of the accident: Zanesville (ZZV) special weather observation at 1222 EDT, automated, wind from 340º at 5 knots, visibility 7 miles in light rain, ceiling broken at 800 feet agl, overcast at 1,200 feet, temperature 6º C, dew point 4º C, altimeter 29.89 inches of Hg. Remarks - automated observation system, ceiling 600 variable 1,000 feet, hourly precipitation 0.01 inch. The pilot of N110EB contacted the Washington, DC, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contract Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) at 0745 EDT (1145Z) on April 21, 2012 and obtained a weather briefing and filed an IFR flight plan. A copy of the event reconstruction for that briefing was obtained and is included as Attachment 1 in the NTSB Meteorology Group Chairman's Factual Report. An audio file was also reviewed and documented to evaluate the accuracy and content of that briefing, which follows: The pilot initially contacted the AFSS for an outlook briefing for the flight departing at 0800 EDT on April 22, 2012. A complete meteorological factual report prepared by a NTSB meteorology specialist is available in the supporting docket for this report. FLIGHT RECORDERS The Recoverable Data Module (RDM) was located in the debris field and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington DC for evaluation and download. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION General The airplane's main wreckage was located on a heavily wooded hillside at 40°14'58.32" North latitude, 81°32'44.95" West longitude at an approximate elevation of 1,060 feet msl. The direction of energy was about 093 degrees magnetic. The hillside had a 10-degree up slope. The initial point of impact consisted of two trees about 31 feet apart. One tree had missing bark and tree scars on one of its large branches approximately 44 feet above the ground. The second tree's trunk was broke off approximately 34 feet above the ground. Three more tree trunks in the direction of energy ranging in size from 4-8 inches were freshly broken off. About 80 feet from the initial point of impact there was a 3-4 foot deep crater that measured approximately 11 feet long. Within the crater, the propeller hub remained attached to a portion of the crankshaft, which still had the #6 cylinder attached to it by the piston and connecting rod. There were two trees at the far end of the crater. The main wreckage including the firewall, engine, instrument panel, and center console, was found leaning uphill against the trees. The remainder of the airplane was severely fragmented and dispersed over a debris field that measured roughly 370 feet long by about 250 feet wide at its widest point. Evidence of spot fires were present throughout the debris field. Brown wilted vegetation was present that was consistent with fuel damage. Evidence at the site was consistent with the airplane impacting the trees about 25-30 degrees nose down and level wings. Engine The main portion of the engine was located approximately four feet from the impact crater and exhibited impact damage. The forward portion of the crankshaft and propeller hub, and the number six cylinder were located in the impact crater and was embedded the ground. Fractured pieces of the engine crankcase and oil sump were located in the impact crater along with a turbocharger, forward section of the cam shaft, parts of the propeller governor,and magneto drive gears. The engine and all components and accessories exhibited impact damage. The right magneto was separated from the engine, exhibited impact damage and the housing was fractured. The magneto was disassembled with no pre-impact anomalies noted. The left magneto was separated from the engine, exhibited impact damage and the housing was fractured exposing the internal parts of the magneto. The magneto was disassembled with no pre-impact anomalies noted. The ignition harness exhibited impact damage. The spark plugs exhibited impact damage and had light colored combustion deposits. The electrodes were normal when compared to the Champion Check A Plug chart. The fuel pump was fractured free of the engine and located in the debris field. The fuel pump exhibited impact damage. The drive coupling was fractured and only half of it was located. The fuel pump turned freely by hand using a screw driver. The fuel pump was disassembled and exhibited normal operating signatures. The oil pump remained attached to the engine. The cover was not removed due to damage to the oil pump housing studs. The oil sump exhibited impact damage and was fractured into several small pieces in the impact crater. Cylinder number six and a portion of the crankshaft were separated from the engine and located in the impact crater. Cylinder five was separated from the crankcase and remained attached to the crankshaft by the piston and connecting rod. All six cylinders exhibited impact damage. All cylinders were inspected using a lighted bore scope. The internal combustion chambers exhibited a material consistent with that of light combustion deposits. The cylinder bores were clear of scoring and no evidence of hard particle passage was observed in the cylinder bore ring travel area. Dirt was observed in the combustion chambers and all induction risers were fractured from the cylinders. Impact damage to the valve train, rocker arms and rocker arm covers was observed. The rocker arm covers were removed and those that were not breached contained a residue of oil. All damage noted was consistent with impact damage. The crankcase exhibited impact damage and the forward section was fragmented. The accessory portion of the crankcase was fractured. The crankshaft was fractured between the number 5 and number 6 rod journals. The forward portion of the crankshaft was separated from the crankcase and the propeller hub remained attached to the propeller flange. The camshaft gear and magneto drive gears were found in the wreckage and exhibited impact damage.The starter was fractured at its base and exhibited impact damage. The base remained attached to the starter adaptor and the other half of the starter remained attached to the firewall by a cable.The propeller hub remained attached to the engine crankshaft propeller flange. All three of the composite propeller blades were fractured near the hub and located in the debris path. All three blades exhibited nicks, gouges, and portions of the blades were missing. Fuselage and Cabin Section The fuselage was severely fragmented along the debris path. Both crew doors were fragmented. Larger portions of the upper and lower sections of both doors were located within the debris field. The latching mechanisms for the upper and lower latches for both doors were located and exhibited impact damage. The baggage door was found separated from the fuselage and exhibited impact damage. All the seats were fragmented. The left front crew seat airbag was deployed. A large portion of the right front crew seat was hanging in a tree and was not accessible for examination. The right front airbag could be seen and was deployed. Cockpit Switch positions and settings could not be documented due to severe impact damage. A flight bag, Jeppesen chart notebooks, airplane manuals, and miscellaneous items (baggage tie down straps, fuel sampler cup, etc.) were present in the debris field. A rolled up set of sun reflector mats were present in the debris field. The pilot's logbook was present in debris field. It had sustained fire damage and no usable information was obtained. A propeller logbook binder cover was present in the debris field. Pages from the propeller logbook were not recovered. The cover for the airframe logbook was located in the debris field. Pages from the logbook were not recovered. Seats and Restraints All the seats were fragmented. The left front crew seat airbag was deployed. A large portion of the right front crew seat was hanging in a tree and was not accessible for examination. The right front airbag could be seen and was deployed. Wing Section and Control Surfaces The wing was found severely fragmented. Three main pieces of aileron were identified in the debris field that made up the majority of the left aileron. Two main pieces of the left flap were located in the debris field that made up the majority of the left flap. The right flap was found separated from the wing and exhibited fire and impact damage. Three pieces of aileron were identified in the debris field that made up the majority of the right aileron. About 4 feet of the center aileron control cable was found from the left hand turnbuckle to the console aileron actuation pulley. The cable was fractured at the console aileron actuation pulley. When visually examined, the fracture had a broom straw appearance consistent with tension overload. The other end of the cable was fractured at the turnbuckle. Two sections of aileron control cable were located in the debris field with the flap hinge assemblies present on the cable. When visually examined, both sections of control cable had fractures with a broom straw appearance consistent with tension overload. The roll trim motor position could not be determined due to impact damage. The flap actuator shaft was found separated from the flap motor. When the flap motor components were laid out together the shaft extension was approximately 4 inches which was consistent with the flaps being in and 'UP' position. Empennage and Stabilizers The empennage was mostly fragmented. The horizontal stabilizer was found separated from the empennage and exhibited impact damage, with both the upper and lower skins mostly intact. Both elevators were separated from the horizontal stabilizer and exhibited impact damage. The pitch trim motor was in a neutral position. Elevator control cable continuity was confirmed. The vertical stabilizer was found fragmented. The rudder was separated from the vertical stabilizer and exhibited impact damage. Rudder control cable continuity was confirmed. Landing Gear The nose landing gear assembly separated from the airplane and exhibited impact damage. The left main landing gear and its surrounding mounting structure separated from the wing and exhibited impact damage. The right main landing gear was fragmented. Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) The CAPS safety pin was located in the debris field and evidence at the site was consistent with the system not being deployed prior to impact. The activation handle was found separated from the activation cable and wa
The pilot’s loss of airplane control in instrument meteorological conditions due to his distraction by electrical system anomalies, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent. The reason for the electrical system anomalies could not be determined.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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