Duck Creek Village, UT, USA
N187PG
CIRRUS SR20
The airplane collided with remote mountainous terrain in an inverted position during the second leg of a cross-country flight in day visual meteorological conditions. Recorded data recovered from the airplane revealed that about 40 minutes into the flight, the airplane reached its highest recorded altitude of 7,847 feet mean sea level (msl). At this time, the airplane was about 4 miles from a mountain ridge directly ahead, the lowest point of which was 8,470 feet msl, with terrain elevations of more than 9,000 feet msl on both sides. The airplane’s recovered electronic data revealed that the airplane’s stall warning system activated about 3 minutes before the accident and remained on for most of the remaining recorded data. The data indicated that the airplane rolled steeply to the left, briefly recovered and pitched up 10 to 15 degrees, and then rolled to the left in a nearly 67-degree inverted nose-down attitude before impacting terrain. Postaccident calculations indicated that at the time of the accident, the airplane was likely being flown close to the airplane’s stall speed. The pilot, who had rented the airplane, had extensive rotorcraft/helicopter flight experience but had accumulated only about 160 hours total flight time in fixed wing airplanes, with about 17 hours in the accident airplane make and model. The pilot’s most recent flight in the make and model of the accident airplane took place about 18 months before the accident flight. Postaccident interviews with personnel from the company that rented the airplane revealed that, on a previous occasion, the pilot had been observed overloading the airplane and was advised that he could not take that much baggage on the flight. The company personnel further stated that on the morning of the accident, after the company fueled the airplane for the pilot’s flight, the pilot taxied the airplane to another area on the airport where he loaded his passengers and baggage. This location was about 1/4 mile away and was not visible from the company’s facility. The calculated density altitude at the time of the accident was 9,287 feet, which would have been detrimental to the airplane’s climb performance, especially if the airplane was overloaded. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilot was unable to maintain sufficient airspeed to climb the airplane over the high terrain, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Further, it is likely that a combination of the pilot overloading the airplane before taking off and the high density altitude conditions would have resulted in the airplane’s reduced climb performance. Further, the pilot’s lack of total experience operating fixed wing airplanes in mountainous terrain likely negatively affected his decision to attempt to fly over the mountainous terrain with the given conditions and contributed to the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On May 29, 2012, about 1258 mountain daylight time, a Cirrus SR20 airplane, N187PG, was substantially damaged following impact with remote mountainous terrain while maneuvering near Duck Creek Village, Utah. The rental airplane was operated by Elite Aviation of the North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), Las Vegas, Nevada. The certified private pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight, which was being operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and no flight plan had been filed. The flight departed the Mesquite Airport (67L), about 1114 Pacific daylight time, with Bryce Canyon Airport (BCE), Bryce Canyon, Utah, as its reported destination. The investigation revealed that the purpose of the flight was for the pilot and his three passengers to fly to Bryce Canyon for a fishing trip; fishing rods, tackle, and fishing licenses were located at the accident site. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot activated a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan in Las Vegas at 0954, and subsequently canceled it after flying clear of McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, Class Bravo (B) airspace about 1005. When the airplane departed VGT, it had 41 gallons of aviation fuel on board. At the time of departure from VGT, the airplane was estimated to be over its maximum gross takeoff weight limitation by 210 pounds. After departing VGT, the pilot flew direct to the Mesquite Airport (67L), Mesquite, Nevada, where it landed about 1100. Recorded non-volatile memory data revealed that the airplane had consumed 7.6 gallons of fuel during the flight. Prior to departing 67L, the pilot added about 10 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. The airplane subsequently departed 67L for BCE about 1214, a flight of approximately 105 nautical miles (nm). At the time of departure, the airplane was estimated to be in excess of its maximum takeoff weight by about 225 pounds. According to radar data, about 1245, which was about 30 minutes after departure from 67L, the airplane was climbing through 6,600 feet mean sea level (msl) on a northeasterly heading. At 1250, it was ascending through 7,100 feet msl, and at 1254:28 the airplane reached its highest recorded altitude for the flight, which was 7,847 feet msl. At this time, and directly in front of the airplane about 4 miles distant, was rising terrain; the lowest ridge was 8,470 feet high, with terrain measuring more than 9,000 feet in elevation bordering the ridge on both sides. Data recovered from the airplane’s Recoverable Data Module (RDM)revealed that about 3 minutes prior to the accident, at 1255:10, the stall warning activated for the majority of the remaining 188 seconds of recorded data. At 1257:57, the airplane began a roll excursion to the left and reached a 54-degree, left wing down attitude, before briefly recovering to 8 degrees left wing down. The airplane then rolled to the left in a nearly inverted attitude at the end of the data. The airplane was in a climb attitude of between 10 to 15 degrees of pitch until about 1258:11, when it pitched to a 67-degree nose down attitude at the end of the data, which was recorded at 1258:20. Local law enforcement personnel located the wreckage about 1930 on May 30, 2012. The airplane came to rest inverted on the west face of a mountain ridge, and about 100 feet below the top of the crest. An onsite examination of the wreckage revealed that all components necessary for flight were accounted for. The wreckage was recovered to a secured storage facility for further examination. In a statement provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), the Mesquite Airport facility manager reported that on the day of the accident, while he was refueling another airplane at the fueling island, he instructed the accident airplane as it pulled up to the fuel pump. He said that one of the four men in the airplane mentioned to him that they were all helicopter pilots, and that another one who was doing the refueling said that the fuel in the right wing was above the tab, and that he added fuel to the left side to balance it out; 9.98 gallons of fuel was added to the left tank. The witness further stated that as the men were boarding the airplane, he heard one of them ask whose turn it was to take the front seat. He concluded by stating that after taking off he observed the airplane do one touch-and-go, and then heard someone say that it looked like [the airplane] took an unusually long time to [gain] altitude. Elite Aviation rented the airplane to the pilot. A post-accident interview with their management personnel revealed that the pilot refueled the airplane at their facility. He then taxied the airplane to another area on the airport to load his passengers and baggage. This location was about 0.25 miles away from the Elite facility, and was not visible from their business. Elite personnel also reported that on a previous occasion, which occurred just after the accident pilot had been checked out in the airplane, he was observed loading the airplane for a flight. Elite management personnel noticed that the airplane would be overweight, at which time the pilot was informed that he could not take that much baggage on the flight. Also during the interview, Elite management personnel revealed that the accident pilot would always try to circumvent things with the female office receptionists, but not with any of the male office personnel. In one instance, it was described that the accident pilot mentioned to the wife of one of the company’s owners that he could fly the rental airplane without renter’s insurance; the company co-owner said that this was not true. Elite personnel also reported that there were a few times when the accident pilot attempted to bargain airplane rental fees. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Pilot number 1 (pilot-in-command who occupied the right front cockpit seat position) The pilot, age 44, possessed an Airline Transport Pilot certificate and flight instructor certificate for rotorcraft-helicopter. He also held a private pilot certificate, issued on May 7, 2010, for airplane single-engine land, and also possessed an instrument airplane rating. The pilot received his most recent second-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate on December 1, 2011, with no limitations noted. At the time of the accident, the pilot was employed as a commercial helicopter pilot by a local sightseeing and tour company, which was based in Las Vegas, Nevada. A review of the pilot’s personal and company flight records revealed that he had accumulated a total time in all aircraft of 5,668 hours, of which 5,465 hours were in helicopters and 160 hours were in airplanes. Additionally, the pilot had logged 1,003 hours of flight instruction given in helicopters. It was also revealed that as of March 31, 2012, the pilot had a total time of 109.5 hours in all Cirrus aircraft, which included 43.1 hours in the accident make and model, the SR20, and 66.4 hours in the SR22. Records indicated that the pilot’s most recent flight in an SR20 airplane prior to the accident flight was conducted on September 15, 2010, at which time he had accumulated a total of 16.7 hours as pilot in command in make and model. Pilot number 2 (left front cockpit seat position) The pilot, age 31, possessed a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter instrument helicopter ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate, with rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings. Additionally, the pilot held a mechanic’s certificate with an airframe rating. The pilot’s most recent second-class FAA medical certificate was dated July 6, 2011, with no limitations. He did not possess a pilot certificate for airplanes. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a Cirrus Design model SR20, serial number 1892. It was a four-place, low wing, single-engine airplane, with a tricycle landing gear configuration. The airplane was issued an FAA normal category standard airworthiness certificate on January 14, 2008. It was equipped with Avidyne MFD & PFD, STEC 55X, dual Garmin GNS 430s, EMax, Stormscope, Skywatch, and an Xm weather/radio. The airplane was powered by a 210-horsepower Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) IO-360-ES21 six-cylinder, reciprocating engine, serial number 360550. The engine was manufactured on December 2, 2007 A review of the operator’s maintenance records revealed that the airplane’s most recent annual inspection was performed on May 3, 2012, at an airplane total time of 1,739.6 hours. The most recent 100-hour inspection was performed on May 23, 2012, at an airplane total time of 1,839.6 hours. When examined at the post-accident layout examination, the HOBBS meter for the accident airplane indicated 2,068.4 hours. The FLIGHT Hobbs meter indicated 1,847.2 hours. WEIGHT AND BALANCE During the investigation, and with data recovered from the airplane’s Recoverable Data Module (RDM), weight and balance computations were calculated by Cirrus Aircraft and confirmed by the IIC for the takeoffs at both VGT and 67L, as well as for the estimated condition about the time of the accident. With 41 gallons of fuel on board and considering the medical weights of the four occupants and weighed baggage, it was calculated that the airplane was 207 pounds over the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) of 3,050 pounds when it departed VGT. After the calculated fuel burn from VGT to 67L and refueling after landing, the airplane was estimated to be about 221 pounds over the MTOW when it departed 67L. It was further calculated that the airplane was 177 pounds in excess of its maximum gross weight near the time of the accident. (Refer to the weight and balance calculations located in the Cirrus Final Mishap Report for additional details.) PERFORMANCE During the investigation, and at the request of the IIC, a Cirrus Aircraft Flight Test Engineer reviewed the non-volatile memory data to determine the climb performance of the accident airplane. The engineer reported that just prior to the loss of control the pressure altitude was 7,250 feet msl, and the outside air temperature was 15.5 degrees Celsius (C). Based on Cirrus certification data for climb performance, the airplane loaded to 3,227 pounds should have been able to climb at +375 feet per minute, assuming that the engine was operating normally at the maximum available power of 2,700 revolutions per minute (rpm) and that the best rate of climb (Vy) of 93 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) was being flown by the pilot. The engineer also reported that based on the Cirrus engine power model and the recorded engine data, at 1856:20, the engine should have been producing 108 horsepower. Further, applying this reduced engine power to the Cirrus certification data, the climb performance would have been reduced to +22 feet per minute, again assuming that Vy was being flown by the pilot. The engineer added that the data appeared to indicate that the airplane was not being flown at Vy at this point in time, but in fact the airspeed was nearly at stall, which was 73 knots indicated airspeed (IAS). The engineer added that as the speed decreases towards a stall, the climb performance is reduced to zero. The 0% flap stall speed for the SR20 at 3,050 pounds is 69 knots IAS. Correcting for a weight of 3,227 pounds yields a stall speed of 71 knots IAS. METEROROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1258, the weather reporting facility located at Swains Creek, Utah, which was about 9 nautical miles east-northeast of the accident site, reported wind from the southwest at 6 miles per hour (mph), gust at 8 mph, temperature 80 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 23 degrees F, sky clear, and an altimeter setting of 30.21 inches of mercury. At 1253, the recorded weather observation at the Cedar City Regional Airport (CDC), Cedar City, Utah, which is located about 26 nautical miles northwest of the accident site, reported wind variable at 4 knots gusting to 17 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 75 degree F, dew point 14 degrees F, and an altimeter setting of 30.10 inches of mercury. A Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) for Bryce Canyon Airport (BCE), which was issued at 1143 on May 29, 2012, and was valid from 1200 May 29 to 1200 May 30, revealed wind 220 degrees at 10 knots, with gusts to 18 knots, sky clear, and visibility greater than 6 miles. There were no AIRMETS or SIGMETS in effect in the vicinity and timeframe of the accident. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION An on-site examination of the wreckage was conducted under the supervision of the NTSB IIC, who was accompanied by representatives from the FAA, Cirrus Aircraft Design, and CMI. A detailed survey of the wreckage revealed that all components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. The accident site was located in mountainous terrain about 7 nm southwest of Duck Creek Village, Utah, on the west face of a ridge about 100 feet below the top of the crest. A GPS reading taken at the site revealed that the main wreckage was located at 37 degrees 26.101 minutes north latitude and 112 degrees 45.899 west longitude, at an elevation of 7,172 feet msl. The main wreckage came to rest inverted on a measured magnetic heading of about 180 degrees, and the energy path was oriented on a measured magnetic heading of 277 degrees. A tall pine tree between 20 to 25 feet tall was located uphill about 15 to 20 feet from the initial point of impact. There were no signatures observed to the tree consistent with impact by the airplane. The initial point of impact was evidenced by various shrubs and branches that had been cut off at a 15 to 20 degree angle to the ground. Immediately adjacent to the shrubs and down slope, a ground scar was observed in the dirt. The ground scar widened out downhill in line with the main wreckage, and contained multiple window fragments throughout the area. Facing downhill from the initial point of impact, another pine tree, about 8 inches in diameter and located on the right side of the debris field, was observed broken off about 1 foot above the ground. On the left side of the energy path, a third pine tree, about 1 foot in diameter, had stripped bark missing from its trunk, about 2 to 4 feet above the ground. The airplane’s propeller was observed separated from the engine, and laying on the ground partially hidden by shrubs. The two trees were estimated to be about 20 to 25 feet apart. The main wreckage came to rest 52 feet from the initial point of impact. The forward fuselage was heavily damaged. The engine and engine compartment were found embedded in the ground, with fragments of the upper cowling and windscreen located uphill from the main wreckage. The forward cabin was observed crushed aft, with the instrument panel crushed and fragmented. The right cabin door separated from the fuselage and was located near the initial point of impact. The left cabin door was fractured into two main pieces consisting of the top and bottom halves. The baggage compartment door separated from the airplane. All three doors exhibited impact damage. The left wing was fractured and separated laterally at the inboard aileron attachment point. The wing was also fractured laterally about 2 feet further outboard. The inboard section of the wing contained 45-degree wrinkling starting forward inboard and then going aft outboard. The left flap was observed basically intact, however, it did contain some downward bending at the outboard most corner. The left aileron was also mostly intact, but was fractured and separated from all attach points. The aileron was observed bent and wrinkled. The left fuel cap was secured, and the fuel cap tab was extended. The fuel tank was breached. The left main landing gear sustained minimal damage. The forward most area of the wheel pant was cracked. The right wing was observed fractured and separated at mid-span. Scratches along the longitudinal axis were also observed with organic debris adhering to the underside of the wing. The right flap was wrinkled throughout its span. The flap hinge was bent outboa
The pilot's failure to maintain sufficient airspeed and airplane control while maneuvering a heavily loaded airplane over high mountainous terrain in a high density altitude environment. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of experience operating fixed wing airplanes in such an environment.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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