Lansing, IL, USA
N717EW
WIGGINS AIR BOSS
The accident occurred during a flight test of the experimental gyroplane. A witness reported seeing the gyroplane yaw nose left and roll right shortly after liftoff. The gyroplane then descended briefly before it rolled back to level and entered a climb. The gyroplane climbed to about 100 feet above the ground while continuing to fly on the runway heading before it yawed nose left again, entered a right roll, and descended rapidly into a cornfield south of the runway. Another witness reported that he heard the gyroplane's engine running until the gyroplane impacted terrain. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation of the gyroplane. The private pilot did not possess a rotorcraft rating; however, federal aviation regulations allow certificated pilots to operate experimental aircraft without an applicable category or class rating. A gyroplane flight instructor reported that he had provided the pilot 1.8 hours of familiarization training in another gyroplane more than 3 months before the accident. He added that the accident pilot told him that he had not flown in over 20 years. Additionally, no record was found indicating that the pilot received any flight training in gyroplanes subsequent to the familiarization training. It is likely that the pilot's overall lack of familiarity with the operation of gyroplanes resulted in his failure to maintain control during the accident flight.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 10, 2012, about 1100 central daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Wiggins model Air Boss gyroplane, N717EW, was destroyed when it collided with terrain at the Lansing Municipal Airport (IGQ), Lansing, Illinois. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The gyroplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local test flight that was originating at the time of the accident. A witness reported that he was watching the pilot test fly his recently completed gyroplane. The test flights consisted of the gyroplane temporarily becoming airborne and then landing on the remaining runway. He stated that the pilot completed three full-stop landings on runway 18 before he taxied back to the hangar. After the flight, the pilot remarked that the gyroplane's flight controls felt "mushy" during the test flights. The witness, a gyroplane pilot, reported that the main landing gear had remained parallel to the runway after each of the takeoffs and that he believed the gyroplane had been flying on the "backside of the power curve" (also known as the region of reversed command; a low-speed flight condition where a decrease in airspeed must be accompanied by an increased power setting in order to maintain steady flight). The witness also remarked that on at least one takeoff the gyroplane had yawed nose left (tail right) shortly after liftoff, but it had realigned with the runway heading before each landing. The witness reported that he agreed to continue to watch the pilot perform additional takeoff-and-landings. He stated that on the next takeoff, shortly after liftoff from runway 18, the accident gyroplane again yawed nose left (tail right) and rolled to the right. The gyroplane then descended briefly from an altitude of 20 feet above the runway before it rolled back to level and entered a climb. The gyroplane then climbed to about 100 feet above ground level (agl) while continuing on the runway heading. The witness reported that since the gyroplane had attained significant altitude, he transmitted to the pilot that he should continue around the traffic pattern instead of attempting to land on the remaining runway. The gyroplane continued to fly on the runway heading before it was observed to yaw nose left (tail right), enter a right roll, and descend rapidly into a cornfield south of the runway. Another individual, who was working outside his residence adjacent to the airport property, reported that he heard the gyroplane's engine running until he heard a sound similar to ground impact. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 66, held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating, which was originally issued on March 19, 1971. The pilot's last aviation medical examination was completed on December 11, 1980, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings. A flight logbook was located in the pilot's vehicle following the accident; however, the logbook was void of any flight entries or any historical pilot data. The pilot's previous flight logbook was not recovered during the investigation. The pilot reported having 350 hours total flight experience when he applied for his latest medical certificate in December 1980. The pilot reportedly had not flown in over 20 years before receiving 1.8 hours of familiarization training in a two-seat gyroplane in May 2012. There was no record that the pilot had received any additional flight training in gyroplanes subsequent to the two familiarization flights. Although the pilot held a private pilot certificate for single-engine land airplanes, he did not possess a category classification for rotorcraft (which includes gyroplanes). However, federal aviation regulations allow certificated pilots to operate non-type certificated (experimental) aircraft without an applicable category or class rating. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe accident gyroplane was an experimental, amateur-built, 2012 Wiggins model Air Boss, serial number (s/n) 001. A four-cylinder, 2.2 liter, Subaru model EJ22 reciprocating engine, s/n 902149, powered the gyroplane. The engine provided thrust through a fixed-pitch, three blade, Warp Drive carbon-composite propeller. The gyroplane seated a single individual, and had an empty weight and a maximum takeoff weight of 641 pounds and 940 pounds, respectively. On September 5, 2012, the accident gyroplane was issued an experimental airworthiness certificate and associated operating limitations, by a designated airworthiness representative. Several individuals reported that the pilot had built the gyroplane over a period of several years and that he had recently begun ground and flight testing. At the time of the accident, the airplane was still operating under the restrictions of the 40-hour initial flight test phase. However, the investigation was unable to determine the exact number of flight hours the gyroplane had accumulated in the five-days since it had been issued its airworthiness certificate. An examination of the gyroplane's electronic flight indication system (EFIS) revealed substantial impact damage that required the removal of its non-volatile memory for download in a surrogate unit. The recovered data, for unknown reasons, was partly corrupted; however, it did suggest that the gyroplane had completed 3 flights, totaling 1 hour 6 minutes. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1115, the airport's automatic weather observing station reported the following weather conditions: wind from 190 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 21 degrees Celsius, dew point 08 degrees Celsius, and altimeter 30.24 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe accident gyroplane was an experimental, amateur-built, 2012 Wiggins model Air Boss, serial number (s/n) 001. A four-cylinder, 2.2 liter, Subaru model EJ22 reciprocating engine, s/n 902149, powered the gyroplane. The engine provided thrust through a fixed-pitch, three blade, Warp Drive carbon-composite propeller. The gyroplane seated a single individual, and had an empty weight and a maximum takeoff weight of 641 pounds and 940 pounds, respectively. On September 5, 2012, the accident gyroplane was issued an experimental airworthiness certificate and associated operating limitations, by a designated airworthiness representative. Several individuals reported that the pilot had built the gyroplane over a period of several years and that he had recently begun ground and flight testing. At the time of the accident, the airplane was still operating under the restrictions of the 40-hour initial flight test phase. However, the investigation was unable to determine the exact number of flight hours the gyroplane had accumulated in the five-days since it had been issued its airworthiness certificate. An examination of the gyroplane's electronic flight indication system (EFIS) revealed substantial impact damage that required the removal of its non-volatile memory for download in a surrogate unit. The recovered data, for unknown reasons, was partly corrupted; however, it did suggest that the gyroplane had completed 3 flights, totaling 1 hour 6 minutes. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONA postaccident airframe investigation confirmed that all airframe structural components were located at the accident site. The main wreckage was located on the extended centerline of runway 18, about 0.2 miles south of the departure threshold. The initial point-of-impact was a ground depression consistent with a main rotor blade impact. The main wreckage was located 59 feet south of this initial point-of-impact. The main wreckage consisted of the tubular fuselage structure and fiberglass enclosure, landing gear, cockpit, flight controls, engine, and main rotor assembly. The empennage had separated from the fuselage and was located 21 feet to the southeast of the main wreckage. Both main rotor blades remained attached to the mast head and exhibited impact damage. Cyclic control continuity could not be established aft of the main cabin due to impact damage; however, all observed cyclic control tube separations exhibited fracture features consistent with overstress failure. One of the two push-pull tubes that connected to the mast head was not located during the on-scene examination. Rudder control cable continuity was confirmed from the cockpit pedals to the empennage control horn assembly. The vertical stabilizer torque tube had separated from the control horn assembly; however, the observed fracture features were consistent with an overstress separation. The pilot seat also functioned as the fuel tank. The plastic fuel tank seat had several ruptures and was void of fuel. There was the smell of automobile gasoline at the accident site. The fuel filter assembly contained automobile gasoline. The fuel shut-off valve was found open by first responders, but was subsequently closed by fire department personnel. The airframe battery leads were also disconnected by first responders. The two fuel pumps functioned when electric power was applied during postaccident testing. A postaccident engine examination confirmed internal drivetrain and valve train continuity as the engine crankshaft was rotated. Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine operation. There were no obstructions between the air filter housing and the carburetor inlet. The carburetor bowl contained fuel. Mechanical continuity was confirmed from the cockpit engine controls to their respective engine components. All three composite propeller blades had separated from the metal hub assembly, consistent with propeller rotation at impact. The postaccident examination revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the gyroplane. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONOn September 14, 2012, an autopsy was performed on the pilot at the Lake County Morgue, located in Crown Point, Indiana. The cause of death for the pilot was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during the pilot's autopsy. No carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, or drugs were detected.
The pilot's failure to obtain adequate familiarization with gyroplane operations before attempting a flight test of the recently completed gyroplane, which resulted in his failure to maintain control during the accident flight.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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